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Abstract 
This study seeks to establish a link between Girard's mimetic 
anthropology and the Biblical notion that man is created in the image 
and likeness of God. While Girard developed deliberately an anthropology 
without reference to theology, this study - in an attempt to show that 
human mimesis makes also sense theologically - has taken creation 
theology as its starting point. By reviewing three Girardian authors, 
Alison, Bailie and Schwager, the thesis that mimesis belongs to man as a 
creature before God and is therefore inseparable from his response to 
God and from man's representational role in creation was further 
developed. To test it, the Genesis Prologue, contemporary trinitarian 
discourse and the life of Jesus were probed for the presence of mimetic 
patterns. The findings showed that the phenomenon of human mimesis 
seems to be profoundly linked to the purposes of God in creation and 
redemption. The Biblical dictum of man's creation in God's image means 
that humanity was conceived in and created as the earthly counterpart 
of trinitarian love. Therefore, the conclusion that the origin of human 
mimesis must ultimately be traced to the Trinity itself in whose image 
human existence has its being is seen as reasonable. At the same time, 
human mimesis in its present condition, represents at best a structure 
of hope for man's inner core of imitative desire fixated in acquisitive 
mode may be converted to one that imitates Christ's sacrificial love so 
that in the final analysis, human mimesis exists for doxological reasons. 
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PREFACE 
It is the work of anthropology--especially Christian anthropology-­
to address questions regarding the ontological and cultural boundary 
between what is human and what is inhuman. As history so 
emphatically reminds us, the re-working of our understanding of that 
boundary is an ongoing necessity. 1
From time to time in the course of life's journey, one encounters 
providential moments, where one's intellectual and spiritual life takes an 
unexpected, and even unalterable turn. Such a moment arose for me two 
years ago during a Theology of Hope Seminar under Professor Tony Kelly 
which introduced me to Rene Girard's mimetic theory. Curiosity grew 
into fascination and my initial intuitive perception (tempered at first by a 
good dose of evangelical skepsis) blossomed into the comprehension that 
I was dealing with a significant hermeneutical key. Further reading 
confirmed that others not just shared this perception, but had already 
traveled a long distance on the road of exploring its significance for 
contemporary theology and biblical interpretation.2 
This research proposal was conceived out of the growing desire to 
contribute somehow to the creative and expository challenge involved in 
the contemporary re-working of our understanding of what it means to 
be human. Since God is the Creator of all reality, we can in our 
1 Jacques Ellul wrote: "Man has ceased for us to have objective reality. We are more and more plunged 
into this abstraction ... we can no longer communicate with the man whom we meet ... for man has 
disappeared. I le remains in the form of the consumer, the workman, the citizen, the reader, the producer ... 
man as man has disappeared, yet it is to him alone that one can really speak" [J. Ellul, The Presence of the 
Kingdom (Colorado Springs: Helmers and Howard, 1989, 2nd ed.), p. 94-95]. 
1 
theological reflections "lay claim to the human phenomena described in 
the anthropological disciplines", wrote Pannenberg, and accept their 
descriptions as a "provisional version" on the assumption that the 
anthropological phenomena contain yet undeveloped, but theologically 
relevant substance. Therefore, it is not just possible, but necessary that 
such critical appropriation is undertaken for the advancement of the 
theological enterprise.3 Hence my conviction that Girard's theory 
presents a fertile sweep of intellectual soil where some serious digging 
and cultivating is bound to yield a rich crop. 
"We all desire to be desired by the One we desire", wrote Sebastian 
Moore.4 This catchy play on words expresses the core of Girard's 
anthropology, as I understand it. That He desires us indeed is the 
mystery of God's love in Christ, for He first loved us and in the embrace 
of His love I offer this thesis in return. 
* * *
That I have preserved the traditional names of Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit (together with the appropriate pronouns "he" and "his") 
should not be seen as evidence that I follow or advocate a patriarchal let 
alone oppressive version of Christianity. A proper biblical understanding 
of these names would rather lead to the opposite conclusion. When 
2 Refer to the following authors in the Bibliography: Alison, J., Bailie, G., Gans, E., Grote, J., Hamerton­
!(elly, It, Kerr, F., Marr, A., McKcnna, A. J., Palaver, W., Sandler, W., Schwager, R., Williams, J. 
' W. Pannenberg, What is man'! Contemporary Anthropology in Christian Perspective (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1970), p. 19-20 
4 S. Moore, 71ie Fire And The Rose Are One (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1980), p. xii
2 
speaking of human beings, I have in most cases used the inclusive word 
"man" (also with the pronoun "he" and "his") like the German Mensch
without implying a male gender bias. Important as they are m 
conjunction with a re-reading of the "image of God", this study does not 
deal with feminist issues. 
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PART 1 HYPOTHESIS STATED 
CHAPTER 1 LITERATURE REVIEW, HYPOTHESIS AND 
METHODOLOGY 
1.1 Background 
During an initial review of the literature, it became clear that not 
only Girard, but also his followers seem to have left the question of 
man's origin as a creature made in the image and likeness of God to one 
side. According to Christian tradition, Gen 1 :26-28 makes an important 
statement of theological anthropology. Its importance, however, does not 
register in Girardian thought. Leaving such a gap seemed to omit from 
consideration man's primeval significance as a creature and by 
implication the question of God as Creator of humanity. On further 
reflection, this omission presented itself as a window upon which to 
center a study proposal, the details of which are outlined below. At this 
point a somewhat general statement shall suffice to describe the scope of 
this thesis: I propose to examine the relation between Girard's theory 
and the "image of God". 
1.11 Girard's Theory 
Theologically speaking, for human beings to enter a responsible 
relationship with God, they must be accorded a certain degree of 
freedom. Setting aside the question how such freedom may be realized 
given the universal presence of sin, many causes of human suffering are 
4 
not necessarily attributable to the ill-will or moral failure of individuals 
but to collective processes operative in society beyond the control of 
individual participants. What Girard's theory illuminates are the 
collective interdependencies in which human beings become so 
entangled that they forfeit their power to act pacifically and beneficially.5
Girard first noticed that interactions of human beings as reflected 
in the great literary texts from antiquity to the present were based on the 
interplay of imitation and desire. He formulated his insight as what has 
become known as 'mimetic theory' or his understanding of the structure 
of human desire. It postulates that every person is more determined by 
imitation or mimesis of other people's desires than by the existence of 
natural drives or the autonomous operation of a free will. He noticed that 
it was not the intrinsic value of an object which determined human 
desire, but its value in the eyes of another. Therefore, he reasoned, all 
human desire is mediated desire, which arises through the presence of a 
mediator, who models the desirability of the object before us. In other 
words, Girard sees the human being - contrary to rationalistic 
anthropology - as an impassioned being, yet no longer equipped with an 
instinctive orientation towards 'naturally attractive' objects once its basic 
needs are met. Consequently, the presence of "indeterminate desire" 
remains as nature's constant in man and constitutes that which is 
specifically human.6 
According to mimetic theory, the structure of human desire is a 
triangular relationship between the desiring individual, the object of 
1 
W. Sandler, "l3efreiung der I3egierde: Thcologic zwischcn Rene Girard und Karl Raimer," in Vom Fluch
1/11(/ Sege11 cler S11e11cle11hoecke, eds. by J. Niewiadomski, W. Palaver, 1995), 49-68 
5 
desire and the model. In a world of limited resources, this structure 
leads inevitably to rivalry. When people become polarized through their 
mutually imitative interaction, there arises the fateful constellation that 
their desire reaches its peak, which is the point when they experience 
the opposition of their rival. Thus, the goal of their desire coincides with 
the desire for the overcoming and elimination of the rival, although their 
passion blinds participants to this relational reality. Paradoxically, the 
rival, whom they seek to eliminate, is at the same time the mediator of 
the desirability of the object. Fixation upon the opponent has now 
become more attractive than the object and the 'bone of contention' is 
simply forgotten. 
In closely-knit societies, an outbreak of mimetic rivalry leads to 
what Girard calls a mimetic crisis, the violence of which may engulf the 
entire group and threaten its existence. At its peak, the rivalry 
disintegrates into a violent rage where everyone fights against everybody 
else. What assures societal survival is the scapegoat mechanism 
whereby the violent energy is redirected by fixing mimetic attention on 
one (mostly arbitrarily chosen) victim, which is collectively killed. This 
act of collective murder now unifies the warring parties as they jointly 
expel the victim and metaphorically lay on him the evil of their own 
malice and mendacity. The expulsion of the victim thus serves as the 
starting point of a new peace and the emergence of "the sacred" as the 
ensuing hush after the rage is attributed to a sacred source of wrath and 
blessing, a phenomenon first described by Rudolf Otto.7
'' M. llcrzog, "Rcligionstheorie und Theologie Rene Girards," Kerygma 1111d Dogma 38, no. 2 (I 992): 105-
137 
7 er. R. Otto, 71,e Idea of the Holy (London: Oxford University Press, 1958)
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Through textual studies, Girard drives his hypothesis relentlessly 
through the phenomena of our cultural and religious history and 
demonstrates how around this violent core we humans have woven 
myths and rituals as reenactments of the foundational murder disguised 
as sacrificial offering to deity. Convinced of the universality of his theory, 
Girard ventures beyond ethnological concerns and from the same 
mimetic model develops hypotheses for the origin of human civilization 
and language. 
His anthropology sees the human being from the beginning as a 
social being, in whose sociality, however, the violent structures of 
acquisitive mimesis are so deeply entrenched that mankind is unable to 
extract itself from their powers. Motivated by a deep skepticism of the 
notion that people are capable of sovereignly directing their destiny, 
Girard regards the existence of an autonomous will as a deceptive 
illusion, adherence to which causes blindness to their own condition and 
drives people only further into captivity to mimetic rivalry. 8
Lastly, Girard has undertaken to interpret Biblical texts and found 
ample evidence for the same mimetic structures, where mob violence is 
resolved through the presence of a surrogate victim, of which the passion 
and crucifixion of Jesus is the prime example. But he reads the Gospels 
in non-sacrificial terms. That is to say, the Father did not require the 
death of his Son to shift his disposition from wrath to reconciliation. 
Rather, the death of Jesus is to be seen as self-sacrifice whereby the self­
giving love of God totally embraces human sin and violence and in that 
embrace exhausts its power. Anthropologically, the cross of Jesus is a 
7 
case of victimage by which the violent structures at the root of human 
culture are exposed while his expulsion shows how deeply this unveiling 
is resented. 
Predictably, Girard has not been without his critics. In the mam, 
the thrust of this criticism has been aimed at his theology and at his 
scientific method. Dunnill has argued that Girard's attempt to find "one 
grand explanation to cover all cases and centering the phenomena 
around one type" diminishes the biblical text to the one explanation to 
which it applies. Despite its "imaginative appeal", Girard's proposal 1s 
"shaky in its empirical base".9 Herzog admits that Girard's analysis of 
the relationship between the sacred and human violence is profitable as 
far as it goes, but alleges that Girard has by scientific standards failed to 
develop a universal theory of human history and culture. At the same 
time, he has reduced Biblical revelation to an explanation of violence and 
"replaced Christology and the teaching of God with anthropology and 
ethics". 1 ° Conservative Christian writers like Hoekema might rule out 
Girard's ideas on fundamental grounds saying that "all views of man that 
do not make the doctrine of creation their starting point ... are to be 
rejected as false".11 While I agree with Hoekema that anthropologies
which deny the divine/human relationship are un-Christian and 
perhaps even anti-Christian, one would take Biblical inerrancy too far if 
its assertions were to prescribe limits to scientific inquiry or make them 
the sole criteria for the falsification of scientific theories. Hefling, on the 
8 cf. R. Girard, Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World: Research Undertaken in Collaboration 
11·ith .lea11-i\liche/ Oughour/ian and Guy lejcJr/ (Stanford, Cal: Stanford University Press, 1987). 
9 J. Dunnill, "Methodological Rivalries: Theology and Social Science in Girardian Interpretations of the
New Testament," .loumalfcJr the Study o/the New Testament no. 62 ( 1996): I 05-119 
10 M. 1 lerzog, ibid., p. 136, 137
8 
other hand, is thoroughly convinced "that Girard has cut for theologians 
an hermeneutic key, which opens windows on the gospels, that have 
been largely shuttered"_ 12 
1.12 The Primeval Events and Their Text 
Since we will be referring in this study to the Genesis story of 
creation, it is important that we relate our position at the outset. The 
primeval events as presented m Genesis have traditionally been 
interpreted as historical reports of the beginning of the world. Under the 
influence of a scientific worldview, this approach has been challenged. 
But the apparent conflict between the Bible and the sciences is based on 
a misunderstanding as Westermann has shown. According to 
Westermann, the Old Testament knows not one, but several creation 
accounts reflecting a variety of traditions. Therefore it leaves the 
question of how God created the world open so that "every age is free to 
express it in a way intelligible to itself' . 13 In addition, it is not just the 
Bible that has something to contribute to the reflection on 
creator/ creation but the whole world including the knowledge discovered 
by modern science and the historical-critical examinations of the Biblical 
texts. As far as the primeval events themselves are concerned, 
11 A. I loekema, Crealed in God's Image (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), p. 76
12 C. I lctling, "A View from the Stern: James Alison's Theology (So Far)," Anglican Theological Review
81, 110. 4 ( 1989): 689-710, p. 699 
11 C. Westermann, Crea1io11 (London: SPCK, 1971 ), p. 5; Westermann points out that the Bible does not
present us with a doctrine of creation but tells stories about it. The creation is made present by rehearsing 
the narrative accounts and in this way preserved early man's understanding of reality for future 
generations. This recall of ancient stories that belong to a mythical age did not address the philosopher's or 
the scientist's question how the world began, but tried to answer more existential concerns [Westermann, 
ibid., 13]. 
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particularly the creation of man in the image and likeness of God, 14 I 
want to simply register three claims for the sake of emphasis. First, if we 
conclude (given the nature of the text) that it is the intention of the 
creation accounts to say something about God's activity in creation, we 
must also concede that they have something to say about what it means 
to be human. Second, what stands out is the personal nature of these 
beginnings. At the cradle of the universe and of humanity stood the 
"deed" of a personal being whose creative activity brought about the 
possibility for a personal relationship between the creature and the 
creator. 15 Third, while the Genesis accounts are more concerned with
ends and relationships than with the actual process of creation, there is 
a vast difference between a personal creation and impersonal evolution. 
Recognition of the difference at the human level is far from automatic 
and without the Biblical witness highly improbable. This study will not 
just seek to ensure that the emphasis on a personal origin is not lost, 
but unequivocally presupposes it. 
1.2 The Research Problem and Hypothesis 
In the most general sense, the research problem exists because 
Girard is more concerned with cultural and religious anthropology than 
with the concept of God. This is by no means to say that he proposes an 
atheistic anthropology. Rather, he seeks to enlarge anthropology without 
making particular reference to a theological or transcendental premise. 
At the same time, we must give full recognition to Girard's self-confessed 
11 Gen I :26-28 
10 
intentions: " ... mine is the search for the anthropology of the Cross, 
which turns out to rehabilitate orthodox theology". 16
Since it is Girard's aim and that of his followers to establish a non­
transcendental anthropology, the lack of reference to so obvious an 
anthropological datum as the "image of God" in the Biblical text is 
understandable. From our point of view this presents an opportunity to 
investigate what theological basis may exist for Girard's notion of human 
mimesis. Assuming such a relationship can be established, mimesis 
could be seen as a constitutive aspect of man's endowment as a creature 
before God and inseparable from man's response to him. This raises the 
further question how mimetic desiring and faith are related in Christian 
experience. Closely connected is the Girardian idea that the "collective 
victim" becomes the "sacred center" of the group, and also how is man's 
capacity for recognizing transcendent significance (even in a dead body) 
is related to the assertion that man is created in God's image. Moreover, 
how shall we relate human mimesis to the "image" as traditionally 
understood, namely as man's mandate to act as God's steward on earth 
pointing to his rule and witnessing to his presence? 
This investigation will attempt to address these issues by seeking 
to prove the following hypothesis: 
The phenomenon of human mimesis is a constitutive aspect 
of man's creaturehood. It rests on the theological foundation 
that man is created in God's image and likeness. Mimesis is 
therefore inseparable from man's response to God and from 
man's representational role in creation. 
" In Biblical tt.:rms this takes on the form of praise [Westermann, ibid., 25]. 
ir,J. G. Williams (ed.), The Girard Reader (New York: Crossroad, 1996), p. 288
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1.3 The Significance of the Study 
The central challenge of our age, which subordinates all that is 
human to all that is technical, is the question "what is man?" From 
where shall humans draw confidence and hope for the future, if all we 
can do is maintain a pretence to peace based on an international balance 
of terror? Will scientific positivism, techno-culture and post-modern 
philosophy bring about the desperately needed transformation of the 
human heart? In the light of history, this proposition must be doubted. 
Yet, especially in times of crisis, we perceive the operation of another 
dynamic. Subversive though it is as far as our human solutions are 
concerned, it brings new departures and offers steady hope. It is the 
dynamic of God's revelation in Christ through the gospel. Re-framing its 
expression, and bringing Christian understanding to a culture far 
removed from the Biblical idiom, is the ongoing task of theology and of 
the Church. It is in this context that the significance of this study is 
presented. It is based on the conviction that only Christian hope is real 
hope. At the same time a Girardian angle on gospel truth has much to 
say to our culture provided we make the intellectual effort to appropriate 
its conceptual substance without compromising Christian fundamentals. 
By investigating how human mimesis may be supported on 
theological grounds, we hope to advance in a small way the application 
of Girard's theory in terms of man's relationship to his Creator. 
Therefore, the significance of this study is likely to arise from the creative 
stimulus of the unprecedented questions and from the prospect of 
12 
sharing with others the understanding of intriguing phenomena the 
author of which is God. 
1. 4 Methodology
The study will begin with observation, analysis and rational 
compansons. At the same time, in dialogue with Girard and his 
followers I hope the inquiry will bear fruit in the form of creative insights 
and in the discovery of hitherto hidden or unknown connections. I 
propose to take the task forward in three steps. 
Having presented a synopsis of Girard's mimetic theory and the 
research problem in form of the hypothesis in Part I, I shall in Part II 
elaborate on it by examining the work of three well-known theologians 
and interpreters of Girard's theory - Gill Bailie, Raymund Schwager and 
James Alison. 17 In the engagement with Bailie, I will focus on how the 
self-concept of human culture is mimetically constituted and how from 
earliest beginnings human desire has been hooked into the false 
transcendence of sacral violence from which man cannot escape except 
through the gospel. With the help of Schwager's dramatic theology we 
shall view in slow motion the inside of the redemptive process, that is the 
dynamics of the human transformation from violent to pacific mimesis 
through God's self-giving love. Lastly, Alison's exposition of original sin 
offers another angle, namely from the vantage point of the resurrection, 
17 I have chosen G. Bailie, Violence Unveiled: Humanity at the Crossroad.1· (New York: Crossroad, 1995); 
R. Schwager, .Jesus in the Drama of Salvation: Toward a Biblical Doctrine q/ Rec/emption (New York:
Crossroads, 1999); J. Alison, 711e Joy c?f' Being Wrong: Original Sin Through Easter Eyes (New York:
Crossroad, 1998). While Bailie has so far only published Violence Unveiled, Alison and Schwager have
\\'ritten more widely on Girard's theory. For instance, Schwager, Professor of Systematic Theology at the
13 
on how God's grace overcomes evil through a divinely given 'intelligence' 
which brings about a radical rectification of human desire. This 
expansion of the hypothesis is designed to deepen our understanding of 
mimesis as an element of what it means to be human as well as its 
dynamic role in the economy of God in redemption. 
It is the purpose of Part III to test the hypothesis by seeking 
evidence for its validity independent of the Girardian School. To this end, 
we shall look for mimetic patterns in three places. Firstly, in the Creation 
story with special attention to Gen 1 :26-28. The rationale is simple. If 
human mimesis is a creation gift to the human race, then we should be 
able to discover traces in the primeval story of man's origin. Secondly, in 
modern trinitarian discourse. Since man was created in the "image of 
God", it seems reasonable to ask whether a mimetic relationality may be 
discernable in theological descriptions as conceived by the doctrine of 
the Trinity. Taking our cue from Rahner's Rule, 18 the study will seek to 
investigate the development of the relationship between the immanent 
and the economic Trinity from Barth to Pannenberg. Thirdly, we shall 
examine incidents in the life of Jesus that may testify to the presence of 
mimetic desire. 
In Part IV, we shall highlight some issues this study has raised but 
could not deal with within its limits and outline some suggestions for 
further studies which the fascinating concept of mimesis has evoked. 
Karl Rahncr University in Innsbruck, has focused his entire theological project in this direction. I have 
selected the above titles as being representative of the authors' theological orientation. 
ix T. Peters, Goel as Trinity: Re/ationality and Temporality in the Divine life (Louisville, Ky: John Knox 
Press, 1993 ), p. 22; Peters borrowed the term from Roger E. Olsen and employs it as a shorthand for 
Rahner's assertion that the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and vice versa. 
14 
While a large part of this study draws on the work of Bailie, 
Schwager and Alison, it is not intended as a critical review. Where such 
comments are offered, they appear with one or two exceptions in 
footnotes rather than in the body of the text. 
1. 5 Definition of Girardian Tenns19
Difference: Distinction arising from victimage, the "they" and "us" 
syndrome, which could have been originally a mere 
gesture or sign. All other distinctions (language, roles, 
cultural institutions and rules) have their origin in this 
first victimary distinction. 
Double Bind: 
Culture: 
Mimesis: 
A term borrowed from G. Bate son's theory of 
schizophrenia. It relates to the experience of conflict or 
paradox when mimesis is blocked by prohibition 
(imitate me in this but not in that). The same 
experience arises when the desire of two subjects 
converges upon the same object and the mimetic 
process turns the mediator/ model into a rival. This is 
also referred to as Mimetic Double [see Mimesis and 
Model]. 
All structures and arrangements as well as the 
common ideas and rules, which allow people to live 
together without being consumed by chaos, violence 
and random killing. It is the result of the functioning 
of the non-conscious mechanism of scapegoating that 
actually maintains the system. 
Synonymous with mimetic desire, i.e. the non­
conscious imitation of others, which in mimetic theory 
always carries the connotation of 'acquisitive' or 
'appropriative'. It is not inherently destructive, for it is 
essentially what Girard calls a "dynamic enabling" that 
allows human beings to open themselves up to the 
world and engage in loving relationships. 
1
'
1The following definitions are a modified version of those found in Williams, Girard Reader, 289-294. 
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Mimetic desire is mediated desire. The desirability of 
an object is not vested in the object but in the model 
that desires it. It is the function of culture to regulate 
the potential conflict between rivals who desire the 
same object. Since human beings are constituted as 
'interdividuals', they live from the reality of the model 
or mediator. This involves them in the mimetic 
paradox where they become so fascinated with the 
model that they desire the being of the model, which is 
the experience of the mimetic double. It occurs when 
the other becomes either an obstacle that needs to be 
eliminated or so internalized that the distinction 
between the self and the other is no longer 
experienced. The possibilities range from murder and 
schizophrenia to conversion through love and 
forgiveness. In the latter case, Girard speaks of 'good 
. . ' m1mes1s . 
Model/Mediator: Whatever or whoever we are in a mimetic relationship 
with. It may be an individual, a group, cultural 
assumptions or settings with which we resonate. The 
model mediates reality for us and we are constituted 
by the model such that the self is a set of past and 
present mimetic relations. If the model is a person 
(authority figure, parent, important peers) the model 
and the one imitating are also potentially rivals. At the 
same time, every rival may be also a model who begins 
to entice our desire for imitation. 
Religion: The cultic expression of mimetic desire, which in 
archaic societies regulates its rivalistic form through 
ritual prohibition and sacral violence associated with 
sacrifice. A mechanism for preserving order by 
protecting society from destructive mimetic crises. 
Sacrifice: Originally the cultic immolation of humans or animals 
(as substitutes for humans) during religious 
victimization. In the negative sense sacrifice means 
scapegoating, in the positive sense understood as 
costly and loving self-giving as in the case of Christ. 
Scapegoating: The mechanism by which societies obtain unanimity 
and/ or surrogate peace or release from mimetic 
violence through the killing of an arbitrarily chosen 
victim. It involves always the non-conscious 
convergence upon the victim as an object of collective 
'wrath', retaliation or vengeance. 
16 
PART II. HYPOTHESIS ELABORATED 
This study is concerned with the relation of Girard's claim that 
human beings are mimetically constituted and the Biblical assertion that 
man was created in the image and likeness of God (Gen 1:26-28). As a 
question it may be put like this. How can one explain the anthropological 
phenomenon of mimesis theologically? If mimetic desire belongs to man's 
fundamental constitution, one could argue that it ought to be possible to 
find evidence for it in the theology of the "image of God" and its 
attendant symbolism and interpretations. By examining the work of 
three well-known theologians and interpreters of Girard's theory - Gill 
Bailie, Raymund Schwager and James Alison - we intend first to 
elaborate on this hypothesis.20 
Our engagement with these authors will lead us into a fascinating 
range of emphases and styles. Bailie's Violence Unveiled, for instance, 
presents a cultural critique. He argues that our refusal to acknowledge 
our own propensity for mimetic violence and the victimage it produces 
drives humanity toward the apocalyptic state where violence becomes 
uncontrollable. Therefore, humanity is at the crossroad and its only way 
out is the gospel, the road of self-giving love. We shall explore what 
Bailie's examination of a culture that conceals the true image of God 
under a cloak of mimetic rivalry has to say to our hypothesis. 
20 See note 17 for references to the individual works considered. 
17 
Schwager, too, looks at the part violence plays in culture, but only 
in connection with the Passion of Jesus. His focus is man's redemption 
and the burden of his scholarly work Jesus in the Drama of Salvation is 
the Father's love behind the cross and God's intent to reach man's heart 
through the dynamism of the God-drama he staged in Christ. We shall 
enlarge our understanding of the role of mimesis in this process and of 
man's response to God. 
The main focus of Alison's highly acclaimed book The Joy of Being 
Wrong is original sin from the vantage-point of the resurrection, and how 
forgiveness becomes the way of transformation. His treatment shows us 
"what we are really up against when we 'work out our salvation"' .21 While 
he seems to integrate for us at another level what Schwager has worked 
out as a systematician, Alison pursues his own theological synthesis 
based on the absolute deathlessness of God and offers interesting clues 
for our hypothesis. 
�
1 Sebastian Moore's in his foreword to Alison's Joy of!Jeing Wrong, p. ix 
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CHAPTER 2 HUMAN MIMESIS IN GIL BAILIE'S CULTURAL 
CRITIQUE 
2.1 Introduction 
Violence, writes Bailie, is both fascinating and highly contagious, 
but we cannot understand what gives it this mysterious power, unless 
we understand religiously and anthropologically "the mimetic 
mechanism" that produces it.22 As an introduction to Bailie's thought, let 
us briefly review this phenomenon. 
The self-concept of a culture is derived from the stories a society 
tells about itself and its origins, especially the symbols and religious 
images embedded in them.23 These myths perform a number of 
functions, as Barbour has pointed out. They structure the worldview, 
relate the individual to the past, offer a sense of identity and uphold a 
prototype for imitation.24 In addition, myths function as an "ego defense" 
against threats and offer mechanisms for the restoration of unity in 
times of societal crisis. They help to explain the numinous experience of 
fascination and dread.25 While Bailie would certainly agree with this 
description as far as it goes, he would probably object that it does not go 
far enough. It does not explain what gives the myths the influence over 
the life of the group and its members. This 'mystifying power' lies in the 
22 Bailie, Violence Um·eiled, 95 
�
1 I. G. Barbour, A{l'th.1·, Models, l'aradigm.1· (New York: Harper& Row, 1974), p. 19-21 
_, Ibid., 21 
21 Ibid., 55-70 
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dynamics of man's mimetic nature and, according to Bailie, violence 1s 
its fiercest and most enthralling form.26
From Bailie's point of view, the principle behind violence, however, 
is not aggression per se,27 but mimetic social contagion. It occurs when
rivalry gets out of hand because in humans it is no longer instinctively 
controlled as it is among animals. In times of a chaotic outbreak of 
violence, cultures, in an attempt to reproduce the unity that brought the 
group together in the beginning, reenact the mythology of their own 
(violent) origins.2s Therefore mimetic violence must be understood as an
instrument of culture generation and maintenance. Its collective 
fascination bestows prestige upon the accompanying religious cult and 
its rituals. But ritual violence (killing required by religious scruples) is 
sacred violence,29 through which the religious system maintains social
order. This so-called 'sacrificial' mechanism resolves internal conflict by 
discharging the pent-up violence on an arbitrarily chosen victim. 
Afterwards, the ensuing peace is attributed to the sacral powers of the 
victim and the efficacy of meticulous adherence to the prescribed ritual. 
This Girardian view of archaic religious systems underlies Bailie's 
analysis. 
Extrapolated into the Christian context, the crucifixion of Christ is 
anthropologically speaking such a reenactment. But strangely it does not 
fulfill the expectations of the archaic religious system. Instead of 
producing a surrogate peace, it "explodes the ancient myths and 
mechanisms and reveals their perversity". Religious mystification of 
21' Bailie, Violence Unl'eiled, 95 
27 Sec also Williams, Girard Reader, 10 
28 Bailie, Violence Um·eiled, 7 
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violence is no longer working, for the demythologizing efficacy of the 
cross has set in motion a historical reality which undermines the (false) 
legitimacy of sacred violence and the perception of its moral 
superiority.30 According to Bailie, the old brakes on rivalry and 
vengeance have lost their power. As a result, mimetic violence is 
increasing to the extent that in our time "... essential cultural 
institutions are reeling in the face of a cultural meltdown ... ".3 1 Since 
conventional culture is largely blind to its pervasive conditioning, 
something from outside the system must insert a logic (logos) other than 
the logic of violence. Structurally speaking, such an 'insertion' is only 
possible through the expelled victim, "whose expulsion brought the 
system into being in the first place".32 Therefore, the ultimate answer to 
this turmoil is peaceful mimesis of the converted heart through the 
gospel. With this background in mind, we shall now turn to the 
theological focus of our discussion. 
2.2 Hominization and the Birth of Religious Experience 
Bailie's analysis makes two assumptions about man. Humans are 
created beings33 although they did not emerge from the hand of God 
'complete'. Rather, they evolved from higher primates. Bailie (following 
Girard) hypothesizes that our hominid ancestors emerged from their pre-
2
') Bailie, l'iole11ce Unveiled, 7 
10 Ibid., 7 
·1 1 Ibid., 4; to amplify this point, another quotation from Bailie: "The Bible's supreme anthropological value 
is that it allows us to sec the structures and the dynamics of humanity's conventional culture and religious 
life and to watch as these structures give way under the weight of a revelation incompatible with them" 
(Ibid., 168). 
�� Ibid., 220; more will be said about this dynamic when we discuss Schwager and Alison. 
"Ibid., 137 
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human forebears when an increase in mimetic excitability coincided with 
a commensurate disappearance of instinctive controls, such as the well­
known dominance-submission pattern.34 
According to Girard's theory, this mimetic propensity among 
hominids caused passionate acquisitive conflicts. A squabble between 
two over a desired object would soon excite the passions of all onlookers 
and draw them irresistibly into the conflict and as each participant 
senses the opposition of mutual rivalry, its ferocity escalates. Since the 
elimination of the rival becomes now the paramount desire rather than 
the acquisition of the object over which the fight began, the conflict 
becomes metaphysical. 35 If the conflict began with an acquisitive 
gesture, which another member of the group imitated, its growing 
volatility36 turns the quarrel over 'acquisition' into violent 'accusation'. In 
such an all-against-all each takes revenge for what the other does to 
him. 
How is such frenzy brought under control? When the fighting 
crowd turns into a lynch mob! At the zenith of the conflict a particularly 
strong accusatory gesture towards one member produces a new phase of 
mimesis. Now everyone's hostility is directed to this one victim.37 It 
works, in Bailie's terms, like a "communal exorcism", which transforms 
the blind chaos into a strange unanimity. What's more, when the victim 
dies in a collective murder, "hush and awe" follow.38 At this supreme 
point the atmosphere is charged with "terror and hallucination" giving 
·11 Ibid., 120 
11 Ibid., 120-121 
3
(, Lkcause the first response signaled a greater desirability of the object through mimetic suggestion, it in
turn elicited a rival response of increased intensity. 
17 Ibid., 122 
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birth to the "primordial religious experience" and "the following detente
only heightens the mystery".39 In this moment of primitive religious awe 
the attention of all is riveted on the victim, upon which they bestow 
sacred status. The dead body becomes an object that everybody wants to 
possess, yet no one dares to touch. Bailie calls it "desire frozen by terror" 
and the first hesitant gesture toward it he considers "the first act of 
terrified supplication" .40 In Bailie's view, this primitive religious event is 
also associated with the historical moment of hominization, when the 
"rupture with the pre-human primate realm can be pronounced 
complete".41
What is important for this study is the recognition that death 
becomes the signifier of something more than biological mortality. A new 
'vertical' dimension seems to have been inserted into the horizontal focus 
that was previously fixed mimetically on members of the group and on 
material objects. The question that arises at this point, assuming we go 
along with Bailie's premise about human origins, is whether man's 
primitive intuition that a mutilated corpse possesses transcendent 
significance may have the faintest resemblance to the idea that man was 
created in God's image. 
2. 3 The Fall and False Transcendence 
In the 1960s comedian Flip Wilson quipped: "The devil made me 
do it" and encapsulated the universal human tendency to externalize the 
.ix Ibid. 
1
') R. Girard, Violence and the Sacred (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 161 
10 Bailie, Violence Unl'eiled, 123 
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responsibility for our predicament. But according to Biblical tradition, 
the human race is fallen and by saying that, we make the rather 
unpopular assertion that the wrongs of the world are to be found in "the 
workings of the human soul".42 The idea of a 'fall' only makes sense 
when posited against a 'good creation', which in this case means human 
beings who were prior to the 'fall' other that what they have been ever 
since. We will consider the issue of 'original sin' in our conversation with 
Alison. Here we simply wish to trace Bailie's interpretation of what 
tradition calls the 'fall' (Gen 3) from the viewpoint of mimetic theory. 
From this angle, it seems to present a fundamental piece of evidence that 
the phenomenon of mimesis is inextricably linked with Biblical 
anthropology from the beginning. 
As Bailie puts it, "the story of the fall in Genesis is the story of 
contagious desire ... the kind of desire that is awakened by the display of 
another's desire".43 We note the presence of the mimetic triangle: the
woman, the serpent and the forbidden fruit as the desirable object. The 
serpent's suggestion about the desirability of the fruit evokes in the 
woman a mimetic desire to possess it and what it stands for, divine 
likeness. When she grasps it, her relationship with the Creator changes 
immediately from co-worker to rival, so that Bailie concludes: "Here then 
is the fall: mimetic desire and resentment in a situation in which there is 
no unsatisfied appetite and only One Transcendent Being against whom 
resentment may be aroused". And further, "even in a situation that is 
unconducive to envy, covetousness and resentment as the Garden of 
11 Ibid., 122 
12 T. Peters, Sin: Radical Evil in Soul and Sociely (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), p. 2
;i Bailie, Violence Unveiled, 137
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Eden, the serpent's gaudy desire 1s all that it takes to unhinge the 
human race ... " 44 
In the same breath, Bailie refers to man's creation and affirms that 
"we are creatures made in God's image". He clearly links the mimetic 
structure of man's constitution with the "image of God". Unfortunately, 
he does not develop this link and it would be futile to speculate why. 
What deserves comment, however, is the slant of his own interpretation: 
[T]he 'test' that the tree represents is whether or not humans can
tolerate even the most innocuous form of self-restraint and even the
most beneficent form of transcendence without becoming resentful and
rivalrous.45
Bailie seems to suggest that the purpose of the Garden scene of 
Gen 3 was a moral test. While this may be in line with the traditional 
view, it runs against the grain of Gen 3:22, in which God comments on 
the post-fall situation that man now had "become one of us knowing 
good and evil". In other words, man could only distinguish good and evil 
after the fall and had been in this respect dissimilar to God prior to the 
event, a point Gerald Bray has stressed when he writes, 
Most seriously of all, the narrative of Genesis itself directly contradicts 
the idea that the image of God conferred moral awareness. It is 
extraordinary that this was never recognized .... 46 
Bray's argument that the original image did not bestow on man 
moral awareness, would strengthen our hypothesis that the morally 
neutral but value prone structure of mimesis has been part of man's 
11 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
-1<, G. Bray, "The Significance of God's Image in Man," Tyndale Bulletin 42, no. 2 (1991): 195-225, p. 207
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design from the beginning.47 According Girard, once mediated desire 
triggers the unconscious mechanism of mimesis, the behavior will 
predictably mirror the desire of the model. 48
To be sure, post-fall humanity has created countless victims and 
drenched the earth in blood. But, (and I say this without seeking to 
diminish human culpability) if man's desire is now so constituted that 
the murderous human heart "has become the ordering principle of 
culture",49 then the human condition is not a moral problem per se, but 
a deeply anthropological one. We need to be delivered from our captivity 
to the contagious distortion of desire, not from the fundamental 
anthropological category of desire itself. 
By seeing the phenomenon of mimesis as the core of the 'sacred', 
Girard achieved a profound understanding of the cultic violence behind 
archaic religious systems. However, from the perspective of Christian 
theology, we note that the 'transcendent experience' of the primitive 
group described earlier did not result from an encounter with the divine, 
but from the intoxication of the primitive mind with mimetic violence. It 
was the simulation of a transcendent experience, a contagious counterfeit 
that seemed to function in the non-conscious underground as the cultic 
glue of society, and, if Girard is correct, it has been working there 
through the mechanism of victimage since "the foundation of the world". 
17 This line of reasoning leaves open the question of moral agency. Gen 3:22 implies that man's design to 
have included the capacity for moral judgement, but its actualization came about through desire 
contaminated by an illegitimate source. 
�x It is therefore debatable whether human 'morality' was within the original intent of the creator. We do 
not have the scope here to examine this issue. In the above context, it is perhaps worth noting that even our 
best efforts arc powerless to restrain or suppress the forces of mimetic desire. What is needed is not their 
restraint, but their transcendence. 
"
1 Ibid., 222 
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The notion that the core of our humanness is occupied by a 
powerful disposition for imitation runs counter to the cherished post­
Enlightenment belief of Western culture in the autonomy of the 
individual. But Girard's theory insists on it. He sees in it the inordinate 
capacity to come under the influence of the desires of others. As already 
mentioned, it operates below the level of cognition, and as Bailie writes: 
... is more powerful and less intentional than conscious imitation, so is 
the notion of desire broader and deeper than the eroticized and 
romanticized notion [of desire] of the modern era.50
This predilection not just determines all our social arrangements, 
but by its very nature constitutes an insatiable appetite for mimetic 
engagement, a form of concupiscence. We saw in the above example that 
as the conflict escalated, the appetite for violence became ferocious 
resulting in an uncontrollable frenzy that ended in a catharsis. In Bailie's 
view, if the pent-up violence is not discharged, an unquenched appetite 
lingers and seeks other forms of expression. Any aggravation then 
produces symptoms of acquisitive mimetic rivalry like resentment, 
jealousy, envy, covetousness, punitive attitudes, judgmentalism and 
hatred. We are reminded of Paul's letter to the Galatian Church warning 
them not to follow their sinful nature. The parallels are striking. 
The acts of the sinful nature are obvious: sexual immorality, impurity 
and debauchery; idolatry and witchcraft; hatred, discord, jealousy, fits of 
rage, selfish ambition, dissensions, factions and envy; drunkenness, 
orgies, and the like. I warn you, as I did before, that those who live like 
this will not inherit the kingdom of God. (Emphasis added). 51 
From the foregoing we note then two aspects of the human being. 
They are 'hungry' for models to imitate. But under the influence of sin (or 
5u Ibid., 51
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counterfeit transcendence), this hunger is perverted. If we accept that 
humans have been created as mimetic creatures, then mimesis itself is 
not the problem, but the false transcendence into which this capacity is 
now 'hooked'. Paul's reference to idolatry seems to recognize the same 
link underscoring our point. This false transcendence, simulated by 
murderous mimesis, impersonates a God-centered transcendence.s2 The 
same issue surfaces in the account of Jesus' temptation. The tempter 
offers Jesus "all the kingdoms of the world" (Matt 4:8-10) in exchange for 
Jesus' worship. Jesus vehemently rejects the offer. Only through 
Girardian glasses do we see it as an attempt to engage Jesus in mimetic 
rivalry for the possession of a kingdom founded on the mechanism of 
generative violence and thus undoing his God-centeredness. One could 
argue that the story would have been pointless unless such a possibility 
existed, which in turn presupposes the presence of a link between the 
mimetic process and a fundamental transmutation of man's 
'transcendent center' through worship. 53 These observations seem to 
support our hypothesis that there are profound theological reasons why 
human beings are mimetic and possibly just because they are created in 
God's image as we hope to demonstrate. 
51 Gal 5: 19-21 (NIY) 
52 A God-centered transcendence, Bailie says, "would satisfy our deepest imitative urges, our deepest 
desires" [Ibid., 145]. 
51 The Bible calls worship of an object or person other than God idolatry and warns that those who do it 
become like their idols (Psa 115:8 and 135: 18). Christian tradition has long recognized that this temptation 
sought to replicate the dynamics of Gen 3. Regarding the human 'center' or heart, it is interesting to note 
one of the hypothesis in the neuro-sciences that the human brain is the meeting point between the physical 
and the transcendent. Ashbrook and Rausch Albright maintain that the brain "reveals a basic and universal 
structure that underlies all belief systems" [cf J. 8. Ashbrook and C. Rausch Albright, "The Humanizing 
Brain: an introduction," Zygon 34, no. I ( 1999): 7-39]. By way of extrapolation one could speculate that 
not only neurological underpinnings exist for the presence of human mimesis, but that a form of mimesis 
may be present in biological systems generally as an adaptive, self-organizing mechanism. 
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2. 4 The Victim 
That idyllic South Sea Islands should have been once the scene of 
rampant cannibalism, human sacrifices and victimization of children 
strikes us with a strange mix of emotions. At the same time, our cultural 
distance blinds us to the archaic religious system that thrived on such 
gruesomeness and has kept humans in bondage 'since the foundations 
of the world'. As Bailie reminds us, it is this part of our universal 
heritage which the human race cannot easily shake off, for vestiges of 
the archaic system are still with us. To be sure, its victimage mechanism 
no longer manifests in the form of pagan sacrificial rites.54 But even
today we create victims and scapegoat members of our own race. While 
victimization continues in apocalyptic proportions and at an unstoppable 
rate, what has changed is that their voice is no longer muted by a 
mythology that once legitimized this violence as religious service. This, 
according to Bailie, is entirely attributable to the emergence of the 
Christian conscience in the world, the moral by-product of the revelation 
of the cross. 55 
Before Girard discovered the link between sacred violence and 
mimetic desire, Rudolf Otto had noted the victim's pull as the center of 
religious fascination. He writes, "[the victim] ... as an object of horror and 
dread ... allures with a potent charm ... and the creature ... has always 
at the same time the impulse to turn to it, even to possess it".56 Given its 
51 The etymology of the English 'victim' (Lat. victima) is also related to the Goth. weihan (weihs = l10M or 
Cierman 11·eihe11, which means consecrating as an object for religious sacrifice [cf W. W. Skeat, 
Ltymological DictiomllJ' qf'the English Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 691 ]. 
55 Bailie, l'iolence Unveiled, 31 
51
' R. Otto, The Idea o/'the Holy (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 31 
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magnetic power, what is it about the mutilated body of a victim that 
provides clues for our hypothesis? 
As we have mentioned earlier, the act of unanimous violence by 
which the victim dies bestows on the body both a sacred status and a 
central place in the group. Not only does it now occupy the common 
focus of the group, but the victim also inserts itself into the center of 
consciousness of each participant in the collective murder. The emotions 
of horror, dread and religious awe inscribe the event in the individual 
and collective memory. In addition, the victim introduces a 'vertical' 
dimension into the mimetically fixed horizontal focus, which had held 
the members of the group captive to fear of each other. When a surrogate 
peace settles on the frenzied mob, the victim's status provides a sense of 
meaning to an otherwise incomprehensible event. The role of the corpse, 
as strange as it may sound, becomes essentially an epistemological one 
derived from the victim's presumed transcendence. Bailie draws a similar 
conclusion from the testimony of the Old Testament prophets, who spoke 
as victims of a religious system they had been called to critique. He 
writes, 
The revelatory power of the prophet depended on how close he was to the 
'still point in the turning world', the point of lucidity in a frenzied world, 
namely the place occupied by the victim of frenzy.s7
This role of the victim as we shall see more fully later in our 
engagement with Schwager, allows us to draw important conclusions 
about a theological justification of human mimesis. Here we follow 
57 Bailie, l'io/ence Unveiled, 178. It is important to understand that for Bailie the great prophets lived in an 
era that was morally intelligible only through the notion of God's wrath. This explains why they often 
responded to spiritual opposition with sacred violence or with means that differed little from the religious 
systems they had come to critique [ cf Elijah's sacrificial battle at Mt Carmel ( I Kg 18-19)]. 
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Bailie's argument to its conclusion. The call to the prophetic office 
involved a radical openness to the voice of God. It meant speaking forth, 
without fear or favor, the corrective utterances of God in the face of a 
religious system that contradicted the divine character. Such a life 
presupposed a disposition of heart that was entirely given to an inner 
conformation to the divine will. It meant imitation of God through the 
formation of a mind that was free from archaic religious and 
mythological delusions. Quite simply, the prophets had come under the 
illuminating influence of the Spirit of God that liberated them from the 
"spell of the primitive sacred so that the living God it concealed and 
impersonated [could] get through ... ".58 Alternatively stated, the same 
inner structure of mimetic desire that brought other men into bondage to 
'the primitive sacred' served the living God as an agency of truth telling. 
Man is therefore so constituted that the divine pattern may become 
evident in human lives through a conversion experience that alters 
man's orientation (model) but not his inner (mimetic) structure. 
Conversion, or the miraculous transformation from a murderous 
human heart to a heart of love, is the work of the Gospel, which exposes 
the archaic religious system for what it is, namely murder and lies. The 
cross robs them of their mystifying power. At the same time, it maintains 
the focus on the victim as an agent of revelation. The entire Easter event 
shifted the attention from violence to true transcendence through 
forgiveness, especially after the resurrection.59 In the cross, the full 
epistemological force of the victim's role becomes apparent. In Bailie's 
58 Bailie, l'iolence U11l'eilecl, 195 
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language, it 1s a "counter-mythological, meta-religious revelatory 
image".60 What's more, it now asserts its worldwide influence as Christ's
promise, "when I am lifted up, I shall draw all men to myself'61 is being 
worked out in history. 
However, more than an intellectual process is needed to deliver 
humans from archaic delusions about the efficacy of violence as the 
bringer of peace. To overcome these effects of mimetic desire and to undo 
the underlying perversion of the human center, philosophy is useless, as 
Bailie has shown.62 Rather, "[it] must be vanquished at the most 
intimate level of experience", to quote Girard.63 This will be the case only 
when the true Victim occupies the revelatory center of the human heart. 
Then will "we 'desire' and have as our ultimate model the One in whose 
image we are made". 64
2.5 Summary 
In our engagement with Bailie we have seen that the self-concept 
of a culture is derived from its mythological base, especially from the 
symbols and religious images embedded in its stories about its origins. 
Not only do they offer cohesion, identity and explain the numinous, they 
also uphold a prototype for imitation. Further, we noted that the 
mystifying power of symbols and myth lies in man's mimetic nature. 
1'1 We can believe in the resurrection because "the emancipating power of the Cross has begun to sweep 
away the mythological, ideological and rationalistic clutter that stands in the way of such belief" [Ibid., 
232). 
(,II Ibid., 130 
rd John 12:32 
62 Bailie, l'iole11ce U11veiled, 235-259 
r,, R. Girard, The Things Hiddenfrom the Foundation <!
f
the /Vorld (London: Athlone, 1987), p. 399 
r,, Bailie, l'iole11ce U11l'eiled, 145 
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Sacral violence is the fiercest and most enthralling form of that power. 
By linking the two dimensions, man's hunger for models to imitate and 
his predilection for sacral violence, we observed that the human heart is 
perverted and locked into a false transcendence. 
Extrapolating from there and from Jesus' temptation account, we 
suggested that there is a profound link between human mimesis and 
worship. We found the same idea reflected in Bailie's explanation of the 
Old Testament prophets. Under the influence of the Spirit of God, they 
were given over entirely to the imitation of God through the conformity of 
their minds so that the same mimetic structure that brought others into 
bondage to the primitive sacred served God as an instrument of 
revelation. 
We also saw that the revelatory process was more than an 
intellectual one. Deliverance from the delusion about the efficacy of 
violence as a peacemaker requires more than a new philosophy or 
morality, but the undoing of the distorted desire, which is achieved 
through the epistemological role of the victim. Only when the image of 
God in Jesus Christ becomes our imitative center, will we be captive to 
true transcendence. 
In the next Chapter, where we explore Schwager's dramatic 
theology, we will see the dynamics of this transformation. What we can 
provisionally conclude is that through man's mimetic predisposition the 
divine pattern of God's image may become visible in human lives but 
only when we are given over to him in worship will we imitate him as our 
model without rivalry. 
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CHAPTER 3 THE IMAGE OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 
FOR HUMAN MIMESIS IN THE DRAMATIC 
THEOLOGY OF RAYMUND SCHWAGER 
3.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter we are asking what Schwager's dramatic theology 
has to say to us about the image of God, about human mimesis and 
about the relation of one to the other. Because of the complexity and 
subtlety of Schwager's presentation (and his often highly technical 
analysis), we propose to move slowly. We shall examine first Jesus' 
identification with sinners and the problematic of judgment. Then, we 
shall look at the question whether the Father's justice demanded the 
death of Jesus. These two topics are somewhat preparatory for the 
development of the third, Schwager's view of the transformation of evil 
and the dynamics of conversion. It is in this last section that we propose 
to draw conclusions about Schwager's contribution to our hypothesis. 
Theologically the doctrine of redemption is found in the space 
where the goodness and justice of God intersect, or in the language of 
Psalm 85: 10 where "mercy and truth have met together and 
righteousness and peace have kissed each other". While such an 
articulation may suffice as an expression of piety and faith, difficulties 
arise when one tries to explicate what it means in history.65 Many 
models have been suggested. In order to connect exegetical and 
<,1The perceived polarity has created longstanding theological problems. For a brief overview of milestones 
from Marcion to von l3althasar see R. Schwager, Jesus in the Drama of Salvation: Toward a Biblical 
Doclri11e o/Sall'(J/ion (New York: Crossroad, 1999), p. 2-16 
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systematic considerations of the doctrine Schwager proposes a "dramatic 
exegesis". 66
To introduce his argument, let me draw a sketch of the scheme. 
According to Schwager the drama speaks to us about man's captivity to 
the principle of sacred violence, victimage and retribution (see also 
Bailie's view of culture). Moreover, the dramatic structure of redemption 
speaks of the process of liberation and by implication of the original 
intention of the Creator. By taking upon himself on the cross the image 
of the victim and by modeling the experience of God as abba, Jesus 
replaces the image of vengeance with the true image of God. Thereby he 
establishes in human history the reality of "communicative love", which 
is able to reach the innermost recesses of the human heart, satisfy its 
deepest longings and so bring healing and freedom.67 By coming to 
sinners m this (new) way, God designates non-violence as an 
ontologically superior principle that renders the archaic scapegoat 
mechanism6s powerless and opens an entirely new path to human 
community. 
3.2 Jesus' Identification with Sinners and the Problematic of 
Judgment. 
Schwager summarizes his own analysis in two fundamental 
statements: "if he [Jesus] identified himself with all victims of sin, then 
every offence against a fellow person or against one's self is aimed 
against him"; and "the universality of the expulsion and thus the 
<><, Ibid., ix 
"
7 Ibid., 43 
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exclusive nature of the substitution are based on the act of universal 
inclusion of the one who stood in for all by making himself one of them" 
(Schwager's emphasis).69
This multi-layered presentation of Jesus' identification with 
sinners produces a rather complex picture of substitution. All human 
beings are sinners and thus guilty of hostility towards God who allows 
himself to become victim of all; at the same time, they are also victims 
themselves, of their own sin and that of others. Since Jesus stood in for 
all, but only as far as they are victims, people still remain accountable 
for their hostile attitude towards God. To be sure, God's abundant love 
will woo and encourage, but it will never compel so that there is no 
automatic salvation. Yet, since Jesus acknowledged from the Cross that 
even the most hostile act performed against him was done in ignorance, 
the possibility exists that people are much more victims of deception and 
sin than committed agents of evil. Therefore, in Schwager's view "the 
great hope persists that all are saved in Christ" .70
However, Schwager asks, does not such a hope fly in the face of 
the judgment sayings of Jesus?71 He argues that in the judgment of 
Jesus something entirely new occurred in that the one who announced 
these judgments was also the one who was judged.72 And although the 
New Testament makes ample use of apocalyptic judgement language, 
according to Schwager "Jesus, by many subtle details, expressed the 
r,x We must recall that the purpose of the scapegoat mechanism is communal cohesion. It serves to restore 
harmony and reinforce the social fabric, albeit based on ritualized communal violence. 
1"1 Ibid., 192 
70 Ibid., 194 
71 e.g. Matt 25:31-46
72 Schwager uses Barth's atonement picture of the Judge who became the one who is judged and
demonstrates it by allowing himself to be subjected to unjust accusation and judicial murder (cf Schwager 
.Jesus i11 Drama, 82). 
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judgement as self-judgment".73 Since this truth of self-judgment remains 
hidden from sinners as long as they do not acknowledge their status as 
sinners before God, judgment must still be preached and the individual 
remains accountable for the response.74 
Schwager's deep concern is to show that God has revealed himself 
in the drama of salvation as the One who is not vengeful and even willing 
to forgive the unthinkable crime of killing his Son. At the same time, 
God's goodness must not be sentimentalized. Since he has stepped over 
the last limit by forgiving the ultimate crime, his goodness is indeed 
unlimited. But it is by no means without the polarity of judgment, of 
which hell is the ultimate expression. Hell, on the other hand, is also the 
ultimate expression of God's respect for the freedom of his creature.75
The notion of freedom is significant for our hypothesis, as we shall 
see when we draw these threads together in the last section of this 
Chapter. Here we want to ask what freedom means if fallen humanity is 
captive to a system that locks every one into rivalistic mimesis? And 
further, what does God's respect for this freedom mean if it allows the 
'free' creature to go to its own doom because there is no way in which 
God will overpower his creature even for its own good?76 Would not such 
a freedom amount to abandoning the creature to an evil power? That this 
is not so is the message of Easter, where Christ did his utmost to secure 
our eternal wellbeing while preserving our freedom without diminishing 
71 
Schwager, ibid., 195; Schwager seeks to make clear that the judgment Jesus delivered in his judgment 
sayings is meant to lead his hearers to self-judgment or repentance. In other words, Jesus' judgment is 
motivated by mercy. The OT parallel may be found in the judgment Jonah delivered to Ninneveh. 
71 Ibid., 196 
75 Ibid., 198-199 
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the scope of God's unconditional respect for it.77 But before we examine 
these matters, we want to explore first one other question. 
3.3 Did God Require the Death of Jesus? 
According to Girard, the life, death and resurrection of Jesus 
brought to light the scapegoat mechanism. But are we reading the 
Gospel text correctly? Girard thinks not. If his theory is valid, it must 
also critique our interpretation of Christ's death and consistently refuse 
to re-introduce into our reading of the Biblical texts elements of the 'old 
order', which the Gospel has come to subvert.78 Therefore, one of the 
central questions Schwager seeks to answer is whether Christ's death 
was a propitiatory sacrifice in the sense that God required it to appease 
his anger. Leading up to his analysis, Schwager examines the notion of 
vengeance and retribution. He seeks to show that in the New Testament 
the system of vengeance (which belongs to the archaic order of the 
sacred) has been breached once for all. 
Let me begin with Girard's position. Already in the Old Testament 
the prophetic voice had criticized the sacrificial system in the name of 
YHWH.79 In the New Testament, we find that Jesus not only confirms the 
earlier prophetic criticism (e.g. Matt 9: 13), but also, through his own 
absolute commitment to non-violence and his refusal to the very end to 
strike back demonstrated the stance of the Kingdom he had come to 
?(, ll . I I c,c,))( ., "/ "/ 
77 Ibid., 20 I 
78 The cause for such misunderstanding must not be sought so much in the work of fundamentalists as in a 
modern ignorance of the scapegoat mechanism that belongs to archaic religion (cf. Williams, Girard 
Reader, 177). 
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proclaim.so To maintain a sacrificial reading in the sense that Jesus' 
death satisfied the wrath of God, it is necessary to assume that God's 
justice demanded the slaying of the Son for the salvation of humanity. 
This presupposes that the Father and the Son had entered into a secret 
pact, which obliged the Father to shift his disposition from wrath to 
reconciliation in exchange for the life of the Son. Moreover, the Gospel 
texts do not describe the death of Jesus as a sacrifice, but simply report 
his crucifixion, the Johannine imagery of the lamb not withstanding. 
Therefore, Girard rejects a 'sacrificial' reading of the death of Jesus as a 
cultural 'tie-back' to sacral violence. 
Schwager underpins Girard's position with two contributions. The 
first is a study of the Old Testament atonement system in the light of the 
prophetic criticism just mentioned. God demanded 'steadfast love' and 
true knowledge of God rather then sacrifices81 and the prophets called 
Israel to account not for infringements of cultic practice but for such 
cardinal offences as idolatry, injustice and murder, which revealed the 
true heart of the nation in its attitude towards YHWH. Since such crimes 
called for the death penalty, its rigorous application would have meant 
the elimination of all Israel, and indeed of the whole human race, 
obviously creating an absurd situation. In the end, the Old Testament 
does not resolve the tension between the prophetic critique and cultic 
practice, so that when the canon closes, the real meaning of the 
sacrificial system as an atoning mechanism remains ambiguous. Von 
n Typical references are Amos 5:21-24; Isa I: 11, 13, 15-16; Jer 2:20, 23; 7:4-7; 19:5-6. 
xo Williams, Girard Reader, 179-188
81 Relevant texts arc found in Hos 6:6; Amos 5 :21-24; Mic 6:6-8; Isa I: I 0-17; Psa 40:7. 
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Rad has made the same point when he wrote, "there is a realm of silence 
and secrecy in respect to what God works in sacrifice". 82 
Then Schwager examines the Epistle to the Hebrews, one of the 
clearest New Testament references to the issue of sacrifice.83 The atoning 
value of Old Testament sacrifices is found in external, cultic purification, 
unable to bring real freedom from sins.84 The letter to the Hebrews, while
using the metaphorical framework of the Old Testament cult, re­
interprets the tradition as something God instituted to awaken 
consciousness of sm, 1.e. for its interim "pedagogic and linguistic 
function and not because of its atoning value".85 But as Schwager 
admits, this line of argument does not solve the problem in its entirety, 
mainly because of an apparent continuity with the cult that operated 
through the blood (cf Hebr 9:7, 12, 14, 18-22). As the high priest of the 
Aaronic order brought blood into the sanctuary, so Christ entered with 
his own blood. How shall we then interpret the presence and operation of 
blood in the light of Jesus' insistence on the non-violence of the 
Kingdom? Do we after all have to accept the view that God's wrath struck 
Jesus directly through the violence of sinners and the experience of 
desolation? 
Schwager eventually resolves the conflict at a different level by 
referring to Maximus the Confessor, who saw in the crucifixion another 
way of looking at the use of death. 86 The cross of Christ is seen no longer
as punishment but as "a means of salvation from sin" (Schwager's 
82 Schwager, .Jesus in the Dra111a, 177-182; see also, von Rad, OT Theology, p. 260. 
x.i Schwager, .Jesus in the Dra111a, 182-191 
81 I lebr I 0:3 
85 Schwager, .Jesus in the Dra111a, 183 
X(, Ibid., I 87 
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emphasis). In his total identification with sinful humanity, even with his 
executioners, Jesus experienced the suffering of being struck to death by 
sin and thus entered the destiny of all human beings, so that Paul could 
write "One died for all; therefore all have died" (2 Cor. 5: 14).87 In other 
words, this hermeneutic move allows Schwager to reinterpret the death 
of Jesus in non-sacrificial terms. After carefully preparing his case over 
many pages, Schwager refutes the traditional penal substitution theory 
of atonement to demonstrate that the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is 
not a God of vengeance and sacrifice, and that it was not the Father's 
justice that slays the Son but human violence.88 
In the crucifixion of Jesus, the Kingdom of God and the 
mechanisms and powers of the old order meet head on. In Schwager's 
perception, the issue for Jesus in that moment is not the readiness of 
the Father to forgive, but how the Father's goodness may enter the 
human heart given the powers of darkness that hold it captive. The 
answer had to be found not in "substitute performance", but in Jesus' 
willingness to be handed over to these powers and become so identified 
with sinners that he answers their rejection of him with an even greater 
self-giving out of love for his enemies.89 How the Father uses the death of 
his Son as a means by which his goodness may enter the human heart, 
is the subject of the next section. Before turning to it, I comment briefly 
on Schwager's atonement discussion. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Pannenberg's substitutionary theory would have been worth considering here. For Pannenberg Jesus dies 
under the law as a blasphemer. The death penalty he bears is the penalty deserved by the whole people 
Israel as far as they arc bound to the law. He is vindicated in the resurrection and through this reversal God 
turns Jesus' judges into blasphemers nullifying the law as interpreted in its pre-Easter operation.
Pannenberg then widens the horizon of substitution to include all humanity [cf. Pannenberg, Jesus - God
ancl Man, (London: SCM Press, 1968), p. 258-269). 
8'> Ibid., 111-113 
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In my view, a good case can be made on Biblical grounds why a 
still wider scope of Schwager's atonement discussion would have added 
further strength to his hypothesis. As we have already observed, in his 
attempt to disprove the penal-substitutionary theory of the atonement 
based on the non-violent character of God, Schwager works carefully 
through a non-sacrificial exegesis of the Epistle to the Hebrews. 
However, other New Testament texts notably Rom 3:25; 1 Cor 5:9; 1 Cor 
11 :25; Eph 1 :7; Eph 2: 13; Col 1 :20, also connect the idea of 'blood' with 
such important rubrics as expiation, justification, covenant, redemption, 
and reconciliation. Given his painstaking attention to the 'blood­
metaphor' in Hebrews, it would have made his position more complete 
had he devoted some space to these texts also. When dealing with Jesus' 
self-understanding of his death, I noticed that he does not mention the 
idea of ransom (although it is implied in places, e.g. on p. 113). However 
else Jesus might have understood it, he certainly spoke of it in those 
terms (Matt 20:28; Mark 10:45). Since the term (grk lutron) and its 
cognates is used in the LXX close to 140 times with the general meaning 
of payment in exchange or compensation, I would have expected some 
reference to it. Lastly, I missed a discussion of Jesus' role in the cosmic 
dimension of reconciliation as an aspect of God's redemptive drama (cf. 
Isa 65:25; 2 Cor 5: 19; Col 1 :21). 
3. 4 The Transfonnation of Evil and Human Conversion 
With our focus on transformation, this last part of our engagement 
with Schwager will cover new ground, but also draw together most of the 
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ideas discussed so far. It will also permit us to propose some conclusions 
about their value for our hypothesis. 
The New Testament phrase, 'the rem1ss1on of sins' (aphesis 
harrnation) does not merely mean the pardon of sins as generally 
understood. It means also their removal, not only of the guilt but also of 
the warped patterns that have sin as their source so that man may be 
set free from their enslavement and compulsions.90 In this section we 
shall give attention to two questions. How does this mysterious 
transformation that emanates from Jesus' work occur in the believer? 
And how is its dynamic related to mimetic theory and thereby to our 
thesis? 
To understand Schwager's presentation of this transformation, we 
need to go back to his notion of 'victim'. At the crucifixion, Jesus became 
the victim of his executioners or generally speaking he became the victim 
of human violence and sin. But in his dying moment "by the power of the 
eternal Spirit" (Hebr 9: 14), he surrendered and entrusted his Spirit to 
the Father (Luke 23:46). In this act he transformed human dying, which 
is largely something humans endure, into an act of deliberate 
surrender.91 Since at this point Jesus gave up the very possibility of
determining himself by his own spirit and so became "totally available 
material" to the Father, he fulfilled in his total abandonment the 
condition for a sovereign action by the Father, namely the resurrection 
from the dead.92 Jesus, by turning the violent death into a deliberate 
surrender to the Father, became the Scapegoat and the Lamb of God in 
•m This term 'remission of sins' covers what in Christian parlance is understood as 'justification' and
'sanctification'.
'II Ibid., 188 
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one and the same act.93 In other words, we must see the death of Jesus 
as self-sacrifice. By abandoning himself into the hands of his enemies, 
Jesus opened himself totally to God and united his will with that of the 
Father to the limit. And when the sinful deeds of his enemies drove him 
to his extremity, they wrung from his heart nothing but limitless self­
giving love and in so doing, because of his identification with them, they 
generated unwittingly their own possibility for transformation. 
But given man's "unprogrammable freedom",94 how can people be 
brought into a subjective experience of what has been worked out for 
them in this drama? From our discussion of the idea of )udgement' we 
recall Schwager's emphasis on Christ's identification with people "in so 
far as they are victims". Schwager also emphasized that there is in each 
person a domain of his or her own responsibility, which is "holy", 
"inviolable" and "original", so much so, that even the most costly 
substitution and grace must not and will not overpower it.95 However, 
while God's respect for human freedom is unconditional, it is not 
limitless. As the Easter event shows, God's love will not abandon sinful 
humanity to its own fate. On the cross, Jesus submitted to the abuse of 
human freedom (sin) while in the same breath making the most 
'12 Ibid., 189 
'11 Ibid., 205; cf. also Jesus' words in John I 0: 18: "No one takes it from Me, but I lay it down of Myself. I 
have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it up again. This command I have received from My 
rather." 
'
11 Schwager, .Jesus in the Drama, 199; a question arises at this point, the exploration of which would 
require a different study than this one. What is Schwager's view of man and of human freedom? If man 
subsists in his biological constitution on the basis of "ontological necessity" rather than freedom, as 
Zizioulas has argued, what is the nature of freedom for 'biological man'? In our fallen condition, the 
possibility of choice is between rival alternatives. These arise from "divisions within [man's] being", born 
from his claim to be the ultimate point of reference. In other words, freedom of choice is not freedom but 
compulsion driven by the necessity of choice. True freedom comes when man is delivered from the inner 
division and his alienation from true community through new birth in Christ. It would seem from the 
phrase man's "unprogrammable freedom" that Schwager's notion of the human being is based on an 
individualistic ontology rather than on one of personhood in Zizioulas' terms [cf. J. Zizioulas, Being as 
Comm1111io11 (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1985), p. 50-53, 120-121]. 
44 
excruciating effort for man's deliverance and welfare as an expression of 
God's goodness. As Schwager puts it: 
The dissolved limits remain in the concept of God as differences, but at 
the same time point beyond themselves. The "concept" of God, which is 
achieved in this way, is a concept which differs from all others not only 
by its content, but also by its nature. It is a concept that includes a 
complete event, which concerns humans, which at the same time 
radically surpasses them, and into which they remain drawn in under 
every aspect. With this event there is no longer a final external 
restriction, but all limits are overcome from within and remain only as 
richness of differences (emphasis added). 96
This 'overcoming from within' lies at the heart of Schwager's model 
of conversion. As people are drawn into the Easter event, the image of 
the Victim infiltrates their world of self-will and violence. What had been 
man's prison from the foundation of the world97 is about to be opened 
from within and with their consent. Because the image of the Victim is at 
the same time God's image in identification with people to the extent that 
they are victims, there exists now a path for the post-Easter movement of 
the Spirit.98 We observe this dynamic at work in the post-Easter conduct 
of the disciples after the coming of the Spirit at Pentecost. Face to face 
with the Victim they had in an act of self-surrender to the other (which 
we may call worship), surrendered their right of self-determination. In 
this highest exercise of human freedom they had become 'material' for a 
sovereign act of God, the subsequent gratuitous 'invasion' of the Spirit, 
'JS Schwager, ibid., 194; power and its application to God is criticized by the meekness of the Crucified. 
'J(, Ibid., 201 
n Ibid., 189 
'!HSince the Spirit is the love between the Father and the Son, whereby both act as free persons in love 
towards each other in a deliberate act of "mutual self-giving" that includes their communication, the 
Spirit's work in conversion must be understood in the same way. This reciprocity of communication and 
surrender was especially visible in the dramatic progression of Jesus' ministry. The rejection of the 
Kingdom called for an ongoing interaction between the Father and the Son and involved the latter in giving 
his consent to the demands of every new situation in complete freedom as the Father desired. The freedom 
by which Jesus surrendered himself at the human level corresponds at the divine level to God's freedom in
the eternal counsel of his will. In other words, freedom is more than 'freedom of choice' manifestin" ine, 
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which transformed their inner being. If such are the dynamics that 
operate at the heart of all Christian experience,99 what can we glean from 
them for our thesis? 
As we have seen, as a fallen creature man is a victim of sin as well 
as its active agent. Because of God's unlimited goodness he has acted in 
Christ on man's behalf and performed an objective work to deliver man 
from the effects and the enslavement of sin. However, there is a 
subjective side to man's salvation that requires a deliberate act of 
consent and appropriation of what God has done to make it effective at 
the human level. As we have seen, the intersection between the objective 
work of God and the subjective experience of salvation is the image of the 
victim. Man can receive this image without fearing the violation of his 
freedom, because he too has been a victim. Schwager says that humans 
are "drawn" into this all-surpassing event that produced it, which closely 
echoes Jesus' own words when he spoke of the mysterious attraction of 
the cross (John 12:22). This 'infiltration', therefore, does not happen by 
stealth to get around man's inviolable freedom and save him against his 
will. Rather God uses the victim image as a symbol of self­
communication, for it is a familiar sign. Or one might say it provides the 
structure, into which the image of the Victim fits, for it was generated by 
the familiar mechanism of collective violence. As irony works as a literary 
device through its opposite, so the true Victim uses the shape of the 
'receptor' which the founding mechanism of archaic religion has 
fashioned in the human heart. As people are drawn to the image of the 
particular acts of obedience, rather an all-encompassing freedom capable of surrendering the whole being 
[ cC Schwager, ibid.,209-217]. 
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Victim, the Spirit of God inserts the true image, which, when received, 
releases its freight of truth and love and so subverts from within man's 
bondage to the false 'transcendence' based on lies and violence. Thus the 
image of the Victim becomes the point of contact and continuity between 
the old order and the new. 
3.5 Summary 
In the foregoing we have tried to show from Schwager's analysis 
that in Christ God is so identified with human beings that he himself 
becomes their sins' victim. He experiences in his own person sin's 
destructive power and tastes death not because the justice of the Father 
slays the Son, but because he embraces and exhausts in that embrace 
the universal victimhood of human sin. 
Through the image of the victim, which is the focal point of the 'old 
order', man may be 'infiltrated' with a familiar symbol that now comes to 
him as God's self-communication. When under the influence of the Spirit 
man's inner being comes to agree with God, and man performs this act 
freely, albeit not unaided, it constitutes the actualization of his original 
responsibility. Since it replicates the Son's obedience and surrender to 
the Father in response to the Father's self-communication, it is man's 
first act of pacific imitation. 
By opening himself up to God, man lets go of his hold on self­
determination. God responds with the gratuitous bestowal of his Spirit 
and man enters a new mode of existence. He receives a new identity that 
•i•i Which Jesus himself saw as so radical that he called this transformation a re-birth by the Spirit (John 3:3, 
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1s on the one hand rooted in Christ's identification with him - even the 
reality of sonship for he is now identified with Christ as Victim and as 
Son. On the other hand, because he is a son, he now desires to work out 
his sonship situation by situation and face to face with the true image of 
God. Man's identity is now carried by grace, setting man free from 
grasping something that is already given. Converted man is called to 
actualize this life in history by faith and in obedient imitation of Christ 
who has become his model and the center of his being. In this way 
Schwager's brilliant analysis supports our hypothesis that there are 
theological reasons why humans have been created as mimetic beings. 
Through the work of Bailie and Schwager we saw the drama of 
man's salvation in a fresh light as Girard's theory illuminated unseen 
nuances of both actors and story. The next Chapter where we explore 
Alison's treatment of original sin from the vantagepoint of the 
resurrection promises to enrich this picture further. 
7). 
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CHAPTER 4 HUMAN MIMESIS AND ORIGINAL SIN FROM THE 
VIEW OF THE RESURRECTION IN JAMES ALISON'S 
The Joy of Being Wrong. 
4.1 Introduction 
We concluded the previous Chapter with the remark that 
converted man now lives by grace resting in the identity he has received 
as a gift and no longer seeks it by grasping for what has already been 
given. 
Alison's work, too, concludes on such a note. While the outcome is 
the same, in comparison with Schwager's route Alison traverses quite 
different theological terrain to arrive there. The larger context of his 
theological project seeks to establish the absolute deathlessness of God 
and our calling to participate through pacific mimesis in "deathless 
divine effervescence" . 100
In The Joy of Being Wrong he deals with original sin and takes as 
his anthropological starting point the death and resurrection of Christ. 
This explains why he abandons the Biblical narrative sequence of 
'creation - fall - redemption - new creation', and instead adopts a 
perspective he calls "Easter eyes". He claims to follow "the logic of 
discovery", because in his view we are able to explicate the meaning of 
original sin only through the revelation of God's activity in Jesus Christ 
and the radically new humanity that emerges as a result of the 
100 This expression was taken from the comprehensive review article of Alison's theological project by 
Charles Hetling [C. Hetling, "A View from the Stern: 689-710]. 
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resurrection.IOI Thereby he seems to align himself with Barth's view that 
Christian theology begins with the resurrection. I02 His conceptual tools
are those of Rene Girard. 
What is important for our thesis 1s his development of a view of 
God as deathless, creative relationality and its coherent relation to 
mimetic theory. In our engagement with him, we hope to elaborate 
further on our hypothesis that there are discoverable theological reasons 
for human mimesis, or more broadly that the Biblical idea of the 'imago 
Dei' may perhaps be more fully understood in the language and concepts 
of Girard's theory. 
We plan to draw on supportive arguments from three themes of 
Alison's work. Firstly, we shall examine from a mimetic point of view the 
pattern of original sin in relation to the death of Jesus. Secondly, we 
shall explore Alison's idea of the "intelligence of the Victim"I03 [by which 
he means not a particular piece of knowledge but a fundamental change 
in human consciousness]. Thirdly, we shall consider Alison's view of the 
new community (and its underlying relationality) that gathers as a result 
of the Christ-event. 
4.2 The Pattern of Original Sin and the Death of Christ 
Sin existed in the universe before the fall of man. Since the 
Scriptures are silent about its ultimate origin, 'original sin' refers to its 
first presence among humans. Traditionally its pattern has been 
1111 Alison , The Joyo/Being Wrong, 94
1112 C. 1 leflint:, ibid.
1111 Alison, lie Joy of Being Wrong, 80
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identified as two concurrent processes. The tempter enticed the woman 
in the Garden (Gen 3) to doubt the veracity of God by appealing to the 
fruit's desirability through the suggestion that God was withholding 
something valuable from her. In the presence of the prohibition not to 
eat the fruit, these insinuations unleashed in her the irresistible desire 
to proceed with its illicit acquisition. The charge of idolatry and the 
depravity of the motif have often been taken as the interpretative focus 
typified by the following commentary, "she gave the tempter the place 
that belonged to God only [and] accepted the most blasphemous assault 
upon [his] integrity".104
This is not the place to discuss the long and complex career of the 
doctrine, nor the incomprehensible nature and origin of sin. Alison's 
phrase that "desire distorted itself'105, does not offer meaning but is in
itself an indication of sin's non-sensical nature as Hefling has pointed 
out.106 The aim of this discussion is more modest, namely to answer the 
question how the pattern of original sin as Alison describes it can deepen 
the understanding of our hypothesis. 
According to Alison, at the root of the story in Gen 3 lies the 
presence of mimetic desire. The object (the forbidden fruit) became 
desirable, because some one else desired it. In this case it was God for 
whom it was proper to desire what was his. Since the object belonged to 
God but through the serpent's mediation became an object of desire in 
10' J. M. l ouston, "Sin," in New Bible Dictionwy, eds. by J. M. Douglas, (Leicester: Intervarsity Press, 
I 962), 1189-1193. 
101 Alison , 7'l,e .Joy if Being Wrong, 151 
10<· Helling has also drawn attention to the risk Alison took by doctrinally linking "originated sin" with an
"originating sin". The latter has to do with the Girardian hypothesis ofa founding murder and the question 
whether we need an original scene at all, for any hypothesis may be a mistake. According to Hetling, most 
modern theologians prefer to be agnostic about the issue whether original sin was also originating sin. They 
51 
the woman, her desire must indeed be seen as the desire to be like God. 
Since the object was illegitimately appropriated, this acquisitive move 
brought a number of consequences. Human desire was deformed.107 It
became fixated in the "mode of appropriation", that is in the mode of 
getting rather than of receiving, and the relationality that followed 
became rivalistic. 108 Hamerton-Kelly makes the same point when he 
says, "[Adam] was the first to turn desire to acquisitive and conflictual 
mimesis". 109 Further, good and evil, instead of being determined on the 
basis of who God is, became defined by the criteria of man-centered 
appropriation ("What is good for me?" or "This is better than that"). 
Moreover, man no longer accepted his 'self' as something given but as 
something that needed to be acquired by "forging an identity over against 
the other".110 We find a similar idea in Bultmann, for whom "the ultimate 
sin reveals itself to be the false assumption of receiving life not as a gift 
of the Creator but procuring it by one's own power, of living from one's 
self rather than from God" .111 Since such self-determination based on
good and evil always elicits discriminatory judgments, Alison says, it 
functions as "self-expulsion out of the paradise of rece1vmg 
gratuitously" .112 
This deformation of desire is not limited to sensuality as has often 
been read into the story based on the shame of nakedness felt by the 
arc content to accept sin as originated and thus avoid the literalism of a historical fall, a position with 
which Alison disagrees [Hetling, "A View from the Stern" 689-710]. 
1 u7 By speaking of 'deformed desire' we are making already a theological judgment based on a 'good 
creation'. In other words, Alison is asserting that humans possessed a desire different from what it became 
alter the fol I. 
108 Alison, 71,e .Joy o/!Jeing Wrong, 246 
Ill') R. I lamcrton-Kelly, Sacred Violence: Paul's Hermeneutic of the Cross (London: Fo11ress Press, 1992),
p. 88
I Ill Alison, The .Joy o/!Jeing Wrong, 246
111 R. Bultmann, Theology c!f'the Nell' Testament (London: SCM Press, 1952), p. 232
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man and the woman after their transgression. Such an emphasis on 
concupiscence (undoubtedly a consequence of sin) tends to obscure 
more significant elements such as covetousness, rivalry and 
scapegoating. Together they are symptoms of a mimetic cns1s. 
Hamerton-Kelly has even suggested that they signify the presence of 
sacred violence.113 Alison too alludes to the same idea in his
christological reading of the fall. He claims that the murder of Jesus 
suggests what must have taken place at the fall. Convinced that sin is at 
heart a relational matter and not a failure in observance, he writes, "sin 
has to do with relational disturbance, which leads to violence among the 
whole community".114 It follows automatically from the distortion of our 
desire and its manifestation as rivalistic mimesis. This is more than the 
Pelagian argument for a social mediation of sin, the infection by bad 
example and its imitation. 115 It is a corruption of the human heart where 
covetousness powered the mimetic conflict so that even God was cast in 
the role of the "vengeful rival" .116
In his christological reading of the fall, Alison urges a radical 
demythologizing of the event. He argues that from the perspective of the 
Christ-event the first prohibition of eating the fruit looks like a projection 
of a way of salvation that depends on Law.117 Paul has shown that Law 
leads without fail to the 'double-bind' of appropriative mimesis.118 Law 
cannot save, says Alison, because it cannot "reach us at the level of 
11" Alison, 7'l1e .Im• o1Bei,w Wro,w, 246 
111 
• '.I ,:, ,:, 
· R. Hamerton-Kclly, Sacred Violence, 91
111 Alison, The Joy o/Bei11g Wrong, 137
115 W. Pannenberg, ,C,)•ste111atic Theology, Vol 2 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), p. 255
111' Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, 148
117 Explained as a pre-occupation of the post-exilic compilers of the Hebrew Scriptures.
118 See also R. Hamerton-Kelly, Sacred Violence, 88-120
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desire".119 If used without an anterior change in desire, the Law will
function only as an instrument of its distortion for it will suggest that 
God himself is enviously keeping something for himself. Since the New 
Testament repudiates salvation by Law, the only appropriate 
interpretation of the story of Gen 3 is one of substitution.120 Such a
reading of the original Garden scene drastically shifts the focus. The 
center is no longer the transgression of a primal prohibition but a 
person.121 According to Alison, the relationality God was bringing into
being from the beginning was based on the possibility that humans 
recognize each other "as alike in the light of non-appropriative 
mimesis".122 The same humanity that God originally intended becomes 
visible in the new community he gathers after the resurrection, where he 
brings into being a people called to be like him by loving each other, 
rather than a social order that lives by prohibition. 
To fully understand Alison's argument, we still must answer the 
question what Alison means when he says that we need to see a person 
at the center of Gen 3. He reasons like this: if God was bringing into 
being creatures capable of seeing each other "as alike" human mimetic 
propensity would have resulted in the temptation of desiring not an 
object such as the forbidden fruit but another human being. In other 
words, the creature made to relate to others in non-appropriative ways, 
now acted against its own kind rivalistically. Since such coveting of the 
being of another means nothing less than taking their life, the initial sin 
would have been an act against the life of one of the beings God was 
1 
�
1 Alison, The .Joy <!/Being Wrong, 250. Paul's lament in Rom 7: 15ff seems to reflect this experience.
Ullbi<l., 247 
121 lbi<l. 
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bringing into existence and not the transgression against a command to 
abstain from reaching for the fruit. 
Since it was this sphere that Christ entered, a world where 
through the dynamism of mimetic rivalry the very being of others 1s 
coveted and violently 'appropriated', Gen 3 must also be understood m 
the light of this dynamic. When a hostile mob took Jesus' life, he 
suffered the fate of all other human victims, which if applied to Gen 3 
means that the pattern of original sin is murder. Concerning the Law, 
his death showed that its ultimate logic leads to expulsion and sacral 
violence. However, as the "perfect imitator of the Father", he exhibited 
the true nature of God, who has nothing to do with expulsion and 
violence for he is without rivalry. 123
Alison is aware that his interpretation of the fall is speculative and 
that his presentation of the story in Gen 3 is a creative re-reading. 
However, by weaving together a Girardian and christological explication 
of its pattern, Alison reconstructs for us the idea of original sin. He takes 
us beyond the symbolic language and imagery of Gen 3 and raises the 
possibility that the Christ-event revealed the bondage we need to be 
delivered from by re-enacting what might have happened originally. 124
The human condition is not a sickness for which Jesus is the cure, but 
captivity to rivalistic and death-dealing mimesis. Hence, we need life in 
the form of a new, non-acquisitive consciousness to reform our desires. 
Only thus will humans be able to enjoy the non-violent relationality of 
122 Ibid. 
12·1 Ibid., 51 
121 Re-telling the Genesis story the way Alison does may have its fascination, but it also raises some 
serious questions about epistemology and theological method, which are beyond the scope of this paper. I 
disagree with Alison when he sees in the primal prohibition only a rabbinic preoccupation with "salvation 
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grace that God wanted humans to have from the beginning, a 
relationality with him and with each other through radical pacific 
mimesis of his own pattern of gratuitous self-giving. Alison's argument 
strongly supports our hypothesis that pacific human mimesis belongs to 
man's design as part of God's original intention. The mimetic structure 
exists as the mechanism by which human existence may be constituted 
relationally, in pacific resonance with God himself. As we shall see in the 
next section, such resonance with God produces a new consciousness in 
man, which Alison calls "the intelligence of the victim". 
4.3 The Intelligence of the Victim 
When Alison speaks of the 'intelligence of the victim', he does not 
mean a certain piece of information about a person or an event, but the 
complete change in human consciousness that Jesus came to insert into 
human history. The resurrection revealed this consummate shift. 
Jesus' return from the grave brought to light the possibility of 
human existence that previously had been completely unimaginable. 125 
Previously the dominant paradigm of human existence was constituted 
by death; now, his return permitted a view of reality that had until then 
been quite impossible, despite mental assent to certain credal 
statements about the "resurrection at the last day". 126 Death represented 
the defining datum of the human story and its ultimate limit. It colored 
every aspect of human culture and society. But the vision of the crucified 
by law", without making room for the view that it represents the moral demand of love [see also D. Kidner, 
Genesis: /11trod11ctio11 wul Commentary (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1967), p. 33]. 
125 Alison, Tire Joy <f Being Wrong, 77 
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and nsen Lord offered a new hermeneutic key not only to the 
understanding of the Hebrew Scriptures, but also to human existence as 
a whole.127 Until then, his followers possessed little or no comprehension 
of what Jesus was talking about, when he referred to it during his 
ministry. Only afterwards, did they understand what Jesus meant. This 
new understanding was brought about by the revelatory event itself (the 
presence of the crucified and risen Lord) and through the work of the 
Holy Spirit, which as the Scriptures tell us, had only become possible 
after his death. This shift in consciousness, Alison calls the "intelligence 
of the victim". 128
It enabled the disciples to see the life and death of Jesus from the 
perspective of the victim, a view he had possessed all along, while to 
them it had to be revealed with the help of hindsight. Only then did they 
realize what it was what Jesus in his teaching had been trying to 
communicate to them from the beginning. This was more than 
information. It meant the deconstruction of the principles that had 
heretofore governed their lives, i.e. rivalry and survival by victimization. 
It meant nothing less than the re-constitution of their way of thinking 
and being. They had to receive a new pair of 'inner eyes' capable of 
seeing everything from the view of the risen victim.129 
Now the human story could be told from the inside, no longer from 
the position of the victimizers but from that of the victim. But until their 
mind had been renewed, they could not receive what Jesus had come to 
121' See Martha's comment in John 11 :24 
m Alison, 71,e Joy 1i
f 
Bei11g Wrong, 79; Alison refers to the OT as the Hebrew Scriptures as he speaks of
the time when an OT/NT structure of the Bible was unknown. 
128 Alison, 71,e Joy rif Being Wrong, 80 
12') Ibid., 81 
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give, namely himself in gratuitous self-giving. Until then, they could not 
imitate his life. Only after their awareness had been changed, were they 
able also to comprehend the other dimension behind the same reality, 
that the one who moved Jesus was the Father and that the Son was his 
eikon, his perfect imitation. 130
The conversion of Paul exemplifies such a profound change of 
mind. So incisive was the break with his former life as a violent 
persecutor of the Church that he would say afterwards 
I have been crucified with Christ; it is no longer I who live, but Christ 
who lives in me: and the life I now live in the flesh, I now live by faith in 
the Son of God who loved me and gave himself for me. 131
To die with Christ meant to identify with the victim. For Paul the 
sufferings of Christ were identical with the demands of the Mosaic Law 
for which the exclusionary system of the Temple stood as a monumental 
symbol. But his conversion allowed him to see the difference (which in 
essence meant a change in desire): in the realm of the Sacred, mimesis 
favors the persecutors and creates victims; in the realm of Christ, 
persecutors are transformed and now see with a new intelligence what 
they have been doing. They see their deeds for what they are - murders; 
and through the "intelligence of the victim" they are rendered incapable 
of justifying their violence by claiming it is 'good violence' because it is 
done in God's name. Hamerton-Kelly sums it up well when he writes: 
To mime the victim is to see the truth about oneself in the mirror of the 
victim, decoding the transference, so that the representation appears as 
the representation of one's own mimetic rivalry and surrogate 
victim age. 132
1 '° Ibid.; in Chapter 7 we shall examine our hypothesis from a Trinitarian perspective for which Alison 
offers us here an intriguing point of contact. 
111 Gal 2:20 
1
32 R. llamcrton-Kelly, Sacred Violence, 70 
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This same intelligence not only structured Jesus' understanding of 
the Kingdom of God but also his radical moral teaching. 133 No wonder he 
equated anger with murder and lust with adultery, for in each case a 
thoroughgoing reconstitution of consciousness is needed to grasp the 
meaning of this message and bring freedom. Such a reconstituted 
consciousness is more than a coping mechanism that resigns itself 
before an evil world by passively playing the 'doormat'. Rather, the new 
intelligence actively desires the imitation of Christ as a proactive 
encounter with the processes of violent victimization in the world to 
embrace them and in a smaller or greater degree exhaust them. 
The human consciousness of Jesus, as Alison asserts, was not 
formed in violence but was "pacifically given and received" . 134 On the 
other hand, the disciples had to be possessed by this new mind that was 
able to perceive the very grace that made it possible. To quote Alison: 
.. .in Jesus this gratuity was always there and had made the intelligence 
of the victim connatural with him: in this world, what a purely 
gratuitous human presence perceives is the intelligence of the victim. 135
This revolutionary understanding then suggests two conclusions 
for our hypothesis. What emerges is an image of God that is entirely 
without violence and only the radical self-giving of God can make 
possible its application to human society whereby our own complicity 
with violence is totally undone by the intelligence of the victim. This shift 
engenders a move from one community to another, from the world of 
mimetic violence to the ecclesia of God whose members have experienced 
1
:
1 Alison, The Joy oj'Being Wrong, 81
1.,i Ibid., 82
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such a renewal of consciousness and now live m "penitent solidarity" 
(mimetically) with the victim. 136 This renewed humanity shall be the 
focus of the next section. 
4.4 The New Humanity 
Before we explore Alison's view of the new humanity God came to 
bring about through his self-revelation in the death and resurrection of 
Jesus, we need to return to what we have been saying about the present 
s ta tc of human affairs. 
We recall Bailie's argument that the historical moment of 
hominization coincided with the moment when our prehuman ancestors 
encountered primitive religious experience. Alison refers to the same 
event when he says that humanity was born when the pattern of 
imitation "proper to anthropoids became the relatively distinct 
phenomenon of desire" . 137 Prior to the point of hominization, there was 
no acquisitive imitation, but when it happened, bloodletting was 
inevitable. Animal sociality became no longer sustainable among the 
evolving hominids and the human race was born, "however dimly 
recognizable"_ 138 
A Girardian reading of the doctrine of original sm reflects the 
above anthropology. Human origins are closely associated with the 
foundational murder and produce a societal structure that is based on 
the distorted desire of mimetic rivalry, the futility of which is now 
135 Ibid. 
iv, Ibid., 83 
1
'
7 Ibid., 253 
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experienced on a universal scale. As we have already observed, the 
pattern of original sin visible in the 'Adamic' order exhibits a conflictual 
form of identity building. The resulting sociality is however permanently 
locked into the necessity for self-justification at personal and corporate 
level and generates an insatiable existential neediness to acquire value 
and significance in comparison with and over against the other.139 This 
social order is constituted and sustained by the dialectic of mutual 
exclusion. Yet, because of its need to rationalize its identity by rendering 
the other culpable for the present state of affairs, the one and the other 
are locked into an inseparable co-dependence. And by attacking and 
blaming the other, they condemn themselves to the futility of mutual 
resentment and victimization. It is the pattern of a failed foundation. 140 
The questions we are asking along with Alison, how this state of affairs is 
going to be overcome and what does this overcoming have to say to our 
hypothesis? 
Being human meant for Jesus a different sociological order. In 
fact, he predicted that the current societal order was gomg out of 
existence, and that a new order was commg into being, based on the 
radical revelation of grace, 141 which in Alison's terms is the subversion of 
all other foundations. Jesus announced the 'divine project', which 
existed before the fall, and it was the latter that had caused the 
distortion of man's mimetic desire.142 It follows that it is not mimesis but
its distortion that needs to be undone, namely its enslavement to a false 
rn Ibid. 
"'
1 Ibid., 170 
1111 Ibid., 171 
Ill Ibid. 
112 Ibid.
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death-dealing transcendence. What 1s needed 1s a transformation from 
within or 'rectification' of our desire. 
But since the fall, God's original intention for a human sociality 
based on the gratuitous self-donation of God needs to be worked out in 
the midst of this futility, as Jesus' life and death have shown. Its 
revelation (and the overcoming from within) does not come to us in a 
single event. Rather it enters human history through the continuity of 
God's story, beginning with Abraham, via the history of Israel up to and 
including the death and resurrection of Christ, and further, through the 
preaching of the gospel. Alison calls this overcoming of the Adamic order 
"the coming into being of the ecclesial hypostasis143 [to which] the 
gratuitous self-giving of God is original and anterior" .144 
This free gift of God's grace is experienced as an unlocking or 
unbinding reminiscent of the raising and unbinding of Lazarus (John 
11 :38-44), which comes about as a creative act. Through it comes the 
undoing of the "thrall of death" and the "undistortion of desire". Both are 
brought about as a result of forgiveness. It takes the form of a 
dismantling of the structure of futility accomplished through the self­
giving of God and is received as forgiveness and acceptance. The 
resulting transformation is so radical that the Bible speaks of it as a new 
creation. It is the coming out of death into life, out of the clutches of 
143 Alison borrowed this term from Zizioulas, but sets it into a different context. While Zizioulas, in order
to describe human existence in patristic theology, juxtaposes the hypostasis of biological existence and the 
'1_l'/JOstasis 1!f"ecclesial existence, Alison takes the 'ecclesial hypostasis' as the foundational reality of what 
it means to be human but in eschatological terms ("what we are becoming through ecclesial life"). He then 
sets it side by side with its negation that is with human existence locked into original sin. Hetling has taken 
issue with Alison for "sewing the phrase into quite a different fabric of terms" and thus "piling one mystery 
upon another" [cf Helling, "A View from the Stern", 695]. To avoid this problem, we shall not use 
Alison's terminology. Unless I misunderstand Alison, I think Paul's use of "new" and "old" is quite 
adequate for our purpose to signal the same distinction Alison seems to have had in mind. 
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original sm and its concomitant grasping for identity by rivalistic 
mimesis into the possibility of a new mode of existence that "floats on 
gratuity" .145
As the old relational foundations are undone, the capacity for a 
peaceful mimesis and God's original pattern begins to emerge. Alison 
writes, "this new way of being human ... is the fulfillment of the original 
intention, access to which is made available by our being constantly 
unlocked from our insertion into futility of the human foundation".146 
Subjectively it means that we become captivated by a new consciousness 
that grafts us into the new foundation of gratuity from where our new 
desires engender a peaceful mimesis. In the divine ambience of 
forgiveness (Paul calls it "living in the Spirit") the unlocking takes place 
and we no longer relate to the mediator of desire in the mode of 
comparison, but in the mode of self-giving.147
The paradigmatic difference between the 'old' and the 'new' 
sociality is therefore nothing less than the grafting of man into a new 
foundation. Here people leave behind the rivalistic system and no longer 
live by self-justification in comparison with others. Personal and 
communal identity now rests in Christ. Identity is no longer derived from 
the desire to establish it on the basis of what other people think, approve 
of or condemn, but by faith in Jesus.148 Alison equates the subjective
experience of this reality with the Pauline terminology of justification by 
faith. It comes about by the undoing of the 'old' desires on the basis of 
111 Alison, The Joy of Being IVrong, 174 
115 Ibid. 
IH, Ibid., 175 
117 Paul no doubt speaks about this very phenomenon when he describes the generosity of the Macedonian 
Churches: ''they gave themselves first to the Lord and then to us" (2 Cor 8:5). 
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God's creative forgiveness. The emergence of 'new community' coincides 
with the emergence of pacific mimesis. This community now imitates 
Christ even to the point of becoming a victim as it gives itself into the 
world with the goal of undoing the mimetic workings of the 'old'. 149
Herein lies the reason why the martyr church has always been the most 
efficacious instrument in the hand of God in giving birth to the new 
creation, for it presented next to the cross the least distorted human 
exemplar of the (victimary) image of God. 
In the cross and the resurrection of Jesus, God broke into human 
history. Gradually, Alison says, it dawned on the first community (the 
apostolic group) that humanity was locked into the false paradigm of 
reciprocal violence, which in turn "disfigured" man's perception of 
God.150 Now they understood not only the subversive nature of Jesus' 
table fellowship with 'sinners', but also grasped that a new sociality was 
possible where people could in the peaceful imitation of Christ live freely 
"as if death were not". For those who have experienced the creative 
forgiveness of God, the continuity between this life and the next has 
already come into view. Through the revelation of the "deathless nature 
of God" they have come out of death into life so that for them human 
history has begun to participate in eternity. 151
1·18 Alison, 7'l1e Joy oj"Being Wrong, 177 
1
·
1
'J Ibid.; Peter's exhortation, "he who has suffered in the flesh has ceased from sin, that he should for the 
rest of his life no longer live for the lust of men, but for the will of God" ( I Pet 4: I) is just another 
expression of the same point Alison makes. 
150 Alison, 7'l1e Joy of"Being Wrong, 216. In our discussion with Bailie, we spoke in a similar context of a 
'false transcendence'. 
151 Ibid., 216-218. Alison sees in this process also the undoing of the apocalyptic view of history. To him
it is a progression in the revelatory unfolding leading from the 'day of vengeance' to its subversion from 
within and the replacement of vengeance with a new eschatological paradigm through the return of the 
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4.5 Summary 
In summarizing the results of our engagement with Alison we want 
to draw three conclusions. 
Humans were created to relate to God and to each other by 
peaceful imitation. This non-violent relationality of grace that God 
intended humans to have from the beginning, however, is not accessible 
in acquisitive mode, only through radical self-giving until humans 
resonate with the love of God. 152 Human mimesis may therefore be seen 
as the mechanism by which such resonance is achieved. 
However, humanity since the fall is captive to a death-dealing 
mimetic consciousness that has its origin in a distortion of desire. The 
revelatory impact of Christ's radical self-giving in the teeth of human 
appropriative violence inserts into our consciousness, namely the 
revelation of the absolute deathlessness of God. This new "intelligence" 
subverts the distortion of our image of God as a vengeful rival and 
causes a profound transformation of human desire. This shift in 
consciousness enables humans to see everything from the perspective of 
the crucified and risen victim. It opens up the possibility for peaceful 
mimesis by accepting and replicating the self-offering of the Other. 
What overcomes the thrall of death and dismantles the structures 
of futility is the free gift of God's grace. It makes way for a new sociality, 
in which God's original pattern of peaceful relations begins to emerge. 
crucified and forgiving victim. See his Raising Abel: The Recovery of the Eschato/ogica/ Imagination
(New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1996). 
152 Radical self-giving to God is primarily an act of worship. We are reminded of St Basil's imagery: 
"when a sunbeam falls on a transparent substance, the substance itself becomes brilliant and radiates lioht 
• 0 
from itself. So too spirit-bearing souls, illuminated by Him, finally become spiritual as well" [St Basil, On
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This new community lives in penitent solidarity with the victim. Its 
members appropriate the forgiveness available to them through the 
presence of the crucified and risen Lord. They now exist "as if death were 
not", albeit in the midst of the old order, which is going out of existence, 
but henceforth they live as a testimony to the eschatological dimension 
of the new. The Christ event released and empowered the potentiality for 
pacific mimesis, which God had laid into the cradle of humanity so that 
man may exist as his image and likeness. 
1!,e 1/oly ,'·,piril, in 8. Bobrinskoy, The Myslery of the Trinity (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir's Seminary 
Press, 1999), p. 278]. 
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PART III HYPOTHESIS TESTED 
By studying the work of three Girardian authors, we gained in Part 
II a deeper understanding of the hypothesis that human mimesis may 
have a theological explanation. In Part III, we shall test this idea by 
seeking evidence for it outside the Girardian School in the hope of 
discovering links between mimetic theory and the revelation of God. Our 
sources are the Creation story (where we shall focus on the current 
exegesis of the phrase that man was created in the image and likeness of 
God), present day trinitarian discourse in its doxological and its doctrinal 
form, and the life of Jesus. 
The logic we are following is straightforward. If human mimesis is 
a creation gift to the human race, we should be able to discover traces in 
the primeval story of man's origin, especially in the theology of the imago 
and its symbolism. Secondly, mimesis has been defined by Girard as the 
capacity to be open to the world and engage in loving relationships. If 
human relationality is meant to reflect the image of God, we may 
suppose that trinitarian discourse in its descriptions of divine 
rclationality might also show some mimetic traces. Finally, we expect to 
find perhaps the strongest evidence in support of our hypothesis in the 
life of Jesus and in his handling of the mimetic paradox. 
Where we investigate the current trinitarian discussion m its 
doctrinal mode, we shall take our cue from Rahner's Rule and examine 
briefly whether the development of the relationship between the 
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immanent and the economic Trinity from Barth to Pannenberg may have 
something to say to our hypothesis. 
We note that since we will still be using the Girardian lens as our 
apparatus, the theory-laden character of this test is unavoidable. But 
given our aim, it will serve to identify additional mimetic patterns as 
evidence for the provisional conclusion that human mimesis is rooted in 
God's design for humanity as his image and by implication perhaps even 
in the very relationality of God. At the same time, we must leave open the 
question whether in the process of testing our hypothesis every detail 
authentically reflects Girard's system of thought. 
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CHAPTER 5 MIMETIC TRACES IN THE GENESIS PROLOGUE 
5. 1 Introduction 
For a long time, the first sentence of the Bible formed the 
foundational framework of Christian understanding of the beginning of 
the world. But even in a scientific age, we must not relegate the creation 
story to the realm of primitive religion because it is written in 
confessional language. The narrative of Genesis 1: 1-2:3 has been called a 
Prologue to the Book of Genesis. It covers the history of creation, where 
we find ourselves in "time before history" as Scullion calls it. 153 While the 
narrative is presented in the language of symbol and story, and is as 
such without proof, it constitutes by no means 'myths' or fictitious 
material. 
According to Westermann, the beginning of the Book of Genesis 
points unmistakably to God as Creator. 154 For the people of the Old 
Testament the world could not have come about in any other way, and 
their response was the praise of the Creator. In such a matrix of Creator­
creation man found his own place as part of a larger whole. 
Brueggemann sees the Genesis narrative as centered on two divine calls: 
the calling of the world into existence, and the calling of a people. The 
text becomes a reflection upon what these calls imply in terms of 
demand from and response to the Creator. 155 Firmage, on the other 
hand, takes a source critical approach and attributes significance not to 
153 J. Scullion, SJ, Genesis, a Co111111entaryjc1r Students, Teachers and Preachers (Collegeville, Min: The
Liturgical Press, 1992),p. l-lO 
151 C \V C' . estermann, reation (London: SPCK, 1971 ), p. 1-5 
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the cosmology of the narrative nor primarily to the creation of man as 
the climax of God's work, but to the underlying Leitmotif of the P source, 
which he sees as holiness. He argues that humanity and holiness are 
twin concepts of God's image on earth. 156 
The text reflects a mindset different from ours. In the Hebrew mind 
all questions had to be resolved in the relationship between the Creator 
and his creation. Man existed as a whole being in a theistically ordered 
world without abstract conceptions or speculative metaphysics that 
divided the universe into such opposing ideas as 'God and the world' or 
'the finite and the infinite'. It is this inner cohesion of the Hebrew view of 
reality that encourages us in our search for mimetic allusions as an 
expression of the relationality between man and his creator. If they exist, 
we should find them right at the beginning. 
We propose to first examine God's inaugural movements in 
creation and the surrounding circumstances of which the creation 
account speaks. Secondly, we shall look at God's work and man's work 
mandate. In the first instance, we hope to grasp something of the 
Creator's original vision, while in the second we shall seek to discover 
how this intention for his creature was to be implemented on man's part. 
5.2 The Creator's Vision 
By bringing forth from chaos an ordered cosmos, by allocating 
fundamental astrophysical and geo-morphological structures and by 
15
5 W. Urueggemann , Genesis: Interpretation (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1982), p. I
151
' E. Firmage, "Genesis I and the Priestly Agenda," Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 82, 
(1999): 97-114. 
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calling forth a world that teems with organic life, God designates himself 
as Creator.157 His vision is put in place through divine speech such that 
his spoken word is continuous with his creation.158 God pronounces
blessing to ensure life's increase and perpetuity and, when this work is 
done, he declares it to be "good" and avers that what has come forth 
conforms to his original vision and design. McBride puts it this way: 
[God] attribute[s] an ethos to creation, underscoring that its order 
reflects deliberate decisions generated in the will or "moral imagination" 
of the creator.159
What is noteworthy is the complete and immediate correspondence 
between God's desire (expressed by his utterance) and the emerging 
universe. If we analyze this responsiveness, we find a two-fold structure. 
First, there is the recurring word-response pattern: 'God speaks 
and so it happens'. God's word is efficacious as proclaimed in Isa 55: 11: 
"so is my word that goes out from my mouth: It will not return to me 
empty, but will accomplish what I desire and achieve the purpose for 
which I sent it".160 
The second element of this responsiveness, by which the world 
takes shape incrementally under further acts of divine speaking, is that 
it follows an intrinsic order or logos. Subsequent tradition has called it 
'wisdom'. For instance, the personified wisdom of Proverbs 8 identifies 
her presence in the act of creation. Consequently the world is not chaotic 
157 An interesting question arises in this context. Can it be said that what surfaces at the human level as 
mimesis is already inherent in the reflexive self-designation whereby God chooses to be 'Creator'? 
158 Cf. Moltmann, Goel in Creation, p. 76; also, Bruce Vawter has pointed out that in the ancient world, 
words and deeds were frequently seen as one [Vawter, B., On Genesis, p.41 ]. 
IYJ S. D. McBride Jr., "Divine Protocol: Gen I: 1-2:3 as Prologue to the Pentateuch", in Goel who Creates,
W. Brown and S. D. McBride Jr. ed. (Grand Rapids: Ee rd mans, 2000), p. I 0
iw Analogously we find in human relationships that words have power. Not because we live in a magical
world, but because words are able to induce a response in the hearer that may be consonant with the 
intention of the speaker. 
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nor senseless, but intelligible. Hermisson wrote, "Wisdom ... is present in 
the created world as regularity and purposiveness, and therefore also as 
beauty". 161
There is yet another dimension. According to Biblical tradition, the 
presence of wisdom while it ensures order and beauty in the universe 
has also an important educational function. Wisdom sayings were 
formulated to turn the correspondence between the intelligibility of the 
world and the divine purpose into effective knowledge at the human 
level, 162 By aligning man's desires and conduct to the pattern of wisdom,
human affairs are adapted to the divine ordering, so that God is honored 
through this response (a form of imitation), which in type emulates the 
material universe in its response to the creator.163 
Other places of the creation story also point to this divinely 
ordained intimacy. For instance, in God's direct speech addressed to 
man,164 how God allocates food,165 and in the regular fellowship he
seems to have enjoyed with man during walks in the Garden.166 The
relationship with man was to be of a "familial" nature.167 It meant -
within human limits - doing what God does, and the scene of Gen 2: 19 is 
a vivid illustration of the idea. God brings to man all the living creatures 
he had made and calls upon man to 'name' them. To be sure, this stands 
symbolically for man's commission to exercise dominion. But just as God 
11" 11.-J. l lcrmisson, "Observations on the Creation Theology in Wisdom", in Creation in the Old 
Testa111e111, E3ernard W. Anderson, ed. (London: SPCK, 1984 ), p. 120 
ir,
2 Ibid., I 19; sec also D. Atkinson, The Message of Proverbs (Leicester, UK: lntervarsity Press, 1996). 
11
'
1 Proverbs 1:7, 20-33; 2:2-5; 10: 12-17; 3:15; 4:6-8; 7:4; 8:10-11 ;  9:5; 10:23; 16:16; 17:16; 19:8; 23:23; 
24: 14 arc relevant examples. 
1rd Gen I :28, 2: 16 
11'5 Gen I :29, 2: 16-17 
I(,(, Gen 3:8 
11'7 M. Wilfong, "Human Creation in Canonical Context", in God Who Creates, W. P. Brown and S. D.
McBride Jr. eds., (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), p. 44
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himself had 'named', differentiated and called forth the cosmic 
creation, 168 so is man now apprenticed to do a similar work at his level 
with the lower creation and thus imitate the divine pattern under God's 
loving supervision and in close relationship with him. i69 Here we find
God and man working together in a moment of shared experience and 
meaning, in a situation one may call the 'primal participative event' 
between the Creator and his creature. This experience of intense mutual 
participation, we suggest, is capable of mediating the desire to do so 
again. For our purpose, we note its triangular structure. As m all 
communication, there is one who communicates and the other who 
experiences the communication and reciprocates it. But then a third 
entity is present, namely the participative event between them. As we 
have suggested, it is the experience of shared meaning that registers as a 
mutually possessed moment of existence made intelligible through an 
exchange of signs. Because the structure of participation is highly 
dynamic, it continually absorbs the relationship into itself, so that each 
new event partially deconstructs and recomposes the concept of the 
relationship, which m turn leads to an ever renewed sign or 
representation. 
6.3 God's Work, Man's Mandate 
l(,x God's 'naming' calls into existence and stands in no comparison with what adam was called to do. 
I(>') I agree with Patrick McArdle that the relations resulting from the naming of the animals are "simple and 
closed" and that the exercise of naming led to the recognition that the rest of creation is utterly "other"[cf. 
Mci\rdle's paper "Called by Name", p. IO, presented at the ACU Research Seminar of July 23, 2001]. To 
my reading, the intimate and mimetic relationship of man to God seems to be also quite visible in the 
divine assignment of naming. 
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We have already suggested that man, as God's creature was to 
follow God's pattern, loving what God loves and doing what God does. If 
we apply this thought to the aspect of work, we find here too some 
interesting parallels. The Creator worked for six days and rested on the 
seventh. Hart has suggested that this pattern "is plainly presented as a 
pattern for man to follow" . 170 He argued that the command to rest makes 
sense only if preceded by days of work and that, in addition, the 
language of the Genesis prologue clearly conveyed the idea of a 
correspondence between God's work and man's. Important from our 
perspective is that the text not only demythologizes man's environment, 
making it safe for work, but also presents again an imitative structure 
where the Creator's work is translated into a mandate for man to fulfill 
in functional terms. Westermann too highlights the point we made 
earlier that man was called to do what God does. He is of the view that 
the nature of man's work (tilling and keeping) falls into two essential 
categories, creating and maintaining,171 which likewise suggests that 
man was to replicate God's work. 
Hart highlights also the liturgical dimension of the "feast of 
creation" as Moltmann calls it,172 when he suggests that man's work 
mandate must be seen in relation to the Sabbath. 173 Its basic 
significance in Israel was not rest (in our meaning of the term) but the 
idea of worship. On the Sabbath Israel did not rest, but engaged in 
liturgical activity and collective worship. According to Hart, "observing 
170 I. II art, "Genesis I: 1-2:3 as Prologue to the Book of Genesis", Tyndale Bulletin, 46, no. 2 ( 1995): 315-
336 
171 Westermann, Genesis 1-/ l, 221 
172 Moltmann, God in Creation 276, following F. Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Er/oesung (Heidelberg, 
t 959), r- 63-69 
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the Sabbath day was a way of making a theological statement". Drawing 
on the parallel of the sabbatical year, which through the pars pro toto 
principle acknowledges God's sovereignty over the land, he argues that 
the meaning of the Sabbath day should be seen in a similar light. Giving 
God the seventh part of the week means giving him the whole, which 
sets man's work in the context of worship. Man's whole life is thus 
directed towards God. 
If Hart is correct, we could argue that the sabbatical principle is 
more than just a reminder. Rather it is an invitation to participate in 
God's own pattern at the human level. The idea of man observing God's 
pattern as it may have been communicated before the fall and its 
fragmentary development during Israel's history based on torah, does not 
diminish the force of the argument that we are dealing with an imitative 
mandate. 
Looking at the dimension of God's work in the rest of the 
Scriptures, one finds the same pattern that has already been observed in 
the prologue to Genesis. There is ample support for the idea that God is 
a worker who intends us to engage with him in the same activities as he 
does. For example, R. Banks has shown that a "theology for every day 
life" may be effectively centered on the correspondence between God the 
worker and man's work. 174 No doubt, the imagery of God as artist, 
composer, potter, metal worker, gardener, garment maker, shepherd, 
builder etc. has been taken from the living images of man's world. At the 
same time, we are conscious that God has also revealed himself in those 
rn I I art, "Genesis I: 1-2:3", 315-336 
171 R. Uanks, God the Worker: Journeys into the Mimi, Heart and Imagination of God (Sydney: Albatross,
1992), p. 10 
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terms. To be sure they are metaphors that provide us with familiar 
vocabulary through which we can relate to God. But we would miss an 
important dimension of God's revelation if we left it at that. Rather, they 
are given to engage our imagination so that we may be drawn more 
deeply into God's pattern of life. Just as metaphor seeks to bring 
harmony between language and the world, so it reaches perhaps its 
supreme instance of connectivity when it mediates between God and 
man through the image it conveys. Such images are designed, says 
Banks, as "a journey into the imagination of God into the heart of God's 
creative work. It is a journey that takes place not for its own sake, but 
that we might become imitators of God." 175
Our closing example comes from the vast realm of musical 
expression. Its very existence may be seen as part of the creative/ artistic 
side of God's inspiration exemplified by the music-making of Israel. Even 
a superficial reading of the Psalms will show the constant interplay 
between the life of God and the invitation to sing, extended both to the 
individual and to the community, and often resulting in spontaneous 
worship. When the Bible speaks of the creation as singing together with 
the angelic host (Job 38:7) and God himself singing over his people with 
joy (Zeph 3: 17), the perception that the musicality of man corresponds to 
God's own musicality is unavoidable. Once again we recognize the 
pattern of intense mutual participation which God inspires to bring 
about a 'participative event' of mutually shared meaning between the 
creator and his creature, which strongly suggests that this participation 
in its worshipful ecstasy obeys on man's part a mimetic structure. 
175 Ibid., 23 
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5.5 Summary 
We began our search for mimetic clues with a reflection on God's 
original creative vision and inaugural movements in creation and noted 
how the creator brought it into being through divine speech. What stood 
out was the immediate correspondence between God's desire and the 
emerging creation. This responsiveness, as a reflection of divine 
sovereignty, followed an intrinsic order of regularity and purposeness. 
The ordering principle of wisdom, we argued, had at the human level 
also an educational function. It was to align human desire with God's 
order by evoking a response that emulated the response of the material 
universe and in this interplay, the presence of a form of imitation was 
perceived. 
We also noted from the creation story that man was called and 
apprenticed 'to do what God does'. Through the work mandate and the 
underlying seven-day structure of the creation week, God was laying out 
a pattern for man to follow. In the assignment to 'till and keep the 
garden', man was expected at his level to replicate God's work of creating 
and maintaining. This correspondence between God's work and man's, to 
which the Scriptures as a whole testify through a variety of imaginary 
metaphors, exists so that man might imitate God in functional terms as 
his partner and co-creator. 
In the course of these reflections on the prologue to Genesis it 
became clear not only that the tenor of the relationship between God and 
man was one of intense mutual participation, but also that man's role 
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was one of imitating God as his model. These discoveries suggest further 
that it is God who inspires this participation with the aim of drawing 
man deeper into the divine life. In other words, man's entire existence 
was to be lived from within a God-centered ecstasy through mimetically 
conditioned participation. 
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CHAPTER 6 MIMETIC TRACES IN GEN 1 :26-28 
6. 1 Introduction 
Few passages in the Bible have been examined and commented on 
more exhaustively than the text that proclaims the reality of God's 
creative activity in the origin of the human race, and declares in daring 
albeit enigmatic language something substantial about man and his 
divinely appointed mission. 
Then God said, "Let us make man in our image, according to our 
likeness; let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, over the birds 
of the air, and over the cattle, over all the earth and over every creeping 
thing that creeps on the earth." So God created man in his own image; in 
the image of God he created him; male and female he created them. Then 
God blessed them, and God said to them, "Be fruitful and multiply; fill 
the earth and subdue it, have dominion over the fish of the sea, over the 
birds of the air, and over every living thing that moves on the earth. 176
As one would expect, the career of this text in exegetical history 
has been as colorful and diverse as the history of interpretation itself, 
influenced as much by the characteristics of the times as by the 
favourite motifs of its interpreters. A vast body of literature has accrued 
on the question what may be meant by the 'image of God' and the 
subject is still an important focus for theological discussion, although 
interest in its exposition has waxed and waned in the course of 
history. 177 Over the centuries, the study of the imago has had an 
important cultural influence, so much so that the history of Western 
171' Gen I :26-28, NKJV, (Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman, 1988) 
177 G. Jonsson, The Image of God: Gen J:26-28 in a century of OT research (Stockholm: Almqist &
Wik.sell, 1988), p. 1-3 
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understanding of man has been regarded as a reflection of the history of 
interpretation of the imago. 178 But as the literature shows, the range and 
the diversity of exegetical opinion have been such that one must 
legitimately ask whether a consensus is at all possible. 
The task of this Chapter, however, is not to explore each exegetical 
position but to seek evidence for human mimesis. Since this term is 
more concerned with sociality than personality structure, we shall limit 
our search mainly to those interpretations of the imago that emphasize 
the dynamic and relational dimension of humanity. To that end, we shall 
first sketch the biblical basis of the imago, then summarize the most 
prominent views of its interpretation. Next, we shall explore to what 
extent human mimesis is detectable in the exegetical proposal that 
currently enjoys the widest support among Old Testament scholars. 
Lastly, we offer a brief excursus on the work of Origen (185-254 AD). 
While his interpretation of the imago does not fit the current majority 
view, we believe we can justify his inclusion in this study. From our 
reading of Crouzel, Origen's modern commentator, it seems plausible to 
me that Origen might have had some distant inkling of the idea of 
mimesis. 
6.2 The Image of God in the Bible 
The primary evidence for the phrase 'the image and likeness' in the 
Old Testament is relatively sparse. The first reference in Gen 1 :26-28 
follows a solemn self-exhortation on God's part "Let us make man ... " 
inll '· 1 ••• • • E l3 )Ju., x111, c1t111g ·. runner.
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Therefore, interpreters have argued the phrase appears first as a 
theological statement, not as an anthropological one. Further, it 
expresses the creator's intention that human beings should have 
dominion over the rest of creation and that they are created as social 
beings through their male- and femaleness. The second reference 
appears in Gen 5: 1-3. Here the 'image' is mentioned in the context of 
generational succession through filiation. The third in Gen 9:5-6 
presents man as an especially dignified being (albeit a sinner by now) 
whose blood may not be spilt on account of the image of God that is in 
him. 
Since the 'image' and 'having dominion' are closely connected in 
the creation narrative, it is reasonable to conclude that "humans have 
been created with a special status as image bearers" and with "special 
accountabilities before God". 179 Von Rad proposed in parallel with 
ancient Middle-Eastern ideas of royal representation, an analogy that 
man is the image of God to represent and "enforce his claims to 
dominion over the earth" . 180 Man as God's image had a function in the 
world. Inherent in the text is the social rather than the individual 
emphasis, not only by virtue of the reference to a plurality of sexes but 
also on account of God's own self-reference. 
The New Testament places the image m a christological context. 
Christ is presented as the ultimate image of God (2 Cor 4:4; Col 1: 15), 
the one who reveals his glory. In salvation the life of believers is 
transformed into the image of Christ and now reflects his glory (2 Cor 
3: 18) and it is their destiny to be conformed to his likeness (Rom 8:29). 
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Therefore, believers must appropriate (put on) the new self (Eph 4:24) to 
experience the renewal of that image (Col 3: 19). God's vision from the 
beginning was to bring about a people (a plurality in community) who 
will reflect his image, the completion of which will have to await the 
consummation of history. 
6.3 Summary of "Imago" Exegesis 
The current exegetical tradition (as distinct from the doctrinal 
tradition) of the imago Dei has existed for over a century as Jonsson has 
shown.181 During this period many changes in exegetical methodology 
and emphasis have occurred which influenced the interpretation of the 
imago Dei. Literary criticism together with the emergence and 
subsequent refinement of the documentary hypothesis of the Pentateuch 
text, played important roles. In addition, the discoveries of ancient extra­
biblical materials like the Enuma Elish offered further insights into the 
importance of these earlier traditions. Since the 1970s a flood of articles 
and books has appeared dealing with the image and likeness of God in 
man. Helpfully, within the broader context of Old Testament studies 
noted scholars (e.g. Jonsson, Wenham, Westermann and others) have 
compiled summaries of imago Dei exegesis. We rely on their work for 
outlining the main contours of current state of the exegesis classified by 
the central idea of each exegetical proposal. 182
17
') S. Grenz, Theologyfi;r the Co1111111111ity of God (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1994), p. 225 ixu G. von Rad, Genesis (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1972), p. 60
181 Jonsson, The Image of God, 6 
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1. The 'image' and the 'likeness' are distinct:
This proposal rests on the assumption that 'image' (tselem) refers 
to the natural qualities in man like reason and personality. The 'likeness' 
(demuth) by contrast represents the supernatural graces, which have 
been lost in the fall. First proposed by Irenaeus, others (including 
Origen) have understood image and likeness as separate aspects of 
human nature. Catholic and Orthodox theology (as distinct from 
exegesis) still show traces of this idea. It has been abandoned as a 
serious proposal mainly because such a distinction is foreign to the 
Hebrew text and does not express the original meaning. 
2. The 'image and likeness' refer to spiritual qualities:
The idea that man shares the mental and spiritual faculties of the 
Creator has enjoyed longstanding support ever since Philo and 
Augustine. Not only were the powers of the soul in memory, intellect and 
will trinitarian traces in man's make-up (Augustine), but the image of 
God manifested also as freedom, consciousness and immortality and any 
other noble trait in man. From its earliest beginnings of the Church in 
East and West, interpreters have been drawn to this view as the most 
plausible one, even though the Old Testament does not support such 
explanations. Augustine, for instance, saw this likeness as constituting 
memory, intellect and will. Modern adherents include such scholars as 
Schleiermacher, Dillmann, Koenig, Procksch, Eichrodt, Gross, Soehngen, 
182 Ibid., 26-34; also Westermann, Genesis 1-11, 147-161 
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and numerous others. The view 1s still current although attempts to 
define the 'image' have been abandoned because it is considered 
superfluous because the nature of the 'image' is too well known. Critics 
have alleged that those who hold this view tend to read their own values 
into the 'image'.183
3. The 'image' consists in physical resemblance:
Based on the most frequent interpretation of the Hebrew tselem
(image) we meet in this proposal with the idea that 'man looks like God'. 
The corporeal form is seen as the expression of the spiritual nature 
resulting in a real external relationship between man's inner being and 
his outward (upright) posture. Those who propose this view do not hold 
it exclusively but see it as part of the meaning of the 'image'. Among 
them we find Gunkel, Humbert, Koehler and von Rad. This view has 
been criticized on the grounds that the Old Testament does not 
distinguish between corporeal and spiritual realms and that in putting it 
forward, scholars have resorted to a crass anthropomorhism. Others 
have been critical from a different angle altogether, arguing that the 
'image' has nothing to do with what man is or does, but with humanity 
as a whole. 
4. The 'image' means man is God's representative on earth:
181 G. Wenham, Genesis /-15 (Waco, Tx., Word Books 1987), p. 30
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This interpretation has come about largely as a result of Barr's 
semantic studies, which led to the understanding that the biblical text 
joins the meaning of the 'image' with the idea of 'having dominion'. Two 
closely interwoven emphases characterize this interpretation, viz. the 
'royal' and the 'functional'. While both locate their meaning in the 
purpose of man's creation (to have dominion), the first draws support 
from recent studies of ancient extra-biblical texts, mainly from Assyria 
and Egypt, where the statue of the king represented the royal presence. 
Analogously the 'image of God' assigned to man a vice-regal position, 
which in turn pointed to God's sovereign rule and witnessed to his 
presence. W.H. Smith and Wildbeger pioneered the royal interpretation, 
while Holzinger and Hehn emphasized the functional view of the 'image' 
which interpreted man's role as one of stewardship. The latter gained 
little support initially, but has now gained favor with most Old 
Testament scholars like Brueggemann, Clines, Dumbrell, Gross, Klein, 
von Rad, W.H. Smith, Wenham, Wildberger, Wolff and Zimmerli. 
According to Hart, 184 it represents the majority view today. Critics have 
argued that the royal metaphor overlooks that the 'image' does not refer 
to individuals but to the species. Wenham says in defense that this 
criticism fails to acknowledge man's implied mediatorial role between 
God and the rest of creation. 185 
5. The 'image' as capacity to relate to God:
181 I !art, "Genesis I: 1-2:3", 3 15-336. 
185 Wenham, Genesis 1-15, 31 
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This exegetical proposal emphasizes that man has been created as 
a being that can stand before God and be addressed by him. It points to 
the divine - human partnership and emphasizes that God and man may 
have dealings with each other. This view has often been associated with 
Barth, but it enjoyed adherents before him. It is first found in Riedel 
(1902). Barth, Brunner, Hessler, Horst, Stamm, Vischer, Vriezen and 
Westermann are among its main proponents. Barth's view that the 
'image' did not refer to anything that belonged to humanity, but to 
humanity itself, offered a new starting point for the 'imago Dei' 
discussion. According to Barth it is in Jesus that we perceive by faith the 
true image of God. Thompson commenting on Barth, writes: "it [the 
image] is given in and with the structure of our being and belongs 
inherently to all people, whether they know it or not." 186 However, it is 
not only the humanity of Jesus that is in view here, but also man's 
communal nature given through our male and femaleness. According to 
Barth, the imago Dei is found in our creatureliness such that our co­
humanity in Christ encompasses the possibility of partnership with God, 
which can only be fully exercised as re-born members of the body of 
Christ. 187 Westermann took a different route and argued that the biblical 
text speaks of an action on God's part and of human nature and that the 
'image' has meaning only in the context of the primeval event, namely 
the process of creation. His presupposition critiques all other views, 
which assume that people bear the image of God as a special quality. In 
his view, exegesis has falsely centered on what the image consists of and 
what it means. Since the text does not offer a universally valid statement 
181' J. Thompson, Modern Trinitarian f'erspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.112
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about the nature of man or the quality of human beings, we must 
rethink our interpretive framework and see the process of creation as the 
hermeneutic of the 'image'. Because the text says something of the 
beginning of humanity, it is the act of creation that enables an event to 
take place between God and man. To that extent, Westermann's view 
overlaps with #4 above. 
* * * 
How do we relate the foregoing to our investigation? If, with 
Westermann,188 "the meaning [of the image] must come from the creation 
event", we can argue that what God creates must correspond to him. 
Furthermore, since the creation text is not concerned with the creation of 
the individual but with mankind as a species, we must avoid engaging in 
ideology driven speculation about special qualities. But if no particular 
quality is meant other than being man, if humanity as a whole is created 
as God's counterpart, 189 then all differences between men and women, 
between one ethnic group and the other, are transcended. In Chapter 6 
we noted the immediate correspondence between God's creative 
utterance and the order which followed. We also observed a similar 
correspondence between God's work and man's so that the 
representational/ functional interpretation of the 'image' 1s quite 
compatible with the thrust of our main argument. Our reflections on the 
vision of the Creator and man's mandate are, in other words, in close 
agreement with the last two exegetical positions. What we shall now 
attempt is to probe this relational expression for human mimesis. 
187 Ibid., I 13 
188 Westermann, Creation, 56 
JX'J Westermann, Genesis/-//, 158 
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6. 4 Iconic Man - God's Counterpart 
Let us begin with the already familiar idea that the creation, 
including the creation of man, is the embodiment of God's loving and 
creative desire. Because humanity as a whole was created as God's 
image, this species is 'iconic'. 19° We have already seen that this symbol 
has more to do with the origin of man and the relationship constituted 
by that origin than with a special quality. At the same time, the human 
being is so constituted that the fulfillment of its iconic design may only 
be sought in an intimate relationship with the creator. Barth puts it very 
eloquently: 
"In our image" means to be created as a being that has its ground and 
possibility ... in God's own sphere of being ... . There exists a divine and 
therefore self-grounded prototype to which this being can respond, which 
can therefore legitimate it for all that it is in heterogeneous imitation; 
(emphasis added).191 
Apart from the ontological point that Barth stresses here, what is 
of interest for our thesis is that God created man such that his true 
existence rests on the imitation of the divine prototype. From the 
perspective of God's original vision we might say that God did not seek 
just to behold what he had created. If human beings are ordained to be 
the image of God, it means that the creature was to recognize the 
creator, and God would in his work behold as in a mirror his own 
countenance.192 Thus man is created as a genuine counterpart whose
l'Jo P. Ncllas, Deification in Christ, p. 173, and J. Zizioulas, "Human Capacity and Human Incapacity", p.
425 
i•n K. l3arth, CD Ill, 183
1'12 Cf Moltmann, God in Creation, 77
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fidelity could be safeguarded only by a love response in terms of God's 
own character. But if humanity is iconic by virtue of its creation, we 
need to ask how iconic humanity is supposed to manifest the 'image of 
God'? The example of ancient Israel illustrates the point. According to 
McBride, 
Israel unlike other nations, ... [was] obliged not only to honor the creator 
from afar but to be configured into a corporeal temple, infused with 
holiness and order to mediate the gracious presence of the cosmic 
sovereign .... " (emphasis added). 193
In other words, man's iconic role was to be mediatorial to the rest 
of creation. Just as Christ is the eikon of the invisible God, so humanity 
was to become a visual reproduction through its relationship with the 
creator. This portrait was to consist in corporate holiness "compatible 
with the divine presence". 194 Let us look at some implications. 
As God's counterpart, man was apparently capable of responsible 
action towards God, towards his fellow man and towards the rest of 
creation. But this implied further that man had to be endowed with the 
ability to be aware of these relationships and ask questions about them, 
that is the capacity for genuine face to face encounter. In Vawter's 
words, "man was not only a creature but also a conscious creature". 195
He goes on to say, "in the consciousness of his creaturehood he mirrors
in some fashion the supreme consciousness with whom he can dialogue" 
(emphasis added). 196 This co-existence and cooperation with God was to 
be achieved along the path of consciousness, discovery and adaptability 
through reciprocity with his Maker, by which humanity through 
1
''
1 McBride Jr., God ll'ho Creates, 29 
1''·1 Ibid. 
i•,s B. Vawter, On Genesis, 57
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creaturely imitation was to replicate the divine life m human 
existence. 197
We have already mentioned man's mandate to have dominion and 
model it on God's dominion. Wilfong's words underscore this idea: 
If humankind is to carry out the task of dominion as God's 
representative, then the exercise of human dominion should imitate
God's own dominion .... (emphasis added). 198
As we can see, the position of iconic man in the scheme of creation 
was to be pivotal. As God's counterpart, it was to be the representative 
link between God and creation by bearing the divine life through 
conscious and faithful reciprocity with its source, doing what God does, 
mediating the presence of God to the rest of creation. This role of man is 
magnificently described m Psalm 104. The psalmist uses his 
consciousness to meditate on the great works of God and thereby 
recognizes the divine order in all that exists. Face to face with God, he is 
concerned about his personal adaptation to the divine pleasure (v 34) 
and expresses his relationship to God in praise and worship (v 1, 31, 33, 
35b). 
But these relational expressions would have little meaning if God 
were not genuinely interactive. 199 In Brueggemann's view, the human 
person, according to Old Testament understanding, "lives in intense 
mutuality with YHWH" (emphasis added).200 This keenly sensitive 
relationship has obvious moral implications for man, for representation 
I% Ibid. 
1'17 Cf K. Barth, CD Ill-I, 184-185 
l'Jx Wilfong, "I luman Creation in Canonical Context", in McBride, God Who Creates,45-46. For Vawter 
this dominion was not to be exploitative, for man's food had been restricted to plants, i.e. man was not 
allowed to kill animals for food [cf Vawter, On Genesis, p. 60]. 
l'J'J Brueggemann, OT Theology, 453 
2')11 Ibid. 
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demands both form and integrity. And the covenant with its obligation to 
fidelity is the instrumentality by which God seeks to ensure that humans 
are empowered to function as the iconic medium of the divine presence. 
"Humanity is sustained by God's covenants", writes McBride.201 But 
man's enjoyment of God's benevolence presupposes adaptation to the 
will of God by replicating in life the liturgical pattern of the covenant. 
What we have been able to establish so far is strongly suggestive of 
what we shall see more clearly in the next chapter, namely that the 
phenomenon of human mimesis seems to be rooted in God's intent for 
man in terms of the divine/human relationship. Man's mimetic design is 
aimed at the fulfillment of his mediatorial and representative role in 
creation. The human being then - like a work of art - was to be a sign 
that incarnates and temporalizes the intention of the Creator, who is the 
ultimate referent of the sign. The possibility exists that this sign is to be 
accomplished dynamically as Gans puts it by "mimetically appropriating 
the central Being" _202
We cannot leave this reflection without thinking about man's 
freedom. If man's role is predicated on an intensely personal relationship 
with God through loving covenantal fidelity, what is it that triggers and 
sustains in man the desire to imitate someone other than himself, 
especially since God's love cannot and will not coerce or compel? On the 
other hand, would not imitation reduce man to a mere mirror or reflector 
and what would that mean for his endowment with power for self­
transcendence and discovery? We cannot explore these issues fully, but 
201 McBride Jr., God 1\'ho Creates, 41 
202 cf E. Gans, L., Signs q/f>aradox: Irony, Resentment and other Mimetic Structures (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1997), p. 94 
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simply draw attention to two aspects. Firstly, our earlier reference to 
what we have called the participative event and its function as the 
mediator of the desire of further replications (which in turn renew and 
reconstruct the signs and representations of the relationship). Secondly, 
that fidelity in the relationship between man and God lies not in 
meticulous observance of law or ritual, but in repeated 'vertical' 
participation (worship). Assuming man is constituted mimetically as the 
foregoing seems to suggest, we would say that man participates freely in 
that relationship, and since he does not perceive his mimetic 
constitution as 'non-freedom', he understands himself as 'free' for he 
acts mimetically towards the model or mediator of his desire. But as we 
have already seen in Chapters 5-7, since man's entrapment in rivalistic 
mimesis is very real, he is deceived about his freedom. Having forfeited 
the ability of pacific mimesis, he cannot extract himself unaided from the 
dark powers of its rivalistic mode. Man must be born again, for only 
Christ can set him free. 
6.5 Excursus - Origen 
One of the ancient minds that seemed to have perceived elements 
of mimesis is Origen's. While neither he nor his commentator H. Crouzel 
whose work we are following, would have thought in terms of mimetic 
theory, we find many astonishing parallels of expression in his work. 
Although Origen adheres like many of his contemporaries to the view 
that the 'image' and the 'likeness' are separate entities, his ideas deserve 
92 
to be heard in the context of this study. For reasons of space, we shall 
limit our observations only to the most telling examples. 
Like most of the ante-Nicene Fathers, Origen interpreted the 
opening of Gen 1 :26 as "a conversation between the Father and the Son, 
his co-worker in creation" .203 Christ is the agent as well as the model for 
the creation of man. Since, for Origen, only Christ is "the image of God", 
Origen invariably refers to man as made "after the image" .204 The locus of 
the image, however, is not in the body but in the soul and in its higher 
regions such as the "intellect or the governing faculty".205 For Origen the 
phrase "after the image" also means "participation in the Father and the 
Son", which in turn means "receiving divinzation and progressing in 
it". 206 The Son communicates to us the "quality of sons". The humanity 
of Christ, while not included in "Christ the image of God", plays 
nevertheless a significant role in the transmission of the image, or as 
Crouzel puts it, "it is the most immediate model offered to us to 
imitate" .207
Origen understands our participation in God dynamically. As 
Crouzcl writes, "the image tends to rejoin the model and to reproduce 
it".208 While he does not imply divine determinism, he sees the image as
man's most profound part. His deepest and dynamic core (participation 
in God) leads man to become more like his model through the imitation 
of God in Christ, which can be understood as progressing spiritually 
20·1 11. Crouzel, Origen (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1989), p. 93
20·1 Ibid.
20' Ibid., 94
2or, According to Crouzel, this term "alter the image" stands synonymously for Origen's understanding of 
sanctifying grace [cf Ibid., 95] 
207 The imitation of God, says Crouzel, is found already in Greek philosophy. While absent in the Old 
Testament, it is abundantly present in the Gospels and the Pauline epistles. The concept holds a strong 
place in Origen. [ibid., 97; see note 30]. 
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from being "after the image" towards the attainment of 'likeness'. As only 
like knows like, we are what we imitate and we imitate what we are.209 
Under the influence of sin, however, earthly, even bestial images, 
are superimposed on the heavenly image. These are assimilated by man 
and worked out on the moral plane. While these images can pollute the 
original, they cannot destroy it. Although the original image may be 
buried under the mire of sin, it can be rehabilitated through the grace of 
Christ. It is this permanence of the image which assures for Origen the 
possibility of conversion. Only through the presence of the image can we 
know God. 
Being created "after the image of God" makes man akin to God, 
and it is God who causes man to desire him. Love is defined as the 
desire for divine things.210 The more man gives himself to that knowing
and desiring, the more he progresses towards God's likeness, which is at 
the same time progression m Son-ship through the believer's 
participation in the reciprocal relationship between the Father and the 
Son.211 Such a relationship Origen hypothesized had its origin in the pre­
existence of the soul, and rational creatures before the fall were 
"absorbed in the contemplation of God" .212
But it is Origen's doctrine of sin that offers us perhaps the 
strongest language in support of our thesis. In a passage on the purity of 
desire, Crouzel, quoting Origen, describes the presence of the mimetic 
M Ibid. 
21''' Ibid., %-97 
210 Ibid .. 140 
211 Ibid., 117 
212 Ibid., �09 
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paradox, where the imitator seeks rivalistically to take the place of the 
model: 
In the divine thought ... the aim of the perceptible is to point the soul in 
the direction of the true realities and ... to inspire in the soul the desire 
for these. There is, however, the risk, because of the weakness of 
selfishness of man that it will take the place of its Model and arrogate to 
itself the adoration due to the Truth, which it figures . ... impurity does 
not attach to the perceptible but to the selfishness of man.213 
While the conclusion from Crouzel's language seems almost self­
eviden t, let us draw the threads together briefly. We note first that even 
in this short account of Origen's interpretation of the imago, all the 
elements of mimetic theory seem to be present: the model, the reference 
to imitation and above all the notion of possessive or acquisitive desire. 
Secondly, we note the deeper insight that, under the deceptive influence 
of selfish desire, what is perceptible to the senses is capable of 
impersonating the true image of God. It may become man's imitative 
center so that this false image emerges as the object of man's 
transcendent desire. Man's propensity for desiring was, by divine 
intention to be directed towards God, and this internal core remains 
present even after the fall. Through it man may recognize and imitate the 
true model, Christ, and grow into his likeness. Astonishingly, it seems as 
if in Origen's mind man was constituted on the basis of imitative desire 
even before creation and that, in his inner core, he was meant to live in a 
reciprocal relationship with his creator, a view to which Crouzel's 
language rather persuasively points. 
6.6 Summary 
211 Ibid., 138-139 
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The purpose of this Chapter was to test the image-of-God 
interpretation as it currently stands in exegetical scholarship for its 
compatibility with the idea of human mimesis. After briefly surveying the 
biblical narrative for occurrences of the "image and likeness of God" 
terminology, we summarized the current state of the imago exegesis. 
Today the majority of Old Testament scholars favour a model of the 
'image' that encompasses humanity as a whole and is both relational 
and functional. We also concluded that this interpretation was in many 
respects compatible with our reflections in Chapter 5 on God's vision in 
creation and man's mandate so that man as a species stands as God's 
counterpart in a privileged, iconic role. The manifestation of man's iconic 
function as a reproduction of the divine prototype was to be both 
mediatorial in the sense of representing God to the rest of creation and 
relational in that it was to be derived entirely from the relationship with 
the creator. This 'portrait' was to be compatible with the divine character 
by mirroring and replicating the divine life in creaturely existence 
through ongoing participation. Since God himself is genuinely interactive 
and seeks to live in intense mutuality with his creature, representation 
demands both fidelity and adaptation to the divine character, which is to 
be accomplished through mimetic appropriation of the divine Being. The 
evidence gathered thus far seems to point to a conclusion that iconic 
man was designed for mimesis. Additional evidence came to light in our 
study of Origen, in whose work we detected many of the elements of 
mimetic theory. The findings of this Chapter strengthened our 
conclusion that the phenomenon of human mimesis is rooted in God's 
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original intention for man to desire him and act mimetically according to 
his ways. It was given to man that he might fulfill his mediatorial and 
representative role in creation and reflect in his creatureliness the desire 
of the creator through free mimetic, yet creative participation with him. 
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CHAPTER 7 MIMETIC TRACES IN TRINITARIAN AND 
CHRISTOLOGICAL THOUGHT 
7. 1 Introduction 
In this Chapter we shall reflect briefly on the Trinity, the central 
mystery of our faith with the aim to apply an additional test to our 
hypothesis that theological reasons exist for the phenomenon of human 
mimesis. Speculative as this attempt may be, the question is whether the 
relational structure of mimesis might have its origin not only in the 
creative intention of the triune God for man (as we have shown in 
Chapters 5 and 6), but possibly in the very life of the Trinity. Space does 
not allow us to engage in a comprehensive review of the doctrine and its 
many nuances. All we can hope to accomplish in this section is to 
discover mimetic traces in trinitarian discourse as it presently stands. 
Already in our discussion of the Genesis prologue we noted that 
the relationship between God and man was intended as one of intense 
mutual participation. Since it was God who inspired it, we argued that 
man's entire existence was to be lived from within a God-centered 
ecstasy. From the viewpoint of trinitarian theology this conclusion says 
two things. The primary trinitarian discourse of the believing community 
is not an abstract and cool doctrinal reflection but a passionate address 
to God himself as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. In other words, before 
trinitarian discourse becomes doctrinal discourse within the community, 
it is worship - the result of divinely inspired ecstasy. 
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In our reflection, we shall follow this twofold pattern214 and look 
first for mimetic traces in trinitarian confession and worship, and then 
seek to discern it in the relationality of the Trinity as understood 
doctrinally. To further underpin our argument, we shall also consider the 
man Jesus in relation to the paradox of mimetic desire. 
7. 2 Mimetic Traces in Trinitarian Discourse 
7.21 Trinitarian Confession 
In the New Testament we encounter the pnmary trinitarian 
discourse in the context of worship and prayer. The true worshiper 
worships the Father in Spirit and in truth (John 4:23). Christ's work of 
reconciliation brought us access by one Spirit to the Father (Eph 2: 18), 
and "God sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts crying Abba, Father" 
(Gal 4:6). The Holy Spirit as Advocate and Intercessor inspires the 
worship and the prayer life of the community (Rom 8:26). Worship of the 
Father is presented not primarily as man's work, but as the work of the 
triune God in which we participate through the Son and in the Spirit. 
The same may be said for the ministry of proclamation, as 
Thompson has shown. Apostolic testimony and preaching was "explicitly 
trinitarian" for it depended on "the Father, who was manifested in Jesus 
Christ himself and written testimony to him by the Holy Spirit is given to 
us m the Holy Scriptures".215 Christian worship, prayer and 
211 Thompson attributes its articulation to Walter Kasper [see J. Thompson, Modern Trinitarian 
/'erspectives, 102] 
215 Ibid., 96-97 
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proclamation exist therefore in a trinitarian framework. But since it was 
made possible through Christ it must essentially correspond to him.216
This is particularly true for the Eucharist, which is an act of worship and 
follows a trinitarian structure. Jesus comes from the Father and through 
the Spirit enables us to have communion with him and "participate in 
his own communion with the Father".217 It reflects the great circular 
movement of the life of God. Originating in God's self-giving love it comes 
to us only to be returned to him in the self-offering of the believing 
community as praise and worship. 
Moltmann, who devotes a whole chapter to what he calls the 
Doxological Trinity, writes: "real theology, which means knowledge of 
God, finds its expression in thanks, praise and adoration. It 1s 
"responsive theology"218 distilled out of the experience of salvation. The
Lutheran theologian R. Jenson also points out the essentially doxological 
character of trinitarian theology. Praise and liturgy, he writes, are an 
aesthetic response to the Beauty of God. Its apprehension is not mere 
subjectivity but the place where "thinking and willing are grasped by a 
reality beyond themselves" .219 And, paraphrasing Jonathan Edwards, he
writes, "the apprehension of beauty is the very event in which our 
thinking and willing are first founded as successful intentions of an 
other". 220 But unless God is actually "Father, Son and Holy Spirit",
Jenson argues, all our trinitarian talk would be of little value. Then, 
2 1(, Ibid., 97 
217 Ibid., 99 
218 J. Moltmann , 71ie Trinity and the Kingdom (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), p. 151-161
21') R. W. Jenson, "What is the Point of Trinitarian Theology?," in Trinitarian Theology Today, eds. by C.
Schwocbel, (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995), 31-43. no Ibid., 32
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great visions of the throne and the lamb or of the fires [and] our icons 
and rhetoric must therefore either be misrepresentations or mimesis ... "
guided by the sight of seers whose · eyes are attuned to such visions 
(Jenson's emphasis).221 
Jenson continues: 
It is throughout eternity that we will be initiated into the pattern of God's 
triune life among the three; if we are now able to shape our liturgy ... , it 
is because our minds may trace a logic not of this world.222 
The point Jenson makes is highly significant for our hypothesis. 
Interestingly he links the human capacity for the apprehension of beauty 
with human mimesis and that in the context of trinitarian worship and 
divine inspiration! He thus seems to rank it as the highest of human 
faculties. If, as Jenson implies, human vision of divine realities is linked 
with mimesis, then we can also conclude that it belongs to what 
Edwards has called "the transcendental unity of the person".223 One 
could even apply his words to the nature of mimesis, that it structurally 
belongs to "a logic not of this world".224 The same echo is found in
Thompson's thought. He sees in Christ the true worshiper and, since the 
Spirit draws us into the worship Christ offers, human worship becomes 
a response to a response whereby "God's glory has its human 
counterpart m our praise and worship".225 In other words, the nature 
221 Ibid. 
222 Ibid. 
m Ibid., 34 
221 Jenson's idea (following Edwards) that worship fuses human thinking and willing into acts of divine­
human glorification and representation would in my view add strength to Bray's argument (cf p. 28) that 
the issue behind Gen 3 was not primarily moral. If one applied Jenson's insight to Gen 3, one could argue 
that the real issue was relational failure to respond to divine Beauty that is failure to make the aesthetic 
response of praise. Eugene Peterson comments similarly when he writes, "Being in the company of Prince 
Myshkin (Dostoevsky's The Idiot) has nothing, or at least little, to do with morality, the doing and saying 
what is right. It has to do with beauty and the good. These cannot be observed in abstraction, for they occur 
only in settings of life, in living, loving persons" [E. Peterson, Under the Unpredictable Plant (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992), p. 54]. 
225 J. Thompson, Modern Trinitarian Perspectives, 103; this reminds us of Paul's exhortation that we are to
"I ive for the praise of His glory" (Eph I: 12). 
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and structure of worship is trinitarian, but its inspired movement is 
mimetic in the form of our free response to Christ's mediation (response) 
on our behalf by which we are drawn into the fellowship with the Father. 
7 .22 Trinitarian Doctrine 
Since it is not feasible in this study to examine every trinitarian 
model, we need to create a workable methodology consistent with 
current trinitarian thought before we can proceed with this experiment. 
We propose a three-step advance. Firstly, we shall assume that the 
economic and the immanent Trinity are constitutively related, for 
without such relatedness we could not say anything about God.226 
Secondly, we shall develop, with the help of Peters,227 a brief summary of 
how the above assumption has fared in recent trinitarian discussions, 
and within this compass we shall search for mimetic traces. 
When Barth challenged the understanding of God as simply a se,
uninvolved with the world, an understanding which theology had 
inherited from Greek metaphysics, he significantly altered the course of 
the trinitarian discussion. For Barth there was only one divine subject, 
yet three modes of being which he grounds in the content of scriptural 
revelation so much so that the Word as God's self-disclosure constitutes 
22c, i\s Schwoebel writes, "if the discourse about the immanent Trinity and the discourse about the
economic Trinity are not constitutively related, the history of salvation becomes irrelevant ... " [C. 
Schwoebel, "Introduction, The Renaissance of Trinitarian Theology: Reasons, Problems and Tasks," in 
fri11itariw1 Theology Today: Essays on Divine Being and Action, ed. C. Schwoebel, (Edinburgh: T & T 
Clark, 1995), p. 7]. What we are witnessing here comes close to Rahner's Rule that the economic Trinity is 
the immanent Trinity and vice versa. With this assumption we not only identify the divine self-giving in 
creation and redemption as a trinitarian movement, but also see trinitarian implications in what we will be 
saying later about Jesus and the paradox of mimetic desire (see 8.3 below). 
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the Godhead as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. From this starting point 
new departures followed, or according to Peters: 
What developed since then has been a progression toward greater 
temporalizing of the self-constituting event of God and the drawing out of 
further consequences of understanding the divine essence in relational 
terms.228
Juengel attempted to resolve the dilemma between God's aseity 
and his relatedness. This problematic is rooted, according Peters, in our 
desire to affirm that God is personal. 229 If being personal means 
relationship with other persons, and if God is personal, i.e. related to his 
creation, then we cannot at the same time affirm God's being a person 
and his aseity. Juengel's solution rested in the proposal that relationality 
already existed in the immanent Trinity. His starting point (like Barth's) 
was not philosophy but special revelation. Since God had revealed 
himself in Jesus Christ, our trinitarian discourse must be grounded in 
Christology. In other words, we can be certain that God "is immanently 
trinitarian" because of what has been "revealed in his economy" .230
However, by resorting to the principle of correspondence as the link 
between the immanent and the economic Trinity, the relationality of God 
still remains for Juengel confined to the latter. 
A new phase in the trinitarian discourse began with Rahner's 
notion that the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity and vice versa. 
In this scheme God relates to the world not in general but in terms of the 
three hypostases. Each "in its own particularity and diversity" 
m Peters surveys the mainstream trm1tanan discussion of the last fifty years in God as Trinity:
Relationality and Temporality in the Divine life (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1993), p. 81-145. Our 
summary is based on his work. 
m Ibid., 142 
22') Ibid., 91 
210 Ibid., 143 
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communicates a gratuitous relation.231 This threefold communication is 
in Rahner's mind not a copy, analogy or correspondence, but the Trinity 
itself. 232 But if it is the relationality itself that is being communicated, 
then God relates his very Self in the economy of salvation so that the 
immanent Trinity has come to us in gratuitous self-giving. Rahner's 
analysis takes the discourse beyond Juengel's by saying that the "Trinity 
itself is with us".233 If we follow Rahner, there emerges an important 
connection for our hypothesis, because Jesus' role as the incarnate Son 
in human history could be seen as identical to his role in the inner life of 
God. We shall connect with this idea in a later section. In Peters' 
summary of Rahner's scheme an important point concerning the nature 
of God is highlighted, which we can only mention but not discuss. If, as 
Rahner insists, we cannot surrender the assumption that God is 
unchangeable, how can the immutable God 'become flesh' and thereby 
incorporate the history of his incarnate life into his own being? According 
to Peters, Rahner does not resolve the dilemma, but hides the problem in 
the divine mystery. Peters asks whether Rahner may still be working 
with the substantialist assumption based on Greek philosophical 
speculation that God is immutable. In any event, Rahner has advanced 
the trinitarian discourse so that Rahner's Rule (the economic Trinity is 
the immanent Trinity and vice-versa) has become a "decisive watershed 
in twentieth century trinitarian thinking" .234 
231 Ibid., 97; Peters quoting Rabner [K. Raimer , The Trinity (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), p.34-
35] 
212 Peters, God as Trinity, 97 
211 Ibid. 
231 Ibid., I 02
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In Moltmann the trinitarian discussion moves into another stage. 
By giving priority to divine relationality, he leaves the presupposition of 
divine substantialism behind. He posits that Christian trinitarianism is 
neither monotheism nor tritheism but something entirely unique and 
only intelligible through an encounter with the God who suffered in 
Jesus Christ.235 The history of Jesus is both, the experience of the Son's 
God-forsakenness on behalf of sinful humanity as well as the 
achievement of a new unity with the Father in the Spirit through the 
Son's immersion into history. Because the Trinity is an open Trinity it is 
possible to draw history into the divine life so that Jesus' own history 
becomes the promise of future eschatological glorification. Until then, the 
Holy Spirit makes Jesus' past and future a living experience in the 
Church. According to Peters, Moltmann seeks to ground his view in the 
revelation of the original Scriptural witness free from the metaphysical 
assumptions about divine substantiality that posed such a problem for 
Nicene theologians. Moltmann sees three subjects acting in history so 
that Jesus' own history is not 'accomplished' by just one, but precisely 
by their "co-efficacy" with each other in their trinitarian inter­
relatedness, and it is that which we witness in the New Testament.236 
Their unity then is not to be found in a prior ontology, but in a 
"unification through dynamic mutuality and relationality" or "in the 
perichoresis of the divine Persons".237 For Moltmann, the identity of the 
divine subject is no longer in a presupposed metaphysical unity (the 
2·15 Ibid., I 03 
rn, Ibid., I 04 
217 Ibid.; nlso Moltmnnn, 71ie Trinity and the Kingdom, 149. Moltmann countered the critique that he was 
projecting a modern notion of persons on to the divine being by pointing out that personhood was closely 
tied to the mutuality ofan I-Thou relationship. And if there was to be mutual love in the Trinity, then there 
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absolute individual), but in the plurality of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, 
which he believes aligns with primitive Christian experience. 
Although Moltmann does not fuse the economic and the immanent 
Trinity "allowing distinctions on doxological grounds" or in Moltmann's 
own words, "we worship God for his own sake, not for the sake of 
salvation",238 he stretched further the line of argument that began with
Barth and continued in Juengel and Rahner. In him it reaches the point 
where the Christ event itself "is constitutive of the divine life proper", 
which "comes close to eliminating the immanent Trinity itself'.239 
Before we draw these thoughts into the framework of mimetic 
theory, we must still consider the views of two other theologians, who 
according to Peters also adhere to Rahner's Rule, Robert Jenson and 
Wolfhart Pannenberg.240
For Jenson the identity between economic and immanent Trinity 
lies in the perception that the latter is the eschatological reality of the 
former. If God is Spirit then the begetting of the Son lies in the moment 
of the incarnation and we should interpret his deity as the final 
eschatological outcome. Interpreting Jenson Peters writes, "the Spirit is 
the principle and source with the Father. The Spirit's witness to the Son 
and the Son's saving work are equally God-constituting."241 In other
words, Jenson posits God's personhood in his "self-constituting relations 
with the history of the world" _242 The decisive point is God's communal
must be more than one 'I' and one 'Thou'. If personality and mutuality belong together, then who we are 
and who God is are both constituted by the I-Thou relationship. [cfT. Peters, God as Trinity, 105-106] 
218 Ibid., I 07. See also Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, 153 
2·1 'J T. Peters, God as Trinity, I 07
rn, Ibid., 128-142 
211 Ibid., 134 
212 Ibid. 
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personhood and ours, which 1s inseparable from relationships with 
others. 
Pannenberg begins where Jenson leaves off (in fact he refutes 
Jenson's position243) with an emphasis on a relational unity of the divine 
essence constituted in trinitarian reciprocal relations. For Pannenberg 
substance 1s subordinated to relations and since relations are 
themselves constitutive, it means for God's being that "each person [in 
the Trinity] is determined by its relation to the others".244 The Father is 
the Father through the Son and the Son through the Father, while the 
Spirit is the bond of their reciprocal love. Pannenberg goes even further 
than this. Not only is divine personhood mutually and reciprocatively 
constituted, but divinity itself. It comes to each of the Three through 
their co-inherence integrated by love. 
To the Son divinity manifests itself in the form of the Father, and the Son 
knows himself only through participation in the Spirit. The Son reveals 
the Father as divine. To the Father, the Son is the realization of his own 
divinity through obedience - that is through the establishment of his 
kingdom of love. And in the Spirit, the Father finds his unity with the 
Son and therewith the certainty of his own divinity. Finally, the Spirit 
serves the Son and serves the Father, thereby finding his own 
personhood and divinity in the community of the Father and the Son.245
With these thoughts Pannenberg leaves the moorings of the 
Western tradition that relied for divine unity on the ontological 
presupposition of a single essence and crests the wave of the trinitarian 
discourse by postulating a mutually 'dependent' self-constituting 
divinity.246
n, Pannenberg, S)•stematic Theology I, 331 
211 Peters, Goel as Trinity, 136-137 
215 Ibid., 138 
rn. Peters emphasizes that in Pannenberg, God is still "free, eternal and independent of the world", but 
explains that God's attributes can only be discerned in relation to the world, so that through the creation he 
made himself dependent on the world [Ibid., 140] 
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As the discussion has been moving towards an understanding of 
the Trinity based on continuous becoming and modes of interaction 
between the Three,247 the question that arises at this point is what 
insights this doctrinal discourse offers for the phenomenon of human 
mimesis. According to Peters, trinitarian theology has traditionally 
sought to define the persons of the Trinity by making use of language 
that belonged to the human notion of the individual. It asserted the unity 
of God by treating him as the absolute subject. Later developments in 
Western theology since Barth moved away from seeking the unity in a 
pre-existing divine substance, but perceived it in the relationality of the 
three divine hypostases. As Zizioulas has recently shown, this position 
was first developed by the great Cappadocian theologians. The three 
persons of the Trinity, by their mutual and reciprocal interaction 
constitute the existence of each other through a constant interchange of 
love and desire for, with and through the other. By reciprocating the love 
of the other they perfectly and instantly imitate the self-giving of the 
other. The Father constitutes the Son who thus receives the Father's 
likeness and in the act of receiving imitates the Father, while the Holy 
Spirit is the shared love in imitation of the Father and the Son. In other 
words, what has traditionally been called perichoresis may be perceived 
in terms of pacific mimesis whereby the three subsistent relations of 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit desire the perfect exchange and imitation of 
uncreated self-giving love in, for and through each other. However, to 
remain true to mimetic theory, we must account for the possibility of the 
mimetic double. The Son in imitating the Father must do so without 
217cfJ. Zizioulas, lJeini as Communion (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1985), particularly 27-65. 
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becoming another originating center with its inherent potential for 
setting up within the Trinity a model/ obstacle in the Girardian sense. 
Here Hegel's insight is relevant that each person of the Trinity 
relinquishes particularity for the sake of oneness and universality. The 
resulting perception of the Trinity as reciprocal self-donation Pannenberg 
has hailed as one of the most significant contributions to the 
understanding of divine perichoresis.248 In our context it suggests a 
resolution of the tension between unity and three-ness consistent with 
mimetic theory. 
While we have not explicitly stated in this study how 'mimetic 
theology' sees the constitution of persons, we have nevertheless implied 
it in many places. A brief summary shall therefore suffice to make the 
point. What is called the 'self' is founded in mediated desire. Thus there 
is no pre-existent self, no subject, only that which is constituted 
mimetically in relationship with others.249 When we think of persons, we 
must therefore think in terms of 'becoming' through the perpetual 
exchange with others, that is in a constant mimetic transposition of 
desire from which the 'self' 2so emerges as a result of socializing
imitation. When we lay these aspects of mimetic theory alongside present 
day trinitarian thought, the conclusion is almost self-evident. Modern 
trinitarian discourse as it seeks to articulate divine relationality seems to 
218 Panncnberg, Jesus - God and Man, p.182-183. If the relinquishing of particularity out of self-giving 
love lies at the heart of the Trinity, must we not see the cross of Jesus in the same light? [ cf. " ... unless a 
grain of wheat falls to the ground and dies, it remains alone. But if it dies, it bears much fruit" (John 
12:24 )]. Such a view would add further support to a non-penal interpretation of his death (see atonement 
discussion, p 46-47). 
2·1'1 As we have seen in our discussion with Bailie and Alison humans are structured in their consciousness 
by mimesis. As long as their culture is structured rivalistically, they too will without fail be constituted in 
their inner being by the same dynamic from which they can only escape through conversion to a pacific 
111 imcsis in the imitation of Christ. 
2511 ·Seit' docs not mean individuals only; it is equally applicable to groups and cultures.
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show significant traces of a language that belongs to mimetic theory 
particularly in Moltmann and Pannenberg. 
7.3 Jesus and the Paradox of Mimetic Desire 
Jesus never presented a systematic exposition of his relationship 
with the Father, but the gospel texts offer ample narrative evidence of 
how he saw himself in that relationship. Right through his life he 
testified to its intimacy. One of the most startling claims Jesus presented 
to his hearers was his identity with YHWH, which earned him the charge 
of blasphemy: "I and the Father are one", and "Whoever has seen me has 
seen the Father".25 1 Many other such references with much the same 
meaning could be cited. Relevant examples are: "No one knows the Son 
except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son";252
"Just as the Father has life in himself, so he has granted the Son also to 
have life in himself';253 " ... understand that the Father is in me and I am 
in the Father."254 
These passages point to the conclusion that Jesus saw his identity 
and his origin in the Father.255 But does this mean that he did not have 
the option of being his own person? In the way Jesus lived and taught 
we note that he never advocated a particular religious observance or 
'rule' as the basis for relationality. Instead, he spoke always in terms of 
2'1 John 10:30,John 14:9 
252 Mat I I :27 
251 John 5:22-23 
251 John I 0:38; other passages alluding to the oneness of Jesus with the Father are found in Mt 16: 17; 
2(P3· 25·34· 18·18 Mk 13·J,· 14·36 Lk 9·26· 10·11 n- n-29 41· 13·46
255 .13y, wa� o·r:x.tra�olation. ;; m�y s
0
ay th�t tl�e r;lati�,�;hi;
·
be;w;�,; J�su� 'on earth' - circumscribed by 
the inevitable limits imposed by his humanity - and the Father 'in heaven', may be directly correlated to 
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model and example and clearly put himself forward as the model to 
follow. His words "follow me" occur over twenty times in the four 
gospels.256 While he points to himself, he primarily points beyond himself
to the ultimate model, the Father, whose image he is. At the same time, 
he emphasized that imitating him would require costly adaptation for it 
would mean to live in a totally yielded and constantly yielding 
dependence on the Father.2s1
I tell you, the Son can do nothing on his own, but only what he sees the 
Father doing; for whatever the Father does, the Son does likewise.258
When we inquire therefore into Jesus' view of his own desires, the 
answer is simple. He gave it himself: "I seek to do not my own will but 
the will of him who sent me"259 acknowledging that he possessed no
desire of his own, that it flowed entirely from his Sonship which rested in 
his relationship with the Father. At the same time, the bestowal of the 
Father's love required from him more than passive receptivity. In order 
for this love to become life in him, it needed to be deliberately received 
and returned. In other words, although Jesus rested in the fullness of 
the Father's love, as the Son of Man he needed to appropriate this love. 
And it was precisely this need that would have brought him face to face 
with the mimetic paradox. At the human level it surfaces as a question 
how man can love God without being jealous of him. For if we admire 
what we have already observed about the Trinity. Their mutual and reciprocal interaction, as well as the 
rriority or the father's will are only too evident. 
25r, It occurs with equal frequency in the Synoptics and in the fourth gospel.
257 The word 'imitation' does not mean that following Jesus involves becoming a carpenter or conducting 
an itinerant gospel ministry. Rather it means following in his footsteps of radical self-giving love to the 
roint where the established order of rivalistic culture is called into question with the predictable 
consequence of expulsion for those who do. As Paul wrote to Timothy, "everyone who leads a godly life in 
Christ Jesus will be persecuted" (2 Tim 3:12). 
258 John 5: 19 
2
5') John 5:30 
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God, yet cannot be like him we humans are aroused to jealousy.260 We
have already touched on this dynamic when we discussed the Trinity. 
Since we can only know what we desire through models, we must 
suppose that Jesus as a human being could have become entangled in 
the 'double-bind', whereby at the height of his imitation of the Father his 
model might become the obstacle or rival. Judging from his temptation 
experiences, Jesus understood these dynamics very well. 
The first is recorded for us after his baptism. He had heard the 
voice from heaven: "this is my beloved Son".261 Soon after, the tempter
approaches with these words, "if you are the Son of God .... "262 By
questioning Jesus' Sonship, the tempter insinuated an ontological 
deficiency while subtly suggesting that Jesus needed to grasp its 
realization on his own terms as he accentuated its desirability. Had 
Jesus followed this satanic invocation, he would of course have repeated 
the mimesis pattern of Gen 3 bringing about a sonship 'from below'. 
The gospels record other incidents which humanly speaking would 
have constituted mimetic crises or temptations for Jesus. By briefly 
examining them we will highlight the underlying mimetic issues and see 
further evidence for our hypothesis. For instance the episode when the 
crowd, after having been miraculously fed, sought to make him king by 
acclamation and also the moment when the possibility for a political 
uprising arose after the cleansing of the Temple. A particularly 
illustrative example is found in Matthew's gospel. Just before his 
lr,o For a more detailed exploration of the double bind in the context of the spiritual life see J. Grote, "The 
Imitation of Christ as Double-Bind: towards a Girardian Spirituality," Cistertian Studies 29, no. 4 (1994): 
485ff. 
2rd Matt 3: 17 
21'2 Matt 4:3; 4:6. 
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crucifixion Jesus refuses to draw on angelic troops to rescue himself and 
his mission through an act of "messianic violence" .263 In each case Jesus
responds with a gesture that showed his authority but he refuses to 
assert his power. In other words, whenever he finds himself in a 
situation of rivalry with earthly powers or satanic suggestions he 
conquers the mimetic crisis in his own being. Faithful to the Father's 
desire, he rejects the model 'from below' that baits him to respond with 
an appropriation of personal power. 
Finally, although the gospels are silent about it, one can surmise 
that on the cross this faithfulness would have had to undergo one 
ultimate trial. At the height of his demonstration of trinitarian love, this 
final temptation would have pressed upon him from the same direction 
as the earlier ones, the taunts of the bystanders suggest at least this 
much. At the extremity, he would have been tempted for the last time to 
discontinue his steadfast trust in the Father and take matters into his 
own hands. But instead of responding with scandalized resentment, 
which would have meant that he had taken offence at the Father, he 
responded with loving obedience. As Jesus embraces on the cross the 
unspeakable tension between humanity's violent expulsion of himself on 
the one hand and the Father's desire for their gratuitous inclusion on 
the other, the power of the mimetic paradox is overcome. 
The significance for our thesis is this: these temptations would 
have been rather pointless had the man Jesus (sinless as he was) not 
been mimetically excitable. Yet he was immune264 to mimetic 
21'1 I have borrowed this term from John H. Yoder's The Politics of Jesus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, I 995, 
1 1"1 Ed'. _ � ,11011), r- 46 
21'1 Sec also note 97.
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contamination. This immunity is to be seen in the irrelevance of the 
freedom of choice in the life of Jesus for the content of his freedom was 
not choice but being in the grip of a destiny that came from the Father 
which excluded all other possibilities. This notion would be consistent 
with Girard's theory which denies the existence of an autonomous will 
(freedom of choice) because the presence of mimetic desire (in Jesus' 
case the Father's desire) which excludes the free play of possibilities and 
presupposes an indifference to other objects of desire. By virtue of his 
own mimetic fidelity to the Father's desire he opened up within the 
compass of human existence the possibility of its transformation through 
a mimesis not of this world. 
From the preceding account of the life of Jesus the impression is 
reinforced that human mimesis as it pertains to man's creatureliness 
(not his sinfulness), may have its origin in the dynamic life of God as 
seen in contemporary theological reflection. 
7.4 Summary 
We began our search for mimetic clues in trinitarian and 
christological thought with the observation that trinitarian discourse is 
worship before it becomes doctrinal reflection. This logic provided the 
structure for our inquiry. We examined some of Jenson's thoughts on 
doxology and discovered that he was quite aware of the mimetic nature 
of human worship implying that m1mes1s belonged to man's 
transcendental capacity given for the apprehension of liturgical patterns 
and of divine beauty. Thompson too believes that when we worship God 
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we imitate Christ the true worshiper and he called worship a "response 
to a response". Similarly Moltmann speaks of doxology as "responsive 
theology". To discover in scholarly trinitarian thought (particularly in 
Jenson) such a clear recognition of the doxological dimension of mimesis 
might come as a surprise especially as such reflections occurred quite 
independent of the Girardian School. 
Next, we argued our case from the development of Rahner's Rule in 
recent discussions of the doctrine. We noted - if Peters' summary is an 
accurate reflection - that modern formulations in their description of 
divine relationality have engaged concepts and language that are quite 
consistent with mimetic theory, particularly in the work of Moltmann 
and Pannenberg. In other words, leading theologians express their 
understanding of the inner trinitarian life in terms that show distinctly 
mimetic connotations. 
Lastly, we examined the presence of mimetic desire in the life of 
Jesus. After pointing to his own self-understanding as the perfect 
imitator of the Father's will (desire), the presence of mimetic paradox was 
highlighted by reference to his temptation experiences where the satanic 
logic of grasping (violence) and Jesus' logic of trusting (non-violence) 
clashed. The key to his overcoming was his absolute and moment by 
moment yielding to the Father in loving self-donation. We concluded that 
it was not by virtue of morality, but through a higher order of mimesis 
that he achieved an imitation of the Father free of jealousy and 
resentment. Jesus' pathway to a faithful representation of the Father's 
will was an utterly pacific mimesis so that Jesus is the only human 
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being who totally fulfilled the calling that belongs to all mankind as the 
image of God. 
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PART IV CONCLUSION 
Our exploration of the question how Girardian anthropology may 
be related to the image of God ranged across a broad theological 
compass. It opened up a number of new angles, but its scope was 
limited. Several other fascinating perspectives had to remain unexplored. 
In any case, this investigation can at best claim to be a preliminary work. 
But having reached its end, we want to draw together in this Part the 
various aspects of the study, highlight the conclusions and outline those 
areas that could not be developed, but may warrant further studies. 
Regarding the latter, four areas look particularly promising. 
First, the observation made during the discussion of man's 
creation that human musical ability may be mirroring the musicality of 
God belongs to the discipline of theological aesthetics. The same may be 
said for the reflections on the doxological and confessional aspects of 
trinitarian discourse. I related these thoughts to man's mimetic capacity 
suggesting that through this relational mechanism man is equipped to 
'mirror' (imitate) the creator. Since the discipline of theological aesthetics 
addresses the relation between divine Beauty, man's ability to apprehend 
it and translate it into life, it explores theologically the artistic and 
liturgical sphere of human existence. Until recently, Christian theology 
had no difficulty in relating one to the other. However, since the work of 
Alexander Baumgarten, a deliberate disengagement has set in that 
separated Beauty from the experience of the beautiful. The need to 
reconnect them has been recognized as an urgent task in theological 
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aesthetics.265 From the perspective of my conclusions, one could 
hypothesize that mimetic theory offers a fresh approach to this task. 
Second, my thesis was concerned in part with the (redemptive) 
unveiling of the scapegoating mechanism which holds humanity m 
bondage to mimetic violence. It also highlighted the expenence of 
freedom (pacific mimesis) through a convers1onary transformation of 
consciousness. This raises questions in social ethics at several levels. 
Since even the followers of Jesus are not immune to the contagious 
influence of mimetic rivalry and scapegoating, we must ask whether for 
the believing community the practice of an utterly non-violent ethic is 
indeed possible. But if not, what will become of the witness to the 
nature of God (as exemplified in the life of Jesus) and to a pacifically 
reconstituted humanity to which Jesus calls his followers as a sign of 
discipleship and love? For secular society - if its cultural agenda remains 
unconsciously captive to acquisitive mimesis and the reciprocal 
exclusion this engenders - there arises the question as to the source of 
its hope for peace and for liberation from violence. And, if Girard's theory 
is correct, must not this tendency of mutual expulsion intensify under 
the political pressures of multiculturalism, no matter how idealistically 
conceived? 
Third, Girard and his followers rely on an evolutionary model for 
their understanding of hominization. They posit a radical animal-human 
continuum that makes higher primates the ancestors of the human race. 
Granted, this assumption is widespread also among Christian scholars. 
21
'
5 A. Garcia-Rivera, 711c Community of the Beautiful: A Theological Aesthetics (Collegeville Min:
Liturgical Press, 1999), p. l 0 
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However, in the light of Biblical revelation we need to keep asking 
whether such a model of hominization is justifiable. Even Girard's work 
evinces the struggle. On the one hand, he proposes an evolutionary 
anthropology, on the other he calls the first Adam sinless and speaks of 
him as of a historical person without explaining how one is to move from 
one to the other.266 From my reading of the literature, the task of 
juxtaposing Biblical revelation and scientific discovery in a model of 
hominization that is acceptable to both faith and science remains still to 
be done. 
The fourth area I have singled out is more speculative. Mimesis is 
a sensitive and unconscious relational mechanism. It may be compared 
to what is known in physics as resonance. Since dynamic patterns of 
resonant relationality have been discovered in molecular and subatomic 
reality, one could ask whether the notion of mimesis might not be 
observable also in the natural sciences. In other words, are we perhaps 
dealing with a more fundamental phenomenon like a biological 
mechanism of adaptation or even with a structure located between the 
transcendent and the physical realm along the lines of Polkinghorne's 
mind-matter complementarity? 
We shall expand these sketches briefly in Chapter 8 and advance 
preliminary arguments why further studies may be indicated. In Chapter 
9 we shall summarize the findings and conclusion of our thesis. 
l<,i, R. Girard, 711i11gs Hidden since the Foundation of the World: Research Undertaken in Collaboration
with .lea11-Michel Oughourlian and Guy Lefort (Stanford, Cal: Stanford University Press, 1987 p. 223 
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CHAPTER 8 UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FURTHER STUDIES 
8.1 Pacific Mimesis and Theological Aesthetics 
The overall thrust of my thesis was to show that there is more to 
the concept mimesis than rivalistic differentiation. This 'more' is already 
implicitly present in the thoroughly Girardian notion of pacific mimesis. 
In my discussion of the language of trinitarian confession, pacific 
mimesis was perceived as the ability to apprehend divine Beauty and 
with this designation pointed in the direction of theological aesthetics. 
Its central question is how divine Beauty is perceived at the 
human level and how this perception is transposed into the experience of 
the beautiful. If, as Jenson has implied, the apprehension of Beauty 
belongs indeed to the core of man's transcendental unity and mimesis is 
the human capacity not just for appropriating it, but for its actualization 
in life, another question needs to be asked. How are these related to each 
other and to the human experience of the beautiful? 
An Old Testament example shall illustrate the point. When God 
revealed to Moses the design of the tabernacle, Moses received a 
'heavenly pattern'. It included the layout of the tent of meeting, its 
construction as well as the exquisite beauty of its ornaments. At the 
same time, Moses understood their liturgical meaning. This 'heavenly 
pattern' had somehow crossed the ontological chasm between the 
Creator and the creature such that divine Beauty took up residence on 
the creature's side of the divide. Foreshadowing the incarnation, invisible 
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Beauty was made visible in the layout and the furniture of God's earthly 
dwelling, in columns and curtains, in vestments and wash basins. 
Christian tradition has never been unsure of the origin of Beauty. 
The perfection of God was its locus and since it had appeared to man in 
the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, faith perceived the 
drama of salvation as perfection's most glorious manifestation. 
For centuries theologians never questioned the capacity of finite 
man to be touched by infinite Beauty until one hundred and fifty years 
ago when Baumgarten treated it as a problematic.267 A gradual
disengagement of Beauty and the experience of the beautiful followed 
and this process Garcia-Rivera suggests has come to its peak in our day. 
He writes: 
We have lost confidence, perhaps belief, in the human capacity to know 
and love God as Beauty. Thus while some still believe in God as the 
source of Beauty, and many, that the beautiful may be experienced, few 
are willing to say that these are connected in a profound and organic 
way_,,2<,x 
According to Garcia-Rivera the theological consequences of this 
loss are far reaching. Not only is the believing community severely 
enfeebled in its ability to express faith and speak with conviction about 
the dignity of man, but its sacramental role in the world is 
undermined.269
By using mimetic theory as hermeneutic key I have attempted to 
show a relational continuity between the orders of creation and 
redemption. From the findings, especially from what emerged from 
reflections on Jenson's thought, one could approach the above task in 
267Garcia-Rivera, Community of the Beautiful,p.10
21'8 Ibid., 11 
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theological aesthetics also from a Girardian point of view. Its hypothesis 
would argue that the source of Beauty and the human experience of the 
beautiful are indeed organically connected possibly through man's 
mimetic capacity which in Girard's anthropology is also linked to the 
comprehension of signs. One of the conclusions of my thesis that human 
mimesis exists for doxological (and therefore for liturgical) reasons offers 
itself perhaps as a point of departure. 
8.2 Pacific Mimesis and Social Ethics 
As far as ethics go, Jesus' exemplary life is to be seen as more 
than an abstraction. By virtue of his radical immersion into the drama of 
salvation as it was played out in the politically charged ambience of first­
century Palestine, he became a personalized model of Christian ethics. 
When his message of the Kingdom was violently rejected he did not 
respond in kind but maintained to the end his non-violent position in 
order to liberate humanity from its bondage to mimetic violence. Killed 
like a scapegoat he refused to be drawn into vengeful retaliation. In his 
post-Easter appearances he returned as the forgiving victim offering 
peace to those who had at least passively sided with the perpetrators. 
The Gospels are quite clear that the new community which formed after 
the resurrection, had its eyes opened to an entirely new relationality 
based not on the murderous scapegoat mechanism but on forgiveness 
and non-violence as the outworking of the Kingdom of God on earth. 
2
''') Ibid. 
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This transformation was the result of a radical change of consciousness 
through conversion. 
Is therefore the non-violent model of Jesus ethically normative for 
his followers and thus for the Christian community? Some have argued 
that his radical commitment to non-violence is unrepeatable. To elevate 
his model to an ethical absolute would simply overtax human capacity. 
Therefore, a Christian ethic must take into account human weakness in 
a world where horrifying, even fascinating powers shape human 
culture.270 Others have recognized the ambiguous nature of even 
sanctioned violence like military service from a Christian point of view. 
Tom Frame wrote: 
Christians who engage in military service find they wield a two-edged or 
delphic sword. When one edge is used to cut down those who practice 
evil and promote injustice, the other cuts across the teaching of Jesus 
into moral conscience. 211 
Again others - at great personal cost - have genuinely attempted 
to put Jesus' non-violent ethic into practice (e.g. the martyrs, the Ana­
Baptists during the 16th century and the Mennonite community in more 
recent times) only to discover that the unveiling of violence as the 
foundation of culture cannot yet abide in our world. 
In our day the call for a non-violent Christian ethic is heard with 
renewed urgency. Among the Girardian writers, Bailie has called for a 
total renunciation of violence. Previously John Yoder and Jacques Ellul 
have made Christian pacific radicalism a fundamental plank of their 
theology. After all, the New Testament speaks very clearly of the 
270 W. Palaver und W. Guggenberger, "Pluralismus - Ethische Grundintuition - Kirche," Zeitschriftfuer
Katlwlische Theologie no. 120 ( 1998) accessed via http://theol.uibk.ac.at/artikel.18/html 
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redemptive and pacific reconstitution of humanity as one corporate 
person in Christ (Eph 2: 11-22) making the outworking of Jesus' social 
ethic and his non-violent political strategy a central concern for the 
believing community. 
The world too longs for peace and for an absence of violence, yet it 
cannot escape the double-bind. It must rely for its survival and its 
external order on the mechanisms of rivalry and exclusion (and does so 
with varying degrees of sophistication). Consequently its social ethic will 
always contain certain elements of force, coercion and victimization. But 
where shall society place its hope for peace and freedom from violence if 
it needs the pharmacon of violence as a culture maintaining mechanism, 
which through its very presence blinds it to the thrall of its contagious 
and intoxicating power? What then does this dynamism mean for a 
society like ours wedded to an almost utopian conception of cultural 
pluralism situated in a world that seems to drift towards almost 
uncontrollable violence? In my view, these questions are worthy of 
further exploration. Such a study would bring into play mimetic theory, 
a political theology of non-violence (i.e. the theology of hope) in critical 
dialogue with the contemporary ideology of multiculturalism. 
8.3 Hominization 
In the context of this investigation, we noted that both Bailie and 
Alison subscribe to a model of hominization where humans evolved from 
higher primates as the mimetic powers of our proto-human ancestors 
rn T. Frame, "Wielding the Delphic Sword: Reconciling Christianity and Military Service" (MTh Thesis, 
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outdistanced their instinctive controls. Having explored the link between 
mimetic anthropology and a theology of relatedness, I believe the issue of 
hominization needs further development beginning with the question 
whether from a Christian point of view the thesis of these writers 1s 
supportable. To clarify my point, let me briefly outline the argument. 
Evolution, once a scientific theory, has become a symbol of a way 
of looking at life. It is a worldview which most people consider to be in 
accord with reality. It enjoys broad-based cultural backing. This 
dominance has little to do with science. Secularized culture uses 
evolution to shape its view of reality in non-theistic ways and 
evolutionary apologists like Stephen J. Gould, Richard Dawkins and 
Francisco J. Ayala among many others make sure that this atheistic 
agenda is brought before the widest possible public. Given their media 
presentations and popular writings the impression is unavoidable that 
their objective is to shift public consciousness more and more towards 
their own materialistic-evolutionary world-view. Today, evolution 
functions as a culture shaping mythology 272 or as Haering puts it, it has 
become the "megatheory of Western thought". 273
As a Christian I believe that there is a personal, triune God who is 
Love, who creates, brings forth life and sustains it by giving himself 
kenotically to his creation. While the creation account in Genesis has 
more to do with the outcome of the creation process and with 
relationships than with the process of creation itself, one cannot entirely 
Canberra: St Mark's College, 1993), p. 226 
m If we apply mimetic theory to evolution as a culture constituting mechanism, it works like a pagan 
religious system with its own scapegoat mechanism that victimizes those who do not abide by its rituals 
and prohibitions. 
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overlook the problematic of process in the context of an anthropology 
that affirms man's creation in God's image. The question whether God in 
a semi-deistic way created matter with such a nature that eventually life 
of various kinds including human life would emerge, or whether we are 
dealing with a special creation seems to me highly significant.274
According to Christian revelation, God acted specifically m the 
unthinkable drama of salvation (incarnation, resurrection). If we are 
faithful to this revelation, we must ask what would have prevented God 
from doing also a special work at the point of hominization?275
By raising this question I am not thinking of the tenets of Creation 
Science276 or of the 'God of the gaps', but more broadly of the sub­
hypotheses of the evolutionary theory. The grand evolutionary program 
rests on four planks or sub-systems generally known as the 'big bang', 
the 'progression of life', 'common ancestry', and life's 'materialistic 
origin'. While the popular mind makes no distinction between them, they 
belong not only to quite different scientific disciplines, but also their 
evidentiary backing varies considerably. For instance, while there seems 
to be a good deal of evidence available in support of the first and the 
second sub-system, actual knowledge about the third is rather sparse, 
and for the fourth it is literally non-existent. If one adds to this the fact 
273 H. Haering, "The Theory of Evolution as a Megatheory of Western Thought," Concilium no. I (2000):
23-33.
rn I am not thinking here so much of a miraculous insertion of a new creature into an existing ecosystem as
of a special work of God within the vast continuities of the cosmic creation in which the Creator is
rersonally involved by endowing this creature with those capacities that make humans human.
-
75 Even Girard's own words may be taken to point in the direction of our question. He believes on the one 
hand in the Virgin Birth of Christ as a special work of God (incarnation) and also that "the first Adam was 
himself without sin ... "(human creation). Assuming his use of Biblical language is deliberate, these words 
like a code will lead the reader to the understanding that Girard also sees in the human creation more than a 
chance-driven biological event [Girard, Things Hidden, p. 220-223]. 
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that reputable scholars have begun to challenge some of evolution's 
cherished assumptions on the grounds of probability, one can 
sympathize with Platinga's view that the odds are against the idea of 
evolution in the materialistic random selection sense of the term.277 For
instance, Denton and others have written about the unparalleled 
complexity and adaptive design (even in a single cell) pointing to them as 
a continuing source of skepticism that this could have been achieved by 
pure chance.278 Moreover, twentieth century physics may allow for a
theistic interpretation that has so far gone unnoticed. The Russian 
mathematician Andrej Grib who bases his view on quantum logic, has 
been critical of the notion of a 'self-organizing universe'. According to 
Grib, without an external observer (creator) "there is no actual event in 
reality but only the objectively existing potentialities of the quantum 
logical reality" (Grib's emphasis). Such a universe could not have 
developed by chance.279 We shall refer again to the 'observer dependence' 
of the universe in the last section. 
Admittedly these issues are very complex. However, I believe a 
deeper understanding is needed from a theistic point of view so that the 
rn, While I disagree with their methodology and conclusions, I am not ashamed to confess that I am 
spiritually much closer to them than to apologists of an atheistic evolutionary ideology like Dawkins and 
Gould. 
m Cf. A. Platinga, "Evolution, Neutrality and Antecedent Probability: Reply to Van Till and McMullen," 
C/1ristia11 Scholars Review XXI, no. 1 (1991): 80-109. For instance, he makes the point that nearly all 
species appear for the first time fully developed with few transitional links to ancestral forms. Further, as 
Denton has shown, there are no explanations how such complex systems like eyes, brains, and wings 
developed by the mechanism of natural selection [see M. Denton, Evolution: A theOIJ' in Crisis (Bethesda: 
Alder & Alder, 1985), p. 188- I 90]. Davies has argued a similar point when he says that paleontologists 
cannot explain the sudden appearance of the complex visual system of trilobites. No life form prior to the 
trilobites possessed even a rudimentary eye, let alone a complex one [J. J. Davies, "Is "Progressive 
Creation" Still a Helpful Concept," Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith no. 50 (I 998): 250-267]. 
rn Cf. M. Denton, Evolution: A theo,y in Crisis (Bethesda: Alder & Alder, I 985); we note that Denton 
cannot be accused of special pleading for he is not a theist. See also M. J. Behe, Darwin's Black Box: The
!Jiochemical Challenge to Evolution (New York: Touchstone, 1996). 
27'1 A. A. Grib, "Quantum Cosmology, the Role of the Observer, Quantum Logic," in Quantum Cosmology
and the Laws of Nature, ed. J. Russell, Nancey Murphy, C. S. Isham, (Berkley and Vatican State: CTNS 
and Vatican Observatory, 1999), 165-184. 
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Christian community has a basis for thinking about them in the light of 
Christian faith. Since the evolutionary model (as a world view) is by no 
means religiously neutral, it seems important that as Christians we do 
not accept uncritically an epistemology which at its core denies a theistic 
and spiritual view of reality. We must not for the sake of consistency 
with a scientific theory (the evolutionary model) no matter how plausible 
it may be at the epistemological level, forfeit the possibility of an 
ontological discontinuity between animal and human existence to which 
the Christian revelation clearly points. 
No doubt, as children of this age our knowledge about human life 
and about the universe has increased enormously, which challenges 
theology to enlarge our understanding of the creator also. To achieve 
this, we must bring our theology and our science constantly into 
dialogue with the aim to develop new models that are acceptable to both 
faith and science.280 Since the Bible points to an ontological difference 
between animals and humans281 and millions of Christians kneel in 
reverence at the words "incamatus esf', I question whether an animal­
human continuum is a model of hominization acceptable to Christian 
faith. And if not, how should we think of human beings as creatures in 
the light of Biblical assertion and scientific discovery? 
"x11 For instance such a model would need to integrate the findings of Biomusic, one of latest and exciting 
new disciplines that explores the role of music in all living things. Research into the songs of birds and of 
humpback whales has shown that their music "converges on the same acoustic and aesthetic choices and 
abides by the same laws of song composition as those preferred by human musicians and human ears", 
wrote N. Angier in a NY Times Article of Jan. 9, 2001 [N. Angier, "Sonata for Humans, Birds and 
I lumpback Whales" 200 I]. 
281 Not only by virtue of a separate creation, but also by virtue of his sinfulness is man distinct from 
animals. Conversely, no animal dies in the prospect of being judged and potentially excluded from the 
source of life. Further, is it not this perceived ontological difference that lies at the root of the current 
debate on human cloning? 
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In my view, any dialogue between theology and science must take 
the Biblical data as seriously as the data of science by making use of the 
best hermeneutical tools available. Girard's theory is certainly one of 
them. While its interpretive power has definitely opened new windows for 
our understanding of the Biblical texts, its anthropology, however, 
presupposes a model of hominization that may be incompatible with 
Christian faith. A theme closely related to hominization, viz. individual 
human uniqueness, for which Girardian anthropology does not offer an 
immediately obvious explanation, would likewise benefit from further 
study. 
8. 4 Mimesis: Interface between Mind and Matter? 
The first inkling that mimesis may be more deeply embedded in 
the structure of existence surfaced when I detected allusions to mimetic 
patterns in what neuroscientists seemed to be saying about the 
possibility that the human brain might be the meeting point between the 
physical and the transcendent.282 Additional hints came from the work of 
W. Wildman and L. Brothers who have attempted to develop a model
describing the relation between experiences of ultimacy and neurological 
phenomena. 
When a particular pattern impinges on another set of neurons it 
becomes a 'sign' to be interpreted. The action of the second set of 
neurons, in response to the original pattern, is the 'interpretant'. This 
action in turn becomes a sign and so forth, until the interpretant arises 
282 See Section 2.3 n. 58 
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at the level of somatic effectors - for example, as movements of muscles. 
Once again, muscular movements become signs.283
At the human brain level then, such 'signs' are relayed to sensory 
areas and interpreted into actions so that sign-producing neural events 
and sign-interpreting social events exist together "as a single continuous 
flux of signs" .284 While the authors do not explain the causes of such
experiences, their semiotic model sees them as "rich and deep forms of 
engagement with reality" and vice versa.285
At the neurological level we find of course no thematization yet as 
to what is being signified. But the issue of signification may be left to one 
side at this stage, since the relevance for our point comes simply from 
the semiotic terminology employed by the authors, which seems to hint 
at mimesis.2sG 
Looking farther afield, I detected similar allusions in other 
disciplines. For instance, the unpredictability of the "exquisitely sensitive 
physical systems"287 of the subatomic world is perceived as an aspect of
an interface between a bottom-up and a top-down pattern-forming 
reality. I am leaning here on Polkinghorne's "complementary 
metaphysics" of mind and matter akin to the wave and particle 
complementarity known in the physics of light. Such complementarity 
would allow participative behavior to occur at either of its two poles, the 
281 W. Wildman & L. Brothers, "A Neuropsychological-Semiotic Model of Religious Experiences," in
Ne11rosciece.1· and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, eds. by R. Russel, M. Nancy et al. 
, (Vatican State: Vatican Observatory Publications, 1999), 347-416, p. 403-4 
181 Ibid., 403-4 
285 Ibid., 407 
28r, In mimetic theory the first 'thought' occurred when the (appropriative) gesture was transformed into a
sign, i.e. Girard's "first non-instinctual attention". Gans by contrast defines 'thinking' as a "deconstructive 
search for the original and ultimately originary components that underlie the idea/image" [ cf. E. Gans, 
Signs r!f'l'araclox, 97] 
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mental and the material. He writes, "we cannot avoid arriving at a new 
view of matter, which sees it as manifesting mental, personal and 
spiritual activities" .288 Dyson makes a similar point when he says: "the 
architecture of the universe is consistent with the hypothesis that mind 
plays an essential role in its functioning".289
Mimesis is by definition a pattern-forming structure energized by 
mediated desire. Could it be that it functions at more fundamental levels 
in the universe as a kind of synaptic gap or fluid transmission between 
the transcendent mind and the immanent material manifestation? Is 
mimesis perhaps the place where the mental agency (desire) at the 
higher level becomes physically enacted through resonance m the 
indeterminacy at the lower level through which new patterns and an 
open future are influenced? 
As scientists now perceive it, the world of classical physics is an 
"artifact of the quantum world" .290 I am asking whether mimesis might 
be the space where the 'artifact' is actualized so that the mimetic 
structure exists as a kind of ontological opportunity of sub-atomic 
matter? I am not thinking of a causal force at work or of an 
interventionist "push" from beyond, but of something that takes place in 
a dynamic yet non-energetic mode like an 'imitative realization of 
potential'. Apparently, such phenomena are not totally unknown. For 
instance, molecular biology has observed an adaptive mechanism in DNA 
287 J. Polkinghorne, Science and Providence: God's Interaction with the World (London: SPCK, 1989), p.
61 
288 Ibid., 25-26 
2x·i r. Dyson, Disturbing the Universe (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), p. 251 cited in T. Peters ,
Science and Theology (Boulder Col: Westview Press, 1998), p. 51 
2'Jll R. J. Russell, "Does the "God Who Acts" Really Act in Nature?" in Ted Peter (ed) Science and 
Theology (Boulder, Col: Westview Press, 1998), 77-102, p. 87 
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molecules that realizes specific genetic advantages through 
"amplification by replication" .291 To quote Russell: 
If nature is open to alternative possibilities, and the actual direction is 
not determined by nature alone, then the course of divine action working 
with nature is a kind of ... actualization of potencies.292
In a discussion of quantum logic in relation to the creation of the 
universe, Grib goes even further. He makes the explicit assumption of 
the existence of an observer who makes measurements of the quantum 
universe.293 This assumption lS not based on theological
presuppositions, but is derived from the features of quantum mechanics 
themselves, namely indeterminism, complementarity, the role of the 
observer and the collapse of the wave packet. These concepts not just 
imply the presence of consciousness, but of a consciousness whose logic 
differs structurally from ours, because "quantum logic is not isomorphic 
with Boolean logic" _294 This means that the universe may be seen as the 
projection of a non-Boolean structure onto a Boolean one. In order to 
grasp this non-Boolean world, "a human observer must project the 
structure of the universe onto his or her mind and this projection causes 
the collapse of the wave function."295 Consequently the universe we see
and in which we live is a "participative universe", says Grib (following 
2'11 Ibid., 91 
2n Ibid., 98 n. 20.
n., It must be noted that Grib does not intend to identify God with the ultimate observer in quantum 
mechanics. He simply seeks to say that scientifically speaking it is not impossible that God created the 
universe, nor impossible for humans through original sin to spoil it and that the resurrection cannot be 
ruled out either [A. A. Grib, "Quantum Cosmology, the Role of the Observer, Quantum Logic," in 
Quantum Cosmology and the Laws of Nature, ed. R. J. Russell, Nancey Murphy, C.J. Isham, (Berkley and 
Vatican State: CTNS and Vatican Observatory, 1999), 165- I 84, p. 167-8]. 
2'1·1 Ibid., 165-184 
2'1' A. A. Grib, "Quantum Cosmology, the Role of the Observer, Quantum Logic," in Quantum Cosmology 
and the Lall's <!l Nature, eds. by R. J. Russell, Nancey Murphy, C.J. Isham, (Berkley and Vatican State:
CTNS and Vatican Observatory, 1999), I 65-184, p. 167. 
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Wheeler), for through our consc10usness we participate m constructing 
it: 
The universe we see is the result of the projection of Ultimate 
Consciousness on human consciousness, and our consciousness is 
responsible for some features of this universe.296
In other words, to bring about the new, God works not by 
changing or manipulating objects or processes, but with and within
creation at the most fundamental level, 297 even using human beings as 
"created co-creators" as Hefner has suggested.298
What we have said so far presupposes the existence of a 'live', yet 
indeterminate (chaotic) interface between the material and the 
transcendent realm. On the basis of this study, it is perhaps not too far­
fetched to say that mimesis - as a pattern-forming structure of 
participation and mutuality - might offer hitherto unknown avenues of 
explanation. At the same time it might allow us to expand our hypothesis 
about the existence of a profound link between human mimesis and the 
image of God in man and relate it to the inner structure of the universe. 
I may be criticized for having too frequently and too simplistically 
equated resonance with Girardian mimesis and by doing so to have 
flattened the Girardian triangle of the mimetic structure. This is not the 
place to discuss whether or not the integrity of Girard's theory is 
preserved in every detail in this study or in the above suggestion. While 
any serious study along these lines would have to take this issue into 
2
')(, !\. !\. Grib, "Quantum Cosmology, the Role of the Observer, Quantum Logic," in Quantum Cosmology 
ancl the Laws of Nature, eds. R. J. Russell, Nancey Murphy, C.J. Isham, (Berkley and Vatican State: CTNS 
and Vatican Observatory, 1999), 165-184, p. 167. 
m Perhaps one could think of it as the Marian Principle of creation, whereby God's creation resonates with 
the same collaborative response: "Behold, I am the hand maid of the Lord. Be it to me according to your 
word" (Luke I :38). 
2'/X I 1· '/ / I e ner, 7 ie / 11111c111 Factor, 23-54 
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account, it seems to me that such a cross-disciplinary proposal may be 
worthy of further exploration; a place of risk, pitfalls and blind alleys, 
perhaps, but also a new frontier potentially. 
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CHAPTER 9 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
This study began with the question what consonance might exist 
between Girard's mimetic theory and man's creation in the image and 
likeness of God. To answer it, we formulated the hypothesis that human 
mimesis is a creation gift from God to his creature and that mimesis is 
therefore both constitutive of what it means to be human and 
inseparable from man's response to God. Testing this thesis meant 
collecting theological evidence for the center of Girard's anthropology, 
viz. the phenomenon of human mimesis. We pursued this goal in two 
steps. In the first, we expanded our understanding of mimetic theory in 
relation to the hypothesis by exploring the work of recognized Girardian 
interpreters. In the second we searched for mimetic clues in three places 
outside the Girardian School, namely in the Genesis Prologue, in modern 
Trinitarian thought and in the life of Jesus. The findings and conclusions 
of this study are presented below. 
According to Girard's theory, the self-understanding of a culture 
and the significance of its concepts are derived from its mythological 
base. The strongest influence falls to its symbols and religious images 
embedded in the stories of a culture's origins. Apart from offering 
cohesion and identity they explain the numinous and uphold a prototype 
for imitation. Further, a culture derives its mystifying power from its 
mythological ties to sacred violence or the scapegoat mechanism, for 
which the demythologizing influence of the gospel is the only cure. 
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Based on Bailie's understanding of mimetic theory we were able to 
show that mimesis, revelation and worship are profoundly connected. 
Under the influence of sin, however, humanity is now locked into a false 
transcendence that chains man's hunger for imitation to religious 
violence, the fiercest and most enthralling form of mimetic desire. If 
human mimesis is to resonate with the will of God, a transformation or 
conversion is required that delivers human consciousness from the 
delusion about the efficacy of violence as a peacemaker, which, we 
concluded, is achieved through the epistemological role of the victim. 
We explored the dynamic of this transformation through the eyes 
of Sch wager's "dramatic theology". God in Christ was so identified with 
human beings that he became their sin's victim and experienced in his 
own person its destructive power. Jesus tasted death not because the 
justice of the Father demanded the execution of the Son, but because he 
voluntarily embraced and exhausted in that embrace the universal 
victimhood of human sin. Now God's self-communication may come to 
man through the image of the victim (the focal point of the 'old order' 
founded on sacred violence) so that through this familiar symbol man 
may be 'infiltrated' with the true image of God. Under the prompting 
influence of the Spirit man's inner being may thus be reconciled with 
God. It involves a mimetic act that constitutes the actualization of man's 
original responsibility to respond in pacific and loving imitation to the 
Father, which is the very imitation of the Son in his surrender to the 
Father's self-communication. Transformed (converted) man thus receives 
a new identity rooted in Christ's identification with him as well as in the 
reality of sonship. Man now seeks to become like Christ by appropriating 
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his life so that Christ becomes man's model as well as his mimetic center 
enabling him to actualize his new identity in history. 
Evidence from Alison's work further supported our argument. 
Humans were created to relate to God and to each other by peaceful 
imitation. But this non-violent relationality which God intended humans 
to have from the beginning was not accessible in acquisitive mode. They 
may posses it only by resonating with the love of God through radical 
self-surrender. Therefore, human mimesis may be seen as the relational 
structure and the dynamism of response by which such 'resonance' is 
achieved. Since humanity is 'fallen', it is captive to a death-dealing 
mimetic consciousness that has its origin in distorted desire. Yet, there 
is hope; for the revelatory impact of Christ's radical self-giving in the 
teeth of human rivalistic violence is capable of inserting into man's 
consciousness the knowledge of the absolute deathlessness of God as 
man's new "intelligence". It in turn subverts the distortion of the image of 
God as man's ultimate (vengeful) rival. This shift in consciousness allows 
humans to see with 'new eyes', namely the eyes of the crucified and risen 
victim. Since man now accepts and replicates the self-offering of the 
Other, a new possibility for peaceful mimesis opens up for him out of 
which a new sociality is born. It emerges as the ecclesial community 
whose (new) order exists side by side with the old as an eschatological 
testimony that the latter is going out of existence. 
A review of the works of Bailie, Schwager and Alison allowed us to 
draw some provisional conclusions. God had laid into the cradle of 
humanity the potential for pacific mimesis that man might exist as God's 
image and likeness. Man's fall into sin had fixated human desire in 
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'acquisitive mode' which brought with it rivalry and murder. Through the 
scapegoat mechanism (the victimage of sacred violence) the perception of 
God was distorted by making him a God of violence and vengeance. 
However, through the Christ event man's acquisitive mimesis may be 
radically altered so that man may be released from his bondage to a 
death-dealing consciousness and enter into his potential for pacific 
mimesis. The evidence behind this summation strongly supported our 
hypothesis that mimetic anthropology stands on profound theological 
foundations. 
To strengthen our conclusion we sought to bring to bear 
arguments that did not originate from within the School of Girard. At the 
same time we were conscious that objectivity would elude us as long as 
we kept using Girard's conceptual apparatus. In other words, the theory­
laden character of our observations would remain, as the data we 
gathered would continue to be refracted by the Girardian lens. 
Reflecting on God's inaugural movements in creation, we noted the 
immediate correspondence between God's desire (word, speech) and the 
emerging creation. This responsiveness we said followed an intrinsic 
order of regularity and purposeness. This responsiveness we perceived as 
a form of 'imitation' and its ordering principle (logos) fulfilled a similar 
function when transposed to the human level as wisdom. It was to align 
human desire with God's order by evoking a free response that emulated 
the response of the material universe. Furthermore, through the work 
mandate man was called and apprenticed 'to do what God does' and we 
concluded that man at his level was to replicate God's work of creating 
and maintaining. Man thereby followed the pattern God was laying out 
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for him including the seven-day structure of creation week. Such a 
correspondence between God's work and man's, we reasoned, was given 
so that man might imitate God in functional terms as partner and co­
creator. It implied a relationship of intense mutual participation. Man 
was to follow after God as his model. Since God inspired this relationship 
with the aim of drawing man deeper into the divine life, we concluded 
that man's entire existence was to be lived out of a God-centered ecstasy 
in mimetically conditioned participation. 
A survey of the imago exegesis showed that its contemporary 
reading was compatible with the above conclusions. As a species, man 
was created as God's counterpart and given the privileged 'iconic' 
position that was to be relational and mediatorial within the created 
order. In this role, human functionality was to be derived entirely from 
the relationship with the creator. Consequently, man's 'portrait' of God 
had to be consistent with the divine character, mirroring and replicating 
the divine life in creaturely existence. The necessary adaptation to the 
divine character was to be accomplished through the covenant in 
mimetic appropriation of the divine Being. Based on this interpretation 
we argued that the phenomenon of human mimesis was indeed rooted in 
God's original intent for man as the image of God. To be sure, man was 
to desire God and his ways for the sake of the Creator. At the same time 
such desiring was the only path to fulfilling man's role of giving tangible 
expression to 'who God is' through his free, mimetic participation in the 
divine life. 
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By tracing mimetic allusions in trinitarian thought we not only 
expanded the horizon of our inquiry, but also added more weight to our 
argument. Trinitarian doxology proved to be a fertile context. Here we 
saw, particularly in Jenson, that human mimesis may be associated with 
man's transcendental openness for the apprehension of liturgical 
patterns and divine beauty, and thus with man's capacity for worship. 
Thompson noted that in worship we imitate Christ, the true worshiper 
and for Moltmann doxology is "responsive theology". We saw in these 
references further confirmation for the intuition that human m1mes1s 
exists as a structure of resonance between God's love and human 
ecstatic response. In other words, the phenomenon of human mimesis 
exists for doxological reasons. When we examined the relationship 
between the economic and the immanent Trinity, we found further traces 
of the same idea. For instance, when modern theologians describe the 
inner trinitarian life, they employ concepts and language that reflect an 
intense relationality of mutual participation in the triangular desire of 
self-giving love thus alluding to the notion of pacific mimesis. This 
feature was particularly apparent in the work of Moltmann and 
Pannenberg. 
Lastly, we examined the life of Jesus for the presence of mimesis. 
We noted its pattern and paradox throughout his ministry but it 
surfaced most notably in his temptation experiences. The key to Jesus' 
faithfulness to the Father's will lay not so much in the strength of his 
will-power but in the practice of a higher order mimesis based on an 
absolute yielding to the Father's desire. Even under the extremity of the 
cross, Jesus demonstrated that his mimesis was free of jealousy and 
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resentment. Through this utterly pacific imitation of the Father's love he 
released the fullest possible representation of God's will in a human life. 
* * * 
Girard's theory is an attempt to enlarge the anthropological 
element without reference to theology. Assuming his theory is valid, it 
has significant implications for our reading of the Biblical text. It will 
lead inevitably to a desacralization of certain themes and of phenomena 
that have traditionally been associated with the supernatural. Needless 
to add that his approach may be misunderstood for it may be seen as a 
substitution of anthropology for theology. However, Girard is at pains to 
assure his readers that just the opposite is the case.299
In the pursuit of this study we have done something which Girard 
for reasons of his methodology has strictly avoided. We have deliberately 
married his anthropological concern with Christian transcendence from 
the start. We did this in an attempt to explore whether mimetic theory 
makes sense theologically if applied to the Biblical notion of the image of 
God after which the Scriptures say man is created. From our findings we 
believe to have shown at least in a preliminary way that the phenomenon 
of human mimesis is profoundly grounded in the theology of creation 
and redemption. And since human existence was conceived in 
Trinitarian Love to be its earthly counterpart, the conclusion is perhaps 
not unreasonable that human mimesis may find its ultimate origin in the 
relationality of the Trinity itself, as we have intimated in this study. 
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While Girard's theory postulates on anthropological grounds that 
human mimesis is the key to being human, the findings of this 
investigation suggest that there are also good theological reasons for the 
idea. From the angle of this study, mimesis is to be seen as the capacity 
through which man worships the Creator, appropriates his life and 
exemplifies in history the self-giving love of the triune God thereby 
fulfilling his calling as the image of God. In this sense, man's mimetic 
endowment may also be called a structure of hope. The presence of 
mimetic desire in every human being constitutes the space of an 
ontological opportunity or the possibility of an openness towards God 
and his future where the potentiality of man's destiny in Christ may be 
realized in the gracious out-working of God's redemption in history. In 
Christ we hope that ultimately man will become the perfect imitator and 
image of God when God will be all in all. Since the revelation of God in 
Christ casts an eternal vision for redeemed humanity, Christian 
anthropology is in the last analysis eschatological. "Beloved, now are we 
the children of God, and it does not yet appear what we shall be; but we 
know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him for we shall see 
him as he is". 300
* * * 
2'1'1 Sec his / see Satan Fall like lightening, p. 192 
100 I John 3: 1-3 
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